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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1941
STATISTICAL, SURVEY
PAUL HEss*

The following tables were compiled from examination of the cases
as they actually appear in the Missouri Reports, the Southwestern Reporter
(Second Series), and the Southwestern advance sheets. There is a slight
but not material, deviation from the list prepared by the clerk of court,
which may perhaps be accounted for by instances of reassignment of
opinions, of delays in announcement (carrying the case into 1942), and of
delays in publication.
The court deposed of the largest volume of litigation in a number of
years, rendering a total of 336 opinions. The number of opinions written
by the individual judges ranged from 16 to 30, by the commissioners from
10 to 41. There was one change in the personnel of the court, Commissioner
Paul Barrett succeeding Commissioner James A. Cooley, who resigned.
Judge Barrett was appointed August 26, 1941.
Table I shows the disposition of the litigation; Table II shows its character, each case having been classified in best category according to its
dominant issue (though obviously many cases involved numerous points
of diverse types).
TABLE I
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION

Appeal dismissed ...............................................................................

3

Decree affirmed ....................................................................................

9

Decree reversed ................................................................................

1

Decree reversed arid remanded --------------................------------------------

2

*Chairman, Board of Student Editors. Now serving in the United States
Army.
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Decree reversed and remanded with directions ............................

2

Judgment for respondent (quo warranto) ..................................

1

Judgment affirmed ..............................................................................

133
Judgment affirmed and defendant discharged .............................. 1
Judgment affirmed except as to one item ........................................
1
Judgment affirmed on condition of remittitur ................................
9
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded .......................................
8
Order and judgment affirmed and remanded with directions ...... 1
Judgment affirmed as to one defendant and reversed
as to other defendant ..............................................................
3
Judgment affirmed in part and cause remanded with directions.. 1
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part ...........................
1
Judgment affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded.. 1
Judgment affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded
with directions ............................................................................
3
Judgment remanded with directions ..............................................
1
Judgment reversed .........................................................................
21
Judgment reversed, and petition dismissed ...................................
1
Judgment reversed and defendant discharged .............................. 5
Judgment reversed with directions .................................................
7
Judgment reversed and remanded ..............................................
37
Judgment reversed and remanded with directions ..................... 30
Judgment quashed and petitioners discharged ........................... 1
Opinion quashed in part ...................................................................
1
Opinion and record quashed ............................................................
1
Ouster granted ..................................................................................
2
Peremptory writ issued ..................................................................
3
Petitioner remanded to custody ......................................................
2
Preliminary rule discharged ............................................................
3
Provisional rule quashed ...................................................................
1
Record quashed ................................................................................
5
Rules absolute ..................................................................................
3
Transferred to court of appeals .....................................................
15
Writ denied .......................................................................................
4
Writ made absolute .........................................................................
1
Writ quashed .....................................................................................
9
Writ quashed and opinion in part quashed ...................................
1
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS

Administrative Law .........................................................................
Agency ................................................................................................
Appeal and Error ............................................................................
Attorney and Client ..........................................................................
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Banks and Banking -----------------------------------------------------......................
4
Bills and Notes ----------------------------------------------3
Certiorari ..............................................................................................
19
Constitutional Law ..........................................................................
4
Contracts ............................................................................................
10
Corporations ------------------------------------------------2
Courts ---------------------------------------------------20
Creditors Rights ---------------------------------------------2
Criminal Law ----------------------------------------------46
Eminent Domain ---------------------------------------------3
Equity ..................................................................................................
8
Evidence --------------------------------------------------3
Gifts ......................................................................................................
3
Habeas Corpus ----------------------------------------------2
Insane Persons ----------------------------------------------1

Insurance ------------------------------------------------------------------------3

Mandamus -------------------------------------------------6
Master and Servant -------------------------------------------15
Mortgages -------------------------------------------------5
Municipal Corporations ----------------------------------------16
Negligence (automobile) ---------------------------------------16

Other Negligence -----------------------------------------------...
24

Paupers ---------------------------------------------------1
Pleading ---------------------------------------------------3
Practice and Procedure ----------------------------------------3
Prohibition ------------------------------------------------9
Quo Warranto -----------------------------------------------3
Real Property -----------------------------------------------21
Statutes ....................................................
15
Taxation --------------------------------------------------13
6
Torts (other than negligence) ------------------------------------Trusts ----------------------------------------------------4
Wills -----------------------------------------------------15
Workmen's Compensation ---------------------------------------2
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APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARNETT*

I. THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The fact that in no less than 17 cases decided in 1941, the supreme court
has found it necessary to decline jurisdiction again demonstrates the failure
of the bar and of the trial courts to appreciate the necessity for a careful
examination of the record to determine the proper appellate jurisdiction
at the time the appealis taken. Every case sent to the wrong appellate court
is, of necessity, subjected to additional delay of several months. That delay
can and should be prevented in the trial court. In 1939, the supreme court
amended its rules by requiring that appellants' briefs must contain "A
concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this court
is invoked."' The purpose of that rule is to direct the attention of appellants
to the question of appellate jurisdiction in order that the delay occasioned
by the necessity for transfer may be avoided. The year's decisions, however,
demonstrate the fact that delays of this nature can only be avoided by
having attention given to the question of appellate jurisdiction at the time
the appeal is taken.
Appeals in cases of original probate jurisdiction are still finding their
way into the wrong appellate court by reason of the failure of the record
to show affirmatively the amount actually involved. Thus, in Cox v. Main2
the question at issue was title to certain corporate stock. There was nothing
in the petition filed in the probate court indicating the value of the stock.
At the trial, testimony was offered tending to establish value but that testimony was excluded by the trial court and, consequently, did not constitute
a part of the record on appeal. Because of the failure of the record to show
affirmatively the actual amount involved, the supreme court found it necessary to transfer the case to the proper court of appeals. Again, in Smith
v. Oliver,3 where the issue was whether or not plaintiff was the adopted
son and heir of the deceased, the record showed that the appraised value
of the estate was more than $12,000.00 but there was a total failure of proof
as to the amount of the allowed and unallowed demands, expenses of
administration or other possible deductions from the appraised value, to
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. Supreme Court Rule 15.
2.

146 S. W. (2d) 597 (Mo. 1941).

3. 148 S. W. (2d) 795 (Mo. 1941).
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the payment of which the distributive share of the estate would be subject.
Pointing to the fact that "'the amount in dispute' not the appraised value
of the estate, must exceed $7500.00 to vest appellate jurisdiction .. ." in the

supreme court, the court again reiterates the rule that general appellate
jurisdiction is in the courts of appeal and not in the supreme court and that,
before the supreme court can take jurisdiction, the record must affirmatively
establish beyond conjecture that it does have jurisdiction. This case, also,
was transferred to the proper court of appeals.
In Hamilton v,Robinson,4 an action to construe the trust provisions
of a will, the court, although the parties did not raise the question of jurisdiction, found it necessary to transfer the case to the court of appeals because the only question at issue was the question of right to immediate
possession, management and control of the corpus of a trust estate valued
at $37,000.00. The court states:
"The record is totally barren of any evidence as to the
pecuniary value of these rights to either the respondent trustee or
to the appellant. There is no basis whatever in the record for
estimating or determining such value."
Likewise, in Frank Scltmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller,5 an action
against a trade union to restrain a boycott of plaintiff's business, transfer
to the court of appeals was necessary because of the failure of the record
to contain an affirmative showing of the money value of the relief sought.
The court points to the well established rule that where jurisdiction is
invoked on the basis of the amount in dispute and a money judgment is
not sought "then such amount must be determined by the money value
of the relief to plaintiff, or of the loss to defendant, should the relief be
granted. . .

."

In that case the evidence showed that the yearly volume

of appellant's business was $40,000.00 and that appellant lost 50 per cent
of its annual receipts or $20,000.00 because of the boycott. It was contended, therefore, that the value of the relief sought was $20,000.00 but
the court said:
"To adopt this argument we would be required to say that
the money value of the right of a company to carry on its business
is equal to the amount of its annual gross sales ....

The right to

pursue a lawful business while entitled to the protection of the law
as a property right is an intangible thing. In determining its value,
the volume of gfbss receipts, no doubt, is a contributing factor but
4. 146 S. W. (2d) 601 (Mo. 1941).
5. 347 Mo. 466, 147 S. W. (2d) 670 (1941).
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it cannot be the sole factor.... The value certainly cannot be set
arbitrarily at the amount of the sales.
"The record does not affirmatively show that appellant's business was carried on at a profit or that the loss of such sales
caused a loss of profits. A proper consideration in arriving at the
value of the relief sought would be the loss of the profits reasonably
expected from these sales."
Because there was no affirmative showing in the record of the money
value of the relief sought the court transferred the case to the proper court
of appeals.
In five cases sent to the supreme court on the theory that title to real
estate was involved, the court found it necessary to decline jurisdiction because, in those cases, title was not directly involved within the meaning of
the constitutional provision vesting jurisdiction in the supreme court in
cases involving title to realty.
In Wood v. Gregory," an action in ejectment, the answer set up the
defense of estoppel and prayed a determination of title, but the court, in
transferring the case to the court of appeals, points to the established law
that the constitutional provision:
"applies only to cases in which title to land is the subject of
the controversy and in which the judgment will operate directly
upon the title and determine title in some measure adversely to one
litigant and in favor of another, or take title from one and give it
to another."
The court further held that the prayer of the answer for a determination of the title was not controlling, especially where--"the prayer
is not warranted by or consistent with the facts stated in the pleading,"
The judgment did no more than determine the right to possession and did
not determine title; and the defendant, on the appeal, did not complain
of the failure to determine title but only complained of the failure of the
court to recognize him as a licensee of the premises in question.
In Hinkle v. Wood, 7 another action in ejectment, defendant pleaded
title in himself and asked the court to declare his title. The judgment was
in favor of defendant but did not award title. Plaintiffs appealed, but
defendants did not. Because the appeal was that of plaintiff, whose claim
was only one for possession, and because the defendant, satisfied with the
judgment, did not appeal from the failure of the court to award title, the
6. 155 S. W. (2d) 168 (Mo. 1941.
7. 155 S. W. (2d) 191 (Mo. 1941).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1
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supreme court held that no question of title to real estate is involved and
that the court is without appellate jurisdiction.
In Burch v. Horn,8 a partition suit, the judgment appealed from ordered
the property sold, determined the fractional interests of the parties and
charged certain indebtedness against certain interests. The supreme court
declined jurisdiction, stating:
"To give this court jurisdiction on the ground that title to real
estate is involved, the title must be in dispute, that is, there must be
a title controversy to be settled . . . the judgment must directly
affect or operate upon the title itself . . . and the judgment must
determine title in some measure adversely to one litigant and in
favor of another or take title from one party and give it to another."
Likewise, in Leach v. Armstrong,9 the court declined jurisdiction of
an appeal in a partition suit where the only question involved was whether
or not certain money deductions should be made from the interests of the
parties in the lands sought to be partitioned.
In Thompson v. Thompson,'0 the court, of its own motion, declined
appellate jurisdiction of an action in equity to set aside a lease claimed to
be fraudulent. The court states:
"This appeal, no doubt, was sent here on the theory that title
to real estate was involved, but from the pleadings, the evidence,
the decree, and the briefs of the parties, it appears that appellant
claims under a lease, which, in consideration of $1 and the performance of certain covenants contained in the lease, gave-her the right
of possession of the premises during her lifetime. Appellant is
interested in the decree, appealed from, only to the extent that her
lease was cancelled thereby ....
Title to real estate is not directly
involved on this appeal so as to give this court jurisdiction."
Out of seven cases sent to the supreme court on the theory that the appeals involved constitutional questions, only one remained there and that was
a case where the trial court had allowed the appeal originally to the court
of appeals and that court had transferred the appeal to the supreme court.
In that case, Fisk v. Wellsville Fire Brick Co.," the appeal involved an
Illinois judgment which defendant contended was void because it had not entered its appearance in Illinois and was not legally served with process in the

8.
9.
10.
11.

152
149
149
348

S. W. (2d) 88 (Mo. 1941).
S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1941).
S. W. (2d) 867 (Mo. 1941).
Mo. 73, 152 S. W. (2d) 113 (1941).
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Illinois suit. In holding that the court of appeals had properly transferred
the case, to the supreme court, the court states:
"If defendant did not enter its appearance, as claimed by
plaintiff, and was not legally served with process, then to enforce
a judgment based upon such proceedings would deprive defendant of
due process under the 14th Amendment."
In Kellogg v. National Protective Insurance Company, 2 an action on
an insurance policy, it was contended that the policy should be construed and
enforced in accordance with the laws of Kansas and the appeal was taken
to the supreme court on the theory that the trial court failed to give full
faith and credit to the Kansas laws. The court, however, in declining jurisdiction, states:
"it rfmight be argued that full faith and credit clause is involved in any litigated controversy-whether a contract shall be construed and enforced under the laws of one state or another.... But
in a true sense the clause is not under construction every time a
question is raised whether it applies to any group of facts. The
meaning of the constitutional provision may not be in dispute, and
the whole controversy may turn on other rules of law determining
whether, under the evidence, the statutes of the one state or the
other do govern the contract. If it be found that statutes of the
foreign state are not controlling, then, of course, the constitutional
provision is not applicable,"
Finding that the constitutional question was not "clearly involved" the
case was transferred to the court of appeals.
Likewise, in Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen,"' an action
for disability benefits under a beneficial certificate issued by the defendant,
domiciled in Ohio, where defendant contended that it was not liable because
of certain Sections of its constitution and the trial court ruled that such
Sections were not a part of the contract, the court held that:
"The ruling of the question did not call for a construction of
the full faith and credit clause by the trial court. Likewise, a review
of that ruling on appeal does not call for a construction of said
clause."
In Superior Press Brick Company v. City of St. Louis,1" an action to
enjoin the enforcement of the provisions of a zoning ordinance, numerous
reasons for appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court were advanced but
12. 347 Mo. 553, 148 S. W. (2d) 751 (1941).
13. 147 S. W. (2d) 601 (Mo. 1941).
14. 152 S. W. (2d) 178 (Mo. 1941).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1
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all of them were held inapplicable and the case was transferred to the court
of appeals. The opinion first holds that the mere fact that the City of St.
Louis is a political subdivision of the state and a party to the suit:
"...is not alone sufficient to give us jurisdiction, unless the
appeal involves county rights or functions.... The matter involved
was directly connected with the city's corporate aspects, functions
and duties, to wit, the enforcement of a city ordinance. The
matter pertained to municipal government. No county rights or
functions were involved."
It was next contended that the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance
was involved; but the court, in denying that contention, said:
"The decree.., did not purport to hold the zoning ordinance
void, as applied to this property, but only held that the 'zoning
ordinance as construed by defendants.., by depriving plaintiffs of
the right to remove said pillars of cay... is unreasonable, arbitrary,
discriminatory and constitutes the taking of properties of plaintiffs
without just compensation and without due process of law.' In
other words, a constitutional question was not decided, the trial
court merely held that the construction placed upon the ordinance
by the defendants,... constituted the taking of property without

due process or just compensation. The ordinancewas not held void
for violation of any constitutional provision and the decree only
purported to temporarily enjoin the city...
"In order for this court to have jurisdiction of this cause on
the ground that a constitutional question if involved, it would have
been necessary for plaintiffs to have contended that the ordinance
was inherently void and totally invalid in any event, as applied to
plaintiffs' property

...

No such contention is made in this case.

In addition, no constitutional right has been decided adversely to
plaintiffs in error, and they rely on the violation of no constitutional
rights."
Finally, the court held that the jurisdictional amount was not affirmatively shown in that case because, although plaintiffs claimed that they
were deprived of the right of removal of $200,000.00 of fire clay from their
property, there was no allegation in the petition to determine the value
to plaintiff of the pecuniary relief sought or the damage to defendant should
the relief be granted, and no finding in the decree with reference to the
amount in dispute or the value of the relief. The court also held that title
to real estate was not involved because the decree does not purport to
adjudicate title nor does it decree the removal of any cloud from plaintiffs'
title.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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Riley v. Woolf Bros.,- an action for damages where the petition alleged
commion law negligence and negligence under a certain city ordinance which
defendant contended was void if it tended to apply to defendant and where,
at the close of the case it was submitted solely on common law negligence,
was transferred to the court of appeals because it did not present any constitutional question; and in Hayes v. Hayes,"6 an action to modify the
alimony and custodial provisions of a divorce decree, where it was contended
that if certain statutes of this state should be held to be applicable, plaintiffs constitutional rights would be infringed, it was held that such contentions do not raise a constitutional question so as to give the supreme
court jurisdiction and the cause was transferred to the court of appeals.
1
In State v. Arnwur Pharmacy,
7 it was held that one being prosecuted
for the violation of a statute making a misdemeanor for any person to sell
intoxicating liquor in any other place than that designated in the license,
is not entitled to question the constitutionality of an additional provision
of the statute authorizing certain officials to make rules and regulations for
the enforcement of the act and that, consequently, his appeal from a conviction under the act did not involve a constitutional question. The court
also held that the so-called constitutional question was first injected in the
case in the briefs filed in the appellate court and hence came too late. The
case was transferred to the court of appeals.

II.

FoRM OF BRIEFS AND ABsTRAcTs

In only two cases decided in the period now under review has the
supreme court found it necessary to dismiss appeals because of failure to
comply with its rules. In one, City of St. Louis v. Central Institute for the
Deaf,"8 the brief contained 23 "Assignments of Error" and 18 subdivisions
under "Points and Authorities" without a single reference to any particular
page of the 440 page record where the adverse ruling appeared. The statement of facts consisted of a chronological review of the various steps and
record entries without any statement of the ultimate facts necessary to an
understanding and determination of the errors assigned on appeal. Notwithstanding the defects in appellant's brief, he filed a motion to strike
respondent's brief for failure to comply with Rule 15, claiming that it is
15.
16.
17.
18.

149
153
152
149

S. W.
S. W.
S. W.
S. W.

(2d)
(2d)
(2d)
(2d)

864 (Mo. 1941).
1 (Mo. 1941).
67 (Mo. 1941).
790 (Mo. 1941).
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difficult to reply to said brief in an intelligent manner. The court holds
that in view of appellant's flagrant violation of the same rule it is not in a
position to complain of respondent's brief; and notwithstanding the fact that
respondent filed no motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the rule,
the court holds:
"We may not ignore such violation of a rule which has been
adopted as an aid to the prompt dispatch of the court's business.
The appeal must be dismissed for failure to comply with this rule."
It must be noted, however, that the opinion concludes that the court
has carefully read the entire record and has reached the conclusion that
there was no merit in the appeal.
In Fearsv. Newman Mercantile Company,9 a negligence action resulting in an involuntary nonsuit from which plaintiff appealed, the respondent
filed a counter abstract of the record, disclosing that appellant's abstract
had failed to set forth all of the evidence necessary to be consulted in the
disposition of the appeal. When the case was first submitted to the supreme
court (on briefs only) an opinion was written dismissing the appeal for
failure to bring up all of the evidence. Rehearing was granted but the
parties again stipulated to submit on briefs and appellant filed no new
abstract. As against appellant's contention that the omitted evidence went
only to the weight of his evidentiary case and that the abstract shows
sufficient substantial evidence to disclose the error of the trial court in sustaining peremptory instructions, the court states:
"It will not do to say that because an appellant's abstract
shows on its face he made a prima facie case, he will be exempt
from penalty.... To hold that would encourage laxity and even
distortion.
The court also held that the respondent is not required to bring up all
of the omitted evidence to show insufficiency of appellant's abstract---"because by so doing he would automatically waive the very errors of which he
complains." The court states that it is not for counsel, but for the court
to say what evidence is material and, holding that appellant, after two
opportunities, had made no effort to correct his abstract, ordered the
appeal dismissed.
In Rhodus v. Geatley,20 an action in equity, to try title, appellant's
brief assigned six errors to the general effect that the judgment below was
19. 348 Mo. 1102, 156 S. W. (2d) 909 (1941).
20. 347 Mo. 397, 147 S. W. (2d) 631 (1941).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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for the wrong party, was contrary to the evidence and the law and against
the equities in the case and that under the pleadings and the evidence the
court should have found for the plaintiff. While pointing to the rule that
mere general statements of error, either in the assignments or in the motion
for new trial are insufficient to preserve questions for appellate review, the
court, after analyzing the record and determining that the case was equitable in its nature, reached the conclusion that"Where, as here, the chancellor has made only a general finding
for one party and against the other and where the losing party
desires us to review this general decision, claiming that the chancellor has reached the wrong conclusion from the evidence and the
law, he cannot possibly make his assignments of error more specific
than those contained in the present motion. We, therefore, hold
that the assignments in the present case were proper and sufficient."
And, in Mauck v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,21
although the court looked upon appellant's Assignment of Error as to the
conduct of plaintiff's counsel as being a general assignment in the nature
of a conclusion, the court held that, because, in defendant's argument, the
record with respect to the alleged misconduct is quoted and the pages are
noted and the reasons for asserting the misconduct are developed, there
had been a substantial requirement with Rule 15, and overruled respondent's
motion to dismiss the appeal.
In Peterson v. City of St. Joseph,22 the short form transcript filed by
appellant showed only a verdict but no judgment, and the Abstract of
the Record showed no judgment. Four days before the case was set for
argument in the supreme court the trial court on a motion for the entry of
a judgment nunc pro tunc, entered judgment and that judgment was made
the subject of a supplemental abstract. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the insufficiency of the abstract but, because it appeared
that both parties had joined in the motion for entry of a judgment nunc pro
tunc in the circuit court, the motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled.
The court pointed out that it is generally the duty of the successful party
to see to the preparation of a proper judgment and the duty of the appellant to file a certified copy of the judgment in the form of a short form
transcript. The court states:
"It must be conceded that respondent was at fault in failing
21. 154 S. W. (2d) 73 (Mo. 1941).
22. 348 Mo. 954, 156 S. NV. (2d) 691 (1941).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1
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to see to the preparation of a proper judgment and that appellant
was derelict in not sooner discovering that no judgment was entered
prior to the appeal."
In Morgan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company,23 an opinion was
written in Division 1 of the court dismissing the appeal because of a defective
abstract and brief, but on dissent of one of the judges the cause was transferred to the court en bane. There appellant filed a new abstract and brief.
Holding that the case stands en banc as if it had not previously been heard
and submitted, the court adhered to previous decisions in refusing to entertain another motion to dismiss because of the defects in the original abstract and brief, which had been corrected at the second presentation.
It is worthy of comment that, in only the few cases hereinbefore noted,
have serious questions been raised with respect to violation of the rules
of court by the litigants in the presentation of their appeals. Only where
such violations have been flagrant, will the court apply the harsh rule of
dismissal of appeals. But the leniency of the courts is a suggested incentive
to the bar to be diligent in adherence to court rules which are designed to
facilitate the work of the courts, prevent delay, and bring about the orderly
administration of justice.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WILLIAM R. COLLINSON*

Every case decided in 1941 in which a constitutional question is even
glanced at by the court is cited in this note. However, in the vast majority
of cases the constitutional question is not controlling, and the constitutional
question raised is disposed of under principles of constitutional law as
fundamental as any case made law can be.

I.

CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND ENFORCEMENT

In the now famous, or notorious, case of State ex rel. Donnel v. Osburn,1 the court had before it the question of whether or not the duties of
the speaker of the house prescribed in the constitution relative to opening
23. 348 Mo. 542, 154 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941).
*Prosecuting Attorney, Greene County. A.B., Drury College, 1933; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 347 Mo. 469, 147 S. W. (2d) 1065 (1941).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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and publishing election returns for the office of governor were ministerial
duties. The court held that the duties were ministerial duties, and in support of this position cited the sentiment expressed in the constitutional
debates of 1875, but stated that the court well recognized that the reliance
which could be placed in the sentiment expressed in the debates was very
limited. The case was actually decided upon principles of statutory construction.
In the case of State v. Vie-up,2 suit had been brought on a surety bond
given by an original package liquor dealer, the bond being required under
Section 19 of the Liquor Control Act. The dealer had been found guilty,
by the Liquor Supervisor, of selling one-half pint of liquor on Sunday, and
his license suspended for thirty days. This suit was to collect the face of
his bond, $2000.00. In the case of State v. Wipke3 the court had that the
entire face amount of the bond of a dealer in liquor by the drink could be
forfeited for any violation of the law. The court held in that case, by the
word of Section 13a of the Liquor Control Act, the bond was a forfeiture
bond, conditioned that the principal would faithfully obey the lay. The
court held in this case that the bond was simply an indemnifying bond,
conditioned that the principal would pay all taxes, licenses, fines, etc. The
distinction, of course, is in the wording of the two sections.
State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy,4 was obviously a test case to
determine whether the Unemployment Compensation Commission could
locate their offices elsewhere than in Jefferson City. The court reiterated
the familiar principle that a statute should be construed so as to make it
valid rather than invalid.
In State v. Armour Pharmacy, Inc.,' the court held that a defendant
could not raise a constitutional question unless his constitutional rights
were directly affected, and that a constitutional question first raised in the
briefs filed in the appellate court could not vest jurisdiction in the supreme
court. This latter point is also the controlling question in State ex rel.
Wallach, v. Oehler,6 and both these cases were remanded to the court of
appeals. Also, in Rust v. Missouri Dental Board,7 the court refused to con2. 347 Mo. 382, 147 S. W. (2d) 627 (1941).
3. 345 Mo. 283, 133 S. W. (2d) 354 (1939).
4. 347 Mo. 484, 148 S. W. (2d) 527 (1941).
5. 152 S. W. (2d) 67 (Mo. 1941).
6. 348 Mo. 655, 154 S. W. (2d) 781 (1941).
7. 348 Mo. 616, 155 S. W. (2d) 80 (1941).
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sider the validity of statute which was challenged as unconstitutional upon
hypothetical grounds.

II.

DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The court disposes of many logical and appealing arguments by the
pithy comment that th wvisdom of legislative acts is for the legislature, and
the meaning of legislative acts is for the legislative draftsmen, which is, of
course, sound constitutional law. Language of this nature is to be found
in a number of cases decided in 1941.8 One of the most interesting of these
is State v. Richan9 involving an insufficient funds check. Undoubtedly,
under this decision, there are some inmates of our state penitentiary, who are
perfectly justified in claiming its a "bum rap."
III. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
In Howard County v. Fayette Bank 0 the county sued the individual
sureties on an indemnity bond given the county when the bank was selected
as depository for county funds. A few months after the bond was given
an act of the legislature became effective barring personal sureties on such
bonds. The court held that the selection of the bank as depository and
the giving of the bond created a contractual relationship, and, of course, the
legislative act could not impair the obligation of this contract.
Washington University v. Gornain is a very interesting case. By a
special act in 1853 the university was given a charter which exempted all
its property from taxation, and was, by its terms, irrevocable. The constitution of 1865 provided that no special laws should be enacted exempting
any property from taxation. In 1866 the collector of St. Louis County taxed
the property of Washington University, which action was enjoined, but
the Missouri Supreme Court dissolved the injunction.12 This was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which held, in Washington University
v. Rouse,' 3 that the charter constituted a contract with the state and was
8. State v. Richman, 347 Mo. 595, 148 S. W. (2d) 796 (1941); Howlett
v. State Social Securiti Commission, 347 Mo. 784, 149 S. W. (2d) 806 (1941);
Motley v. Callaway County, 347 Mo. 1018, 149 S. W. (2d) 875 (1941); Sandy
Hites Co. v. State Highway Comm., 347 Mo. 954, 149 S. W. (2d) 828 (1941);
Magers v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 348 Mo. 96, 152 S. W. (2d)
148 (1941); State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 154 S. W. (2d) 128 (1941).
9. 347 Mo. 595, 148 S. W. (2d) 796 (1941).
10. 347 Mo. 982, 149 S. W. (2d) 841 (1941).
11. 348 Mo. 310, 153 S. W. (2d) 35 (1941).
12. Washington University v. Rowse, 42 Mo. 308 (1868).
13. 8 Wall. 439 (1869).
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protected against impairment. In 1875 our new constitution provided that
all laws exempting property from taxation should be void, but in another
attempt to tax the University's property in 1931, the supreme court of this
state followed the decision in Washington Univ. v. Rouse, supra. Now this
suit involves the same question, based upon a novel argument. In the
famous case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the United States Supreme
Court overruled the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,15 which permitted federal
courts to exercise independent judgment as to what the common law of
a state should be. It was contended, therefore, that under the Erie case
the United States Supreme Court would now have to follow the decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court in the first Washington University case.
Our supreme court held, however, that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson and
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, had nothing to do with cases to be determined
according to the Constitution of the United States. The decision in State
v. Rouse, supra, was decided in Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution, and had nothing to do with the common law of Missouri, and the
decision was still binding.

IV.

EQUAL PRoTcToN

In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. State"8 the constitutionality of the
reciprocity Sections of our state inheritance tax laws were in question.
Since this Section was repealed in 1939 this case will have little value as
precedent. The court upheld the validity of the Section, holding that it did
not create an arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination between different
persons or classes of persons, but that the classification by the legislature had
a reasonable basis.
Similarly,.in Edmonds v. City of St. Louisa7 the court upheld, for the
same reasons, a license-tax of a flat sum pet annum on automatic slot machines used for the sale of goods.
V. RETROSPECTIVE AND Ex POST FACTO LAWS
In Lucas v. Murphy,18 Section 5075 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1939, which has been such a headache to title examiners, was before
the court. This Section provides that all taxes or fees of any description owed
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

304 U. S. 64 (1938).
16 Pet. 1 (1842).
348 Mo. 725, 155 S. W. (2d) 107 (1941).
348 Mo. 1063, 156 S. W. (2d) 619 (1941).
348 Mo. 1078, 156 S. W. (2d) 686 (1941).
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by a corporation to the state are a lien against all the property of the
corporation, and the lien is not lost by any transfer of the assets. In this
case the taxes in question were "contributions" owed under the unemployment compensation act. The precise question was whether or not- the state's
lien for this tax was superior to the lien of an earlier recorded bona fide deed
of trust. The case does not decide this question, but holds that since the
deed of trust was recorded prior to the enactment of both, the Unemployment Compensation Act and Section 5075, that the lien of the deed of
trust is superior. This, of course, because these acts are not retrospective
by their express terms, and under principles of constitutional construction
will not be construed to be retrospective in operation. But the court did not
pass on the question of whether or not such taxes are superior liens to the
lien of a deed of trust recorded since 1937, the date of both acts.

VI. DuE PRocEss
The companion cases of State ex rel. Pultizer Putb. Co. v. Coleman,
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzsimmons, and Cog/dan v. Fitzsimmons" attracted nation
wide attention a year ago last spring. They involved the power of a circuit
court to punish for contempt. The precise point argued by the newspaper
columnists and editorial writers through their publications was the denial
of right of trial by jury. Upon this point the lower court was completely
sustained by the supreme court, and the case squarely held that the right
of trial by jury does not exist in contempt cases, because it did not so exist
at common law, and a court has inherent judicial power to punish for contempt, without a jury trial. The cases were reversed upon the grounds that
criticism of a court in regard to a past case is not contempt, and was not
so known at common law, but the court gravely points out that "freedom
of the press" does not free newspapers from liability for contempt for acts
which embarrass or obstruct a court in a pending proceeding.
In Dodds v. Kansas City20 the holders of general revenue bonds of the
city challenged the issue of water revenue bonds, which were a first lien on
revenues of the municipally owned water plant, as depriving them of property without due process of law. The court overruled this contention by
pointing out that the original issue was intended to be paid out of tax
revenues, and only tax revenues, s'o placing this lien on water revenues did
not prejudice the bond holders.
19. 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941).
20. 347 Mo. 1193, 152 S. W. (2d) 128 (1941).
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In State ex rel. Callahan v. Hess,21 a peculiar situatio nwas before the
court. After a vacation order admitting a will to probate, plaintiffs brought
a suit in circuit court to contest the will. This was tried on the merits, the
will sustained, and the case appealed. Upon appeal the point was raised
that the suit was prematurely brought, since there was no order made in
term time confirming the vacation order admitting the will to probate.
The supreme court then remanded the case with directions to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. 22 But meanwhile, during pendency of the suit, and
more than one year prior to this dismissal, an order had been made in term
time confirming the vacation order. The will contestants were then barred
from bringing another suit because Section 538 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri of 1939 provides that will contest suits must be brought within one
year after the probate of the will. They then brought this certiorariaction
to quash the record confirming the probate of the will. The constitutional
question raised was that the order confirming the probate was without notice
to them and therefore deprived them of property without due process of
law. This contention was overruled upon the ground that such a proceeding is a proceeding in rem, and always ex parte. An interesting dissenting
opinion was written by Judge Ellison, which will probably appeal to the
average lawyer more than the majority opinion.
In Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co. v. Hayes,23 the defendants attacked
Section 2970 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1939 as depriving them
of their "liberty to contract." This section provides that in an action
against a tenant holding over after termination of written lease, oral evidence of renewal, extension or new lease is inadmissible. The court held
that this statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
In Davison v. Arne2 4 another tax title fell by the wayside. In this

case the affidavit for publication recited it was made by the Collector of
Jasper County, but the affidavit was actually signed with the collector's name
"by Geo. W. Crocker, D.C." The court held that this did not comply with
the statutory requirement of an affidavit.
VII.

PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

In Arkansas-Missouri Power Corporation v. City of Kennett 2 plain21. 348 Mo. 388, 153 S. W. (2d) 713 (1941).
22. Callahan v. Huhlman, 339 Mo. 634, 98 S. W. (2d) 704 (1936).

23. 348 Mo. 1085, 156 S. W. (2d) 898 (1941).
24. 348 Mo. 790, 155 S. W. (2d) 155 (1941).
25. 348 Mo. 1108, 156 S. W. (2d) 913 (1941).
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tiffs sought to enjoin the construction of a municipal electric system. The
two constitutional questions raised involved the right of the city to prescribe
wage and hour standards in its construction contract, and the question of
whether or not these minimum wage standards did not deprive the taxpayers of property without due process of law. The court disposed of the
first question by saying that it was not a question of a city power to impose
such standards, but that these were simply made conditions of a contract,
and a person entering into a voluntary contract with the city accepts such
contractual conditions as may be agreed upon. As to the second question,
it was pointed out that by adopting certain requirements as to minimum
wages and hours the city received a sum from the national government
greatly in excess of amount by which bids could possibly have been increased by the minimum wage and hour provisions.

EQUITY
JOHN W. OLIVER*

Most of the prior reviews of the annual decisions of the Supreme Court
of Missouri relating to the subject of Equity have been prefaced with a
statement that the cases decided during a particular year "were not marked
by any new developments . . . and involve merely the application of recognized principles" or that they "display no startling or unusual features";
or that "the court applied familiar principles to facts which fall generally
within familiar categories."
Such a preface is inevitable and is dutifully repeated this year, with
the additional comment that it seems that so long as the democratic process
is retained each annual review will likely contain a similar preface. The
history of equitable jurisprudence since the classic contest between Ellesmere
and Coke, has been blessed with a peculiar and vague consistency. The
so-called maxims have been and are handed down by Francis, Story, Indermaur, Pomeroy and the various courts, including our own, to the effect
that "Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy"; "Equity is Equality"; "Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation"; and of
course, the one concerning "Clean hands" that is always good for at least one
chuckle in the first year Equity class in Law School.
*Attorney, Kansas City. A.B., University of Missouri, 1934; LL.B. 1936Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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The court this year repeated its share of maxims, but it must be
remembered that equity is one of the few fields of law in which authorities
as old as Story's Equity Jurisprudence, published first in 1836, are still

cited as precedents and that a comparison of that work with the latest
edition of Pomeroy illustrates the fact that the main categories of specific
performance, the law of vendor and purchaser, injunctions, reformation and
rescission have long been the tools of equity, so that the regular grist of
litigation through the years is merely the application of those broad principles to new and different factual situations.
Such being the case, it seems that the most practical way to point out
"the progress of law.., to the members of the legal profession.., in a way
that the reading of the isolated cases during the year cannot do" (as the
first annual Review in 1936 put it) is to classify the various cases according to the broad category and to arrange those cases decided for the plaintiff against those decided for the defendant. In this manner, the busy
practitioner can locate for citation purposes the most recent cases that
held his way, and he may also hope that opposing counsel has not paid
out his $2.50 for an annual subscription to this Review and therefore not
have the benefit of the collection of the cases decided the other way.
I. SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE

As in the past, numerous cases dealing with specific performance of
oral contracts with deceased and other persons occupied a considerable time
of the court. In Boyers v. Boyers1 the action of the trial court decreeing
specific performance of an alleged oral contract to convey real estate to
a son from his father was reversed outright with directions to dismiss the
plaintiff's petition because "no such contract was established by clear and
convincing evidence.'
Sportsman v. Haistead2 upheld an oral contract between the deceased
and plaintiff wherby deceased agreed to leave plaintiff whatever property
he owned at death in consideration of the plaintiff taking care of him during
his life. The case, however, was remanded to the trial court because of the
". .. exceedingly murky proof as to the value of the estate." The court,
in accordance with the doctrine of Sele v. Selle,8 directed the trial court,
after hearing further evidence, either to order a money judgment for the
1. 147 S. W. (2d) 473 (Mo. 1941).
2. 347 Mo. 286, 147 S. W. (2d) 447 (1941).
3. 337 Mo. 1234, 88 S. W. (2d) 877 (1935).
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value of the services rendered to be secured by a lien on the property, or
to order a conveyance of the property found to have been covered by the
contract.
The cases in which plaintiffs sought to have oral contracts of adoption
specifically performed all resulted in favorable outcomes for the various
defendants. The rule that the evidence to prove such a contract must be "so
clear, cogent and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt" as to the
existence of the contract was applied in each case. In Thornton v. Miler
plaintiff failed to prove that she should be declared the adopted daughter
of a husband and wife, both of whom were killed in a railroad crossing accident. Stillman v. Austin5 involved the unsuccessful attempt of plaintiff
seeking to.be declared an adopted son, and Niehaus v. Madden8 sustained
the trial court's finding that "plaintiff failed to prove a contract of adoption made by the decedent."
Four cases involved- actions for specific performance of contracts for
the conveyance of real estate. Mason v. Mason involved an oral contract
between a divorced husband and wife. The findings of the trial court refusing specific performance were deferred to and judgment for the defendant
sustained. While Tant v. Gee8 involved a case of specific performance of a
contract to sell real estate, the real question in the case was whether a, certain credit should or should not have been allowed on the purchase price
of the property. The trial court found that it substantially should not be
allowed and the supreme court found otherwise, ordering specifiic performance in accordance with its findings. Eisenbeis v. Slillington9 involved an
action by a vendor seeking specific performance. Findings and decree, nisi
refusing plaintiff relief, were affirmed. Branch v. Lee 0 granted specific performance against a grantee of the vendor who was found to have had notice
of original contract of sale.

II.

FRADULENT CONVEYANCES

General American Life Insurance Company v. Leavenworth"I and
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. v. Rossen Furniture Co.1 2 both followed
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
-11.
12.

151 S. W. (2d) 1101 (Mo. 1941).
148 S. W. (2d) 573 (Mo. 1941).
348 Mo. 770, 155 S. W. (2d) 141 (1941).
153 S. W. (2d) 27 (Mo. 1941).
348 Mo. 633,-154 S. W. (2d) 745 (1941).
159,S. W. (2d) 641 (Mo. 1941).
159 S. W. (2d) 677 (Mo. 1941).
347 Mo. 876, 149 S. W. (2d) 360 (1941).
348 Mo. 1177, 159 S. W. (2d) 276 (1941).
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the doctrine reannounced in 1939 in Buckley v. Maupin' 3 to the effect that
a petition must state on its face that a judgment has been obtained before
a creditor has a right to equitable relief in the nature of a creditor's bill
unless it is alleged that the existence of the debt is either admitted or not
denied or that the debtor is absent from the state and not subject to process.
Absent the allegation of a judgment or of the two exceptions above mentioned, the petition is held to not state a cause of action.

III.

RELIEF FROM JUDICIAL AND TAX SALES AND

OTHER EQUITABLE

AcTioNs CONCERNING TITLE TO REALTY

Practically all of the cases noted under this section turn upon factual
questions. Slwmate v. Hoef'ner 4 set aside a trustee's deed given under the
foreclosure of a second mortgage because the defendant had lulled the owner
of equity of redemption into a sense of security without giving actual notice
to the owner. Homan v. Gonnett 5 held that a federal land bank foreclosure deed was not invalid because executed by an agent and attorney-infact, thus following a holding to the same effect made by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Bross.16
In Gray v. Carder17 the court sustained the trial court's action of setting
aside a quit-claim deed on the ground of fraud and undue influence. Other
cases involving equitable actions to try title and certain equitable defenses
raised in various actions concerning title could be but are not mentioned
because each of such cases is so peculiar on its facts that it would serve
no useful purpose to note them in this necessarily short review.
Mutual Bank & Trust Company v. Goedecke (two cases)18 involved
attempts to have equitable mortgages decreed on certain property in St.
Louis. The trial court issued a decree for the plaintiff but the supreme
court reversed the cases outright because ". . . a chancellor is without
authority to decree an equitable mortgage" where there is no evidence of
intent to create such a mortgage which the supreme court found to be nonexistent under the facts.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

344
347
348
122
347
348

Mo. 193, 125 S. W. (2d) 820 (1939).
Mo. 391, 147 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941).
Mo. 244, 152 S. W. (2d) 1053 (1941).
S. W. (2d) 35 (Mo. 1938).
Mo. 1046, 151 S. W. (2d) 1112 (1941).
Mo. 1164, 159 S. W. (2d) 258 (1941) and 159 S.W. (2d) 260.
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INJUNCTION CASES

It may be stated in connection with injunction cases generally that they
present the best opportunity of detecting a toe or two of the chancellor's
foot which may be protruding from beneath the judicial robe. Whether or
not any phalanges are discernible in the opinions written in 1941, the writer
leaves to the judgment of the bar. Bussen Realty Co. v. Bensonz' 9 decided
by a divided court en bane involved an injunction suit against the Collector
of St. Louis County to prevent him from delivering a tax deed to the
purchaser at a tax sale of land sold pursuant to the provisions of Jones-.
Munger Tax Law.20 There was no'question about statutory compliance or the
regularity of the proceedings, the plaintiff admitting in open court "... . we
make no attack on the validity of the sale or the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the sale." The majority opinion stated that "the one and
only question presented and for decision is whether relief should be granted
solely because of inadequate consideration."
The court in the majority opinion then traced the historical development of Missouri Tax Law, concluding that "over the years this Court has
developed the rule . . .that a consideration paid at a tax sale ...which
is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, by itself establishes
fraud." The majority opinion conceded that "certainly every man should
pay his taxes to support his government" and that "if he neglects to do so, he
should suffer the penalty prescribed by law" but argues that this penalty
should be suffered "only when that penalty is enforced lawfully and free
from fraud, actual or constructive." Recalling that it was conceded that
the tax law was strictly adhered to, the possibility of "actual fraud" falls
out of the case. Therefore, the case turned upon what the court called "constructive fraud." The equasion became easy when "inadequacy of consideration" was made to equal "constructive fraud."
The dissenting opinion is prefaced by the statement that "The principal opinion hords'the sale void, not for actual fraud, but upon the highly
artificial doctrine of fraud in law." The real basis of the dissenting opinion,
however, was that the "statute is plain and unambiguous, the legislative
intent clear and it should be given effect." The case is an interesting example
of how a court of equity arrives at a result that it clearly wished to reach.
Two cases involving injunctions against governmental officials were
19. 159 S. W. (2d) 813 (Mo. 1942).
REV. STAT. (1939) § 111117 et seq.

20. Mo.
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before the court, neither of which were decided on the merits. State ex rel.
Reed v. Harris2l involved an injunction against the police officials of Kansas
City to prevent them from disseminating police photographs and finger
prints of persons in the custody of Kansas City Police Department for violation of traffic ordinances to various law enforcement agencies throughout
the country. The case before the court was one of prohibition against the
injunction suit pending and the court en banc held that while the pending
action stated no cause of action, prohibition would not issue because one
might possibly be stated. The jurisdiction of equity because of inadequacy
of legal remedy was upheld. State ex rel. Bames v. Mason2 2 involved an
injunction suit brought by fifty-two democratic employees of the Park
Department of St. Louis who sought to have a republican director of that
department enjoined from discharging them from their offices for political
reasons. Although it is not directly stated in the opinion, it is a permissible
inference that a change of political complexion had recently taken place
in St. Louis. It was likewise alleged that there was pending before the electorate of St. Louis a certain Civil Service Bill that "would insure the plaintiffs of being retained in office irrespective of their political faith or beliefs."
The trial court had issued its rule to show cause why a temporary injunction
then in effect should not be made permanent, returnable two days after the
election was to take place. The case was before the supreme court as prohibition, which the court denied, holding that equity had jurisdiction to
hear and determine such a case.
Hall v. Koelderi 3 affirmed the trial court's enforcement by injunction
of certain residential restrictions in a certain addition in Kansas City.
Clark v. Crown Drug Co.24 should perhaps be mentioned in closing.
Plaintiff attempted to enjoin a drug store from delivering intoxicating
liquors which were ordered by the public over the telephone and paid for
upon delivery by messenger boy. Plaintiff's theory was that such sales
constituted a violation of the Liquor Control Act and therefore constituted
illegal competition with plaintiff's own business, which was that of operating a tavern where liquor was sold by the drink.
The action of the trial court in issuing the injunction was reversed by
the supreme court. The court admitted for the sake of argument that the
21.
22.
23.
24.

348
348
347
348

Mo. 426, 153 S. W. (2d)
Mo. 436, 154 S. W. (2d)
Mo. 658, 148 S. W. (2d)
Mo. 91, 152 S. W. (2d)

834 (1941).
67 (1941).
489 (1941).
145 (1941).
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sales violated the law, but held that "the evidence fails to show any damage
whatsoever has been in fact suffered by plaintiff because of defendant's
telephone sales," and therefore reasoned that "since plaintiff has failed to
show that his rights have been damaged in any way, he has no standing in a
court of equity merely to enjoin the commission of a crime," which is certainly the law.
It will be a sign of encouragement to the lovers of precise theory and
accurate statement to find that the court did not resort to the all too
familiar formula of saying that there were no "property rights" involved and
therefore no jurisdiction in equity. The court carefully stated that "a court
of equity has no such authority where no civil or property rights are concerned." True, a "civil right" is probably no more elucidating than the term
"natural right" referred to in the comment on the Right of Privacy in the
June, 1940 issue of this Review, but it at least concedes that equity in some
circumstances does impose duties and enforces corresponding rights that
cannot 16gically or legalistically be placed in the category of a "property
right."
The' writer is not particularly worried about the language or terminology
that a court of equity choses to explain its actions, because in spite of the
fact that John Selden said that "Equity is a roguish thing" as far back as
the seventeenth century, the results that have been reached have certainly
met the standard of justice (whatever that word may mean) required by our
Anglo-American jurisprudence. -Such has been the experience of Missouri
for the past year.
EVIDENCE
CreUMEs L. CARR*
The Supreme Court of Missouri decisions in the Evidence field during
1941 are concerned almost entirely with the application and restatement
of sound, well-established rules in connection with the particular facts involved. This is to be expected. In the short space of a given year very few
cases are presented involving new questions and calling for the announcement of additional principles of law. Even where particular rules of evidence are outmoded, are overly technical, or are too prohibitive in the
*Attorney, Kansas City, Mo., and Lecturer on Evidence, University of Kansas
City Law School. B.S., Northwestern University, 1913, LL.B., 1915.
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exclusion of evidence, the court cannot act to correct the rule until a proper
case involving the particular rule is presented for determination. Thus it
was that in 1922, in State v. Swares,1 the improper rule that proof of possession by the accused of property recently stolen gives rise to a presumption of law as to the guilt of the accused, was corrected by doing away with
the presumption of law and leaving such proof as a mere logical fact inference of guilt for the consideration of the jury, and this without any intrusion on the part of the court; that in 1930, in Scanlon v. Kansas City2 the
unsound rule that opinion testimony is not evidence in the same sense as
other testimony, being mere advice which the jury is at liberty to disregard,
was disapproved and the new rule was announced that opinion evidence is
to be considered like any other testimony, is to be tried by the same test,
and receive just so much weight and credit as the jury may deem it entitled
to when viewed in connection with all the circumstances; that in 1932, in
McCloskey v. Koplar,3 the erroneous rule that in res ipsa loquitur cases a
rebuttable presumption of law arises shifting the burden of proof on defendant to disprove negligence, was corrected, by eliminating the presumption, by recognizing that the proof in res ipsa loquitur cases merely gives
rise to logical fact inferences of negligence to be considered by the jury
without the intervention of the court, and by drawing the proper distinction
between burden of proof and burden of evidence; that in 1935, in Paitizer
v. Chapman,4 the then too narrow rule of evidence was broadened to render
admissible the prior inconsistent statements made in a deposition in the
same case by a witness who testifies at the trial, not only for the purpose
of impeaching the trial testimony, but also as substantive proof of the facts
stated in the deposition; and that in March, 1942, in Bartlett v. Kansas City
Public Service Co.,5 the last mentioned evidence rule was further broadened
by rendering admissible the testimony of a witness in another lawsuit, where
the same issues are litigated, even though there is not identity of parties,
identity of interests alone being present, and the witness is unavailable at
the time of the subsequent trial. The above examples show that the Supreme Court of Missouri, when and as the opportunity is afforded, is modernizing the Missouri Evidence Rules, is liberalizing the rules of admissibility and is unshackling the jury to enable it to consider the evidence in its
1. 294 Mo. 139, 241 S. W. 934 (1922).
2. 325 Mo. 125, 28 S. W. (2d) 84 (1930).

3. 329 Mo 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (1932).
4. 337 Mo. 298, 85 S. W. (2d) 400 (1935).
5. 160 S. W. (2d) 740 (Mo. 1942).
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proper scope, giving it its proper weight, and this without the intrusion of the
trial court. A similar trend is noted in other states and particularly in the
federal courts under Rule 43 of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the following outline of the evidence decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1941, emphasis is made of the rule itself and
accompanying facts are recited only where necessary to a proper understanding of the rule. Limitation of space has required the omission of many
cases where the determination was merely with respect to the sufficiency
or insufficiency of the evidence in the particular lawsuit.
I.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

In the case of State ex rel. Donnell v. Searcy,6 it is announced that the
supreme court has the power to notice facts outside the record for the purpose of considering the moot character of the questions before it.
In Zickefoose v. Thompson,7 it is ruled that facts judicially noted are
equivalent to evidence, that the court will judicially notice that a black
surface will reflect substantially less light than a light surface and that
judicial notice will be taken that the ordinary walking speed of the average
man is 2 or 3 miles per hour, or 2.9 feet to 4.4 feet per second. The same
rule as to walking speed and distance is found in Rosenberg v. Terminal
R. R. Association of St. Louis."

In Lloyd v. Alton R. R.,9 it is held that judicial notice'will be taken of
the well known habits of domestic animals, the ordinary habits, characteristics and instincts of dogs and that many dogs are hit and killed by
moving motor vehicles due to their habit of running beside or in front of
vehicles.
In State ex rel. Martin v. Stoner,10 the court judicially noticed the fact
that the village of Watson in Atchison County contains more than 200 inhabitants and that the Watson Consolidated School District No. 2 in Atchison County comprises at least two districts besides the village district of
Watson. In State v. Posey,1' judicial notice is taken that the distance from
Holland, Missouri, to the state line on Highway 61 is 5 miles.
6. 347 Mo. 1052, 152 S. W. (2d) 8 (1941).

7. 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. (2d) 784 (1941).

8.
9.
10.
11.

159 S. W. (2d) 633 (Mo. 1941).
348 Mo. 1222, 159 S. W. (2d) 267 (1941).
347 Mo. 242, 146 S. W. (2d) 891 (1941).
347 Mo. 1088, 152 S. W. (2d) 34 (1941).
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2 the

In State ex rel. Baumes v. Mason,
St. Louis Charter and in Flesh1
3
ner v.Kansas City, the Charter of Kansas City, were respectively noticed
by the court.
In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Priest,4 the supreme court takes
notice that cases are constantly being filed in which the clerk of the circuit
court must issue process, that the clerk is required to issue subpoenaes in
cases set for trial, must record the proceedings of the court in the permanent
records of the court, must make transcripts on change of venue and appeal,
and must keep complicated books of account in which he enters financial
transactions occurring in his office. In Howard County v. Fayette Bank, "
judicial notice is taken of the court calendar of the Howard County Court.
Judicial notice is taken of the journals of both houses of the legislature,
showing dismissal of contest of election of governor, in State ex Tel. Donnell
v. Searcy. 6 In Smith v. Oliver,'7 the supreme court in ascertaining whether
the amount in dispute was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction on appeal
in a suit involving the issue as to whether the plaintiff was the adopted son
and heir of the deceased, took judicial notice that certain items not involved
in the action were chargeable against deceased's estate and as the record
failed to show that the amount in dispute exceeded $7,500.00, the case was
transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
The court also took judicial notice (a) in State ex rel. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hugles,18 that a soliciting insurance agent has
the duty to secure applications for insurance, but has no function whatever
in regard to resisting payment of -claims; (b) in Magers v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co.,' 9 that many of the sounder, better managed
insurance companies now make no surrender charge against the policy reserve in the case of lapsed policies; (c) in Rust v. Missouri Dental Board,20
that "advertising" includes publication by handbills, signs, billboards, sound
trucks and radio; (d) in State ex rel. General Mills, Inc. v. Waltner,2
that telephone listings are often made under a trade-name; and (e) in
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

348 Mo. 436, 154 S.W. (2d) 67 (1941).
348 Mo. 978, 156 S. W. (2d) 706 (1941).
348 Mo.37, 152 S.W. (2d) 109 (1941).
347 Mo.982, 149 S.W. (2d) 841 (1941).
347 Mo.1052, 152 S.W. (2d) 8 (1941).
148 S.W. (2d) 795 (Mo.1941).
152 S.W. (2d) 132 (Mo.1941).
348 Mo.96, 152 S.W. (2d) 148 (1941).
348 Mo.616, 155 S.W. (2d) 80 (1941).
348 Mo.852, 156 S.W. (2d) 664-(1941).
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that a business failure may occur

when conducted by one individual while another individual may be very
successful in the same building and under the same circumstances.
II.

PRESUMPTIONS

In the case of Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate & Investment Co.,23 the

presumption rule was involved that where the existence of a certain condition or state of affairs of a continuous nature is shown, the general presumption arises that the condition or state continues to exist, until the contrary is shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, so long as is usual with
conditions or things of that particular nature. In the particular case the
plaintiff was seated upon a wooden box on the sidewalk at the side of a
building and was injured by a piece of terra-cotta falling from the building
wall above the sidewalk. The plaintiff introduced in evidence a ten-year
lease of the particular building to the defendant as lessee under which the
term commenced approximately 5 years previous to the accident. By the
lease the duty to repair the building (so far as involved in the case) was
upon the defendant-lessee. The above presumptive rule was used to show
that the lease was in full force and effect at the time of the particular
accident, absent evidence to the contrary.
In Brown v. Weare,24 the court recognized the rule that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary title to the fee of a highway is presumed to be
in the abutting owners and that the title of each extends to the center of
the way, but that such presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing
that the entire way has been taken from the land of only one of the abutting
owners. The court applies the same rule to the lands used for railroad purposes and later abandoned. In the particular case the evidence disclosed
that plaintiff's predecessor in title had conveyed the entire land in question
to the railroad for railroad purposes and that the plaintiff had acquired all
the right, title and interest of said predecessor. In view of this evidence the
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the entire land abandoned by
the railroad.
In a suit to set aside a trustee's deed executed under foreclosure of a
deed of trust, where the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was charged with
aiding mortgagee in his alleged fraudulent conduct, and the purchaser was
22. 347 Mo. 1224, 152 S. W. (2d) 100 (1941).

23. 348 Mo. 407, 155 S. W. (2d) 90 (1941).
24. 348 Mo. 135, 152 S. W. (2d) 649 (1941).
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personally served with process and filed answer, the purchaser's failure to
appear at the trial to refute the charges created an unfavorable circum25
stance against her.
In the case of Thorpson v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis,20
the court reaffirmed the rule that where a given witness is equally available
to both of the parties, neither of them may draw any adverse inference from
the failure of the other to put such witness on the witness stand. The court
ruled that the mere fact that the absent witness and plaintiff were co-counsel
employed by the same client, there being no proof that the absent witness
and plaintiff were co-conspirators, would not make the absent witness more
available to the plaintiff than to the defendant.
In an action on an official bofid of a circuit clerk, where the petition
states that the clerk had the duty to make quarterly reports to the county
court of fees collected in the clerk's official capacity, but did not allege
whether the clerk had done so, the supreme court on review would not
presume that the clerk did not do his duty nor could the court accept as an
averment of the petition a statement in the reply brief that no reports
27
were filed.
In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Priest,28 the City of St. Louis

brought the action to recover on the official bond of the clerk of the circuit
court on account of a resulting loss from the clerk's failure to issue execution on a judgment for the city in a condemnation proceeding within the
ten-year statutory period. The request that the execution be issued was
made by letter a few days before the expiration of such period and the clerk
and his deputies did not have knowledge of the necessity for the immediate
issuance of the execution. The court in holding that the evidence did not
disclose any negligence on the part of the circuit clerk announced and followed the rule that the law presumes the reasonable performance of official
duty and the burden is upon the person claiming neglect to show that the
conduct of the officer has actually been negligent.
In Otten v. Otten,29 the plaintiff sought to correct a warranty deed by
having himself made the sole grantee and by eliminating an undivided onehalf interest in his son, the defendant. Alterations appeared on the face
25. Shumate v. Hoefner, 347 Mo. 391, 147 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941).

26. 347 Mo. 748, 148 S. W. (2d) 757 (1941).
27. State ex rel. Livingston County v. Hunt, 347 Mo. 1150, 152 S. W. (2d)
77 (1941).
28. 348 Mo.37, 152 S.W. (2d) 109 (1941).
29. 348 Mo.674, 156 S.W. (2d) 587 (1941).
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of the deed. The plaintiff contended that the alterations were made by the
son after the execution of the deed. The son contended that the changes in
the deed were made at the time of the execution or prior thereto. The court
in rendering its decision recognized the rule that a presumption exists that
alterations and erasures on written instruments, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary or suspicious circumstances, were made before or contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of the instrument and the
party attacking the instrument has the burden of showing otherwise. The
court also points out that the presumption of change at or before the execution of the instrument does not obtain where the alteration is apparent on
the face of the instrument and the instrument is suspicious in itself; that
in such case the law presumes nothing. In the particular case the court held
that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show the fraudulent alteration of the deed. The decree of the chancellor was upheld on the ground
that there was sufficient evidence to support same in favor of the defendant.
Where a law case is tried without a jury a presumption exists that the
court in weighing the evidence is governed by correct rules of law.30
III.

BURDEN OF PROOF

In the case of Draperv. Louisville & N. R. R., 31 the plaintiff, a pedestrian on the private right-of-way of the defendant railroad, was struck and
injured by a switch engine. The plaintiff was not an invitee so as to impose
on the railroad a duty to keep a lookout. The accident occurred in Kentucky
and the case was tried on the Kentucky last chance theory. The plaintiff,
to prove that defendant's fireman saw the plaintiff in a position of danger
in time to avoid the accident, put the fireman on the witness stand as the
plaintiff's witness. The fireman, however, gave lositive direct testimony that
he never did see the plaintiff on the track. No other witness testified with
respect to the above essential issue of plaintiff's case. In reversing outright
the judgment obtained by plaintiff the court followed the rule, originally
formulated by Judge Lamm, namely:
"If A put B on the stand and prove by him a certain state of
facts, this does not preclude A from putting C, D or E on the stand
and proving a different state of facts; but if A puts B on the stand
as his only witness to prove a fact, and does prove it, then he is
precluded from impeaching B, or from otherwise inviting the jury
30. Hancock v. State Highway Commission, 347 Mo. 944, 149 S. W. (2d)
823 (1941).
31. 348 Mo. 886, 156 S. W. (2d) 626 (1941).
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to disregard B's testimony. He may not avoid his dilemma in
that way."
The court sums up the situation by holding that if a plaintiff has the
burden of proof and if he puts on only one witness to prove a given fact
essential to his case and the witness gives positive direct testimony contrary
to the fact, then the plaintiff cannot have the jury disregard his only direct
evidence on the point and find that the fact is exactly the opposite on the
basis of any inferences from circumstances also stated in the testimony of
the same witness; that where facts proved by a party having the burden
of proof give no more than an equal basis to two inconsistent inferences,
such party has failed by his proof to remove his case beyond the realm of
speculation and conjecture as to the existence of such essential facts.
In Hahn v. Brueseke,32 the court announces the rule that in a.will contest case the burden of proving alleged fraud and undue influence is on the
contestant.

IV.

RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY

In the case of Bass v. Kansas City Journal Post Co.,3 3 the rule is announced that evidence which is competent for the court to consider in
passing on a demurrer to the evidence is competent to go to the jury.
In Rentfrow v. Thompson,3 4 a truck driver was killed when his truck
was struck by defendant's train at a railroad crossing. The defendant was
not charged with negligence in maintaining an improper crossing. The trial
court, over objection, admitted evidence to the effect that the crossing was
rough, that the ground between the rails was hollowed out and was not
filled with gravel, macadam or concrete and that one of the planks alongside
the rails was missing. The trial court did not admit the evidence for the
purpose of convicting the defendant of negligence in maintaining an improper crossing but the evidence was offered and received by the court
solely for what bearing it might have on the defense of contributory negligence, that is, to show how and why deceased's truck became stalled and
as showing the sudden emergency confronting deceased. The supreme court,
in upholding the action of the trial court, applied the elementary principle
that where certain evidence is competent for one purpose but incompetent
for another, it must be received, but the opponent has the right to request
instructions limitihg the application of the evidence.
32. 348 Mo. 708, 155 S. W. (2d) 98 (1941).
33. 347 Mo. 681, 148 S. W. (2d) 548 (1941).
34. 348 Mo. 970, 156 S.W. (2d) 700 (1941).
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In the case of Long v. Mild,3 5 which involved a collision between an
automobile in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger and a truck making
a left-hand turn in front of the approaching automobile, the plaintiff contended that the trial court committed error (a) in permitting a deputy
constable to testify that the automobile in which plaintiff was riding traveled at a speed of 50 to 60 miles per hour from a point several miles from
the scene of collision and up to within three and a half blocks of the place
of collision and (b) in permitting the same deputy constable to testify that
he examined the brakes on the automobile in which plaintiff was riding, onehalf hour after the collision, and found that the brake pedal went all the
way to the floor board. The supreme court held that the evidence of excessive speed was admissible as tended to show that such speed was continuous up to the time of the collision and other evidence indicated an
excessive speed of the automobile to the point of collision itself. The court
also held that the testimony was admissible with reference to the brake
pedal going all the way to the floor board when the brake vas examined
one-half hour after the accident. The court, while recognizing that there
was no evidence that the brakes were bad before the collision and that the
witness was not an expert on brakes, points out that the witness merely
testified as to what he did in examining the brakes and that there was no
evidence to show that the brakes were damaged in the collision. The court
ruled that lack of control of the auto at the speed alleged was within the
issue to show negligent speed and the objections urged went merely to the
weight of the testimony.
In Owen v. Kurn3' the plaintiff sustained injuries in attempting to remove a push car from a railroad track before it was struck by a train. The
supreme court upheld the trial court in permitting the introduction of the
railroad rule requiring all trains to whistle for curves where the evidence disclosed that the rule was in force about ten years before the time of the
accident and that the engineers continued to whistle for curves after the
rule no longer existed. The supreme court held that the rule had probative
value to establish custom.
7
In Gilioz v. State Highway Corvmission,3
a contractor's action to recover amount deducted as liquidated damages for failure of the contractor
to complete a viaduct within a specified time, the supreme court held that
35. 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S. W. (2d) 853 (1941).
36. 347 Mo. 516, 148 S. W. (2d) 519 (1941).
37. 348 Mo. 211, 153 S. W. (2d) 18 (1941).
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evidence concerning matters connected with other contracts between th(
state highway commission and the contractor was inadmissible.
In the case of Russell v. Frank,8 the supreme court held that the chancellor below committed error in excluding records in prior years of a school
board, the members being the same, where the question for determination
involved the intent of the board in submitting to the electors the question
of a tax levy, and where the evidence offered was relevant to such intent.
In so ruling the court followed the well known rule that evidence of past
action by an individual or group of individuals is relevant as bearing upon
the intent with which they performed a similar act.
Two will cases should be here noted. In Walter v. Alt,89 the court reaffirmed the well known rule in will contest cases that evidence of occurrences and circumstances prior to and closely approaching the time of the
execution of a will, and shortly subsequent thereto, which evidence tends to
shed light on the question of testamentary capacity and tends to show the
condition of the testator's mind at the time of the execution of the will,
is competent evidence and that it is not required that proof of testamentary
incapacity at the very moment of the execution of the will be made by eye
0 the rule is announced that
witnesses. In Palm v. Maguire,"
in a will contest action the proponent must prove the due execution of the will to the
court's satisfaction and this even though the petition does not allege improper execution of the will.
In the case of Carpenterv. Kurn,4" an action for the death of a person
struck by a train while sitting on a railroad track, the testimony of witnesses who made certain tests for the purpose of ascertaining the distance
within which one standing on the track could tell that a person sitting in
the same position and dressed the same as deceased was \a human being,
was admissible as against the contentions (a) that such witnesses knew in
advance that the object on the track was a man and (b) that the engineer
was in a moving engine attendant with much vibration and lateral motion;
the evidence disclosing that an engineer on a moving engine could see as
well as a man standing on the ground.

38.
39.
40.
41.

348 Mo.
348 Mo.
347 Mo.
348 Mo.

533, 154 S. W. (2d) 63 (1941).
53, 152 S. W. (2d) 135 (1941).
189, 146 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941).
1132, 157 S. W. (2d) 213 (1941).
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BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE-PAROL' EVIDENCE

In Mickel v. Tlzmpson,42 the plaintiff on cross-examination was asked

as to the contents of the medical report made by his doctor. The supreme
court, in upholding the trial court in its ruling excluding such evidence,
again stated the elementary rule that medical reports are the best evidence
as to their contents.
In Bullock v. E. B. Gee Land Co.,43 a suit to quiet title, the court held
that the trial court properly excluded defendant's evidence concerning the
execution of an allegedly lost deed for the reason that defendant did not
show diligence in attempting to locate the alleged lost deed.
In the case of Dodd v. Turner,4" an acti6n of ejectment to obtain
possession of land wherein the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had
altered the deed under which the plaintiff claimed, the supreme court upheld the ruling of the trial court in admitting secondary evidence to determine the true wording of the deed, where the evidence disclosed and the
trial court concluded that the alteration of the deed was not intentional.
In State v. Brickey,45 a prosecution for obtaining a school district warrant by means of false pretenses, a certified public accountant was permitted to testify as to the result of an audit he made of the available records
of the school district. The supreme court in upholding the introduction of
such testimony again stated the rule that under proper circumstances qualified witnesses may state the result of an audit made.
In the case of Burnett v. McHaney,46 the court applied the rule that
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to change the terms of a will which
speaks for itself. The court pointed out that in construing a will which
expresses the testator's intentions in ambiguous terms, the court could consider testator's situation and circumstances surrounding him when he executed the will but only for the purpose of explaining the provisions of
the will.
VI. ADMiSSIONS AND DECLARATIONS
In the case of Accomac Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis,7 an action for

damages for alleged depreciation in the value of property occasioned by a
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

348 Mo. 991, 156 S. W. (2d) 721 (1941).
347 Mo. 721, 148 S. W. (2d) 565 (1940).
348 Mo. 1090, 156 S. W. (2d) 901 (1941).
348 Mo. 248, 152 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1941).
347 Mo. 499, 148 S. W. (2d) 495 (1940).
347 Mo. 1224, 152 S. W. (2d) 100 (1941).
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change in street grade, the trial court permitted the defendant to introduce
evidence that the retail business operated on the property involved had
been losing money. As a part of this proof the trial court permitted the
defendant to introduce in evidence, as admissions and declarations against
interest, the intervening petition that one Julius Seidel filed in the receivership suit of the Julius Seidel Lumber Company. Julius Seidel was the president of the Julius Seidel Lumber Company and was also the president of
the plaintiff, Accomac Realty Co. The latter company was not a party in
the above receivership proceedings. The supreme court ruled (a) the
evidence that the retail lumber business operated on the property involved
had been losing money was not competent evidence in the particular proceeding and (b) as the statements made in the intervening petition filed
in the receivership suit were made in a case in which the plaintiff was not
a party any statements made in such intervening petition were not binding
on the plaintiff corporation.
In Gil1ioz v. State Highway Commission,48 a contractor's action to recover an amount deducted from the amount due on a contract as liquidated
damages for failure to complete a viaduct within a specified time, the court
held that the admission of testimony of the defendant commission's inspector concerning statements made by steel manufacturers' agents, who
were not employees or agents of the contractor, was improper where the
statements were not offered for impeachment after laying of proper foundation. Such statements were not binding upon the contractor and did not
constitute admissions on the part of the contractor.
In Morgan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,4' plaintiff obtained a verdict against the defendant, a lessee of a store, for personal injuries sustained
in falling on an icy sidewalk when approaching the latter's store. The
supreme court reversed the case outright on the ground that the evidence
clearly showed that the place where plaintiff fell had been dedicated to
public use as a part of the street and accepted by public user. This is shown
by the original, first and second amended petitions filed by plaintiff in the
particular action and which petitions were introduced in evidence. The
court ruled that the abandoned pleadings were competent evidence as admissions of the plaintiff.
In the case of Wild v. Pitcairn,0 the defendant complained of the trial
48. 348 Mo. 211, 153 S. W. (2d) 18 (1941).
49. 348 Mo. 542, 154 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941).
50. 347 Mo. 915, 149 S. W. (2d) 800 (1941).
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court's refusal of an instruction which would have told the jury, in substance, that fact admissions by attorneys and statements in depositions
admitted in evidence, should be given the same credit as testimony of witnesses appearing in person. The supreme court upheld the trial court and
announced that the instruction did not properly sjtate the law. The court
points out that admissions of fact by attorneys during a trial must be accepted as true and that the credibility and weight of other statements are
for the jury. In the particular case the court ruled that the attorneys
admitted that the defendants were engaged in interstate commerce, thus
dispensing-with proof of that issue and making it unnecessary even to submit it to the jury.
VII. HEARsAY EVIENCE
In re Decker's Estate,5" an action by an administratrix to discover
assets of the deceased's estate in possession of the defendants claiming them
as gifts from the deceased, the defendants contended that the trial court
erred in admitting in evidence the holographic will of the deceased and
the memorandum signed by him and attached to the will, both of which
were executed some time after the time of the alleged gifts. The supreme
court sustained defendants' objection to the above evidence and ruled that
the evidence was inadmissible as hearsay on the question of the deceased's
intent at the time of the alleged gifts. The court also ruled that the cases
cited by plaintiff, sustaining the admission of hearsay on an issue of undue
influence in will contests, were not in point.
In Palm v. Maguire,= a suit to set aside a will, the supreme court held
that the testimony as to testator's and chief beneficiary's statements, showing their state of mind and attitude toward each other as bearing on the
issue of undue influence, was properly admitted for such purpose, but not
as proof of facts related in the statements.
In State v. Taylor," a prosecution for murder, defendant sought to
introduce in evidence by witnesses statements allegedly made by a third
person, an employee of the deceased, that the employee had received two
fetters from the deceased after his disappearance. The particular employee
was present in court but apparently the defendant did not want to make
the employee his witness as he had testified against the defendant as a
51. 348 Mo. 32, 152 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
52. 347 Mo. 189, 146 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941).
53. 347 Mo. 607, 148 S. W. (2d) 802 (1941).
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witness for the state at a previous trial. Apparently the state, likewise,
did not want to make the employee a state's witness as the said employee
was an ex-convict and the state did not desire to vouch for his testimony.
The supreme court held that the trial court ruled correctly in excluding the
evidence as being hearsay. The fact that the defendant did not want to
make the employee present in court defendant's witness did not justify the
admission of hearsay evidence.
VIII. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
In Cooper v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.," a personal injury action, during
cross-examination of one of defendant's medical witnesses by the plaintiff's
attorney, the attorney sought to frame a medical question from a medical
book that he held in his hand. Defendant's attorney objected that the
attorney for the plaintiff could not read out of the book unless the witness
recognized and agreed with the medical authority. The supreme court in
upholding the trial court, which overruled the objection, announces that it
is well settled that the contents of a medical text are not independent
evidence yet there is a legitimate use of such books on cross-examination;
that it is not necessary before propounding a medical question on crossexamination to a medical expert to ascertain whether the witness agrees with
the medical text from which the question is framed.
IX. OPINioN EvmENCE
In the ca'e of Mann v. Grim-Smithl Hospital and Clinic," a malpractice
action for alleged failure of medical physician to properly set and treat
the plaintiff's broken leg, the trial court, on objection, refused to permit
an osteopath to testify as an expert and refused to permit plaintiff's attorney to qualify the osteopath as an expert by proving that he was familiar
with the methods of reduction of fractures by both osteopathic and medical
physicians and that the methods were the same. The supreme court, in
reversing the rulings of the trial court, held that while a physician is entitled
to have his treatment of his patient tested by the rules and principles of
the school of medicine to which he belongs, such rule does not mean that
no testimony of a practitioner of one school is competent in a malpractice
case against a practitioner of another school; that in a malpractice action
against a medical physician, an osteopath is competent to express an opin54. 347 Mo. 555, 148 S. W. (2d) 773 (1941).

55. 347 Mo. 348, 147 S. W. (2d) 606 (1941).
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ion as to matters of diagnosis and to testify to any scientific fact that is,
or ought to be, known to every physician and surgeon of every school or
system. The supreme court points out that the osteopath should have been
permitted to testify that from his study of books and from his experience
gained over a long period of time practicing with medical physicians that
the methods of reduction of fractures by an osteopathic physician and a
medical physician were the same; that the same text books and authorities
were used by the followers of both schools; that such evidence showed that
the osteopath was qualified to testify as an expert. In considering certain
objections made the court points out:
"It is, of course, no ground for exclusion of the testimony of an
expert witness to say that a question calls for an opinion or conclusion or invades the province of the jury, so long as the question
does not call for a conclusion of law."
In Richleson v. Roebber,56 likewise a malpractice suit involving a broken
leg, the supreme court held that expert evidence is not always essential in
malpractice cases to make an issue for the jury-in some cases the result
of the treatment itself may be sufficient. The court ruled in the particular
case that the x-ray photograph of the broken leg, disclosing a very unsatisfactory result of the treatment by defendant, coupled with defendant's admission that he had advised the patient that the treatment employed would
not achieve satisfactory results and that an operation would be necessary,
made a jury case without any expert evidence to establish defendant's negligence, where the evidence as to whether defendant advised an operation
and whether the patient refused to submit thereto was conflicting.
In Baptiste v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Lois,5 7 a will contest
action founded on the mental incapacity of the testator and undue influence, it was held proper to permit contestant's expert on mental diseases to
give an opinion, based on a hypothetical question, that testator was of unsound mind when he executed the alleged will and codicil but that it was
error, invading the province of the jury, to permit the expert, over objection, to give his opinion as to whether the testator had sufficient mentality
to know the general nature of his property and the persons to whom he
desired to give it (testamentary capacity). The court points out that a
witness is not to be permitted to express an opinion upon the question&
directly in issue and thereby invade the province of the jury.
56. 159 S. W. (2d) 658 (Mo. 1941).
57. 148 S. W. (2d) 743 (Mo. 1941).
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8 and Wild v. Pitcairn,"9 both personal
In the cases of Bebout v. KurnP
injury actions, it was held that the qualification of a physician as an expert
is largely within the trial court's discretion. In said Bebout case the court
states the general qualification rule, -namely: an expert witness must possess
knowledge from education or experience which will aid an ordinary jury
in forming an opinion on the subject matter of the inquiry where from
common experience the jury could not do so correctly. In the same case
the court held that an expert witness who had never been a locomotive
engineer, but who had had operating experience on locomotives for many
years, could give his opinion as an expert as to the distance within which
a train could be stopped at given hypothetical speeds by the use of emergency brakes. In said Wild case it was held that a physician could give
his opinion that a switchman's injuries were due to a fall, that the switchman would suffer future pain and that the injuries were permanent as these
were matters for expert testimony.
In Arnold v. Alton R. R.,6 1 a personal injury action, the deposition of
defendant's head brakeman was read in evidence by the plaintiff. The court
refused to allow that part of the cross-examination that expressed his opinion
as to whether or not the movement of the engine at the time in question was
sufficient to cause the glass in the window to break, and providing it did
break, if the glass would fall outside of the engine cab. The supreme court
upholding the ruling of the trial court again points out that the question of
the qualification of an expert witness is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court; that in the particular case the witness was a brakeman
and not a fireman or an engineer. The supreme court also points out that the
trial court permitted firemen and engineers to give their opinion on these
questions but was apparently convinced that brakemen were not qualified
as expert witnesses on the particular matter.
In the case of Walter v. Alt,61 a will contest, the court held that where
the opinions of lay witnesses that the testator was of unsound mind at the
time he executed the will were not based on facts inconsistent with sanity,
the opinions were wholly valueless, had no probative value, and such statements of opinions would not compel a submission of the issue of testamentary
capacity to the jury.

58. 348 Mo. 501, 154 S. W. (2d) 120 (1941).
59. 347 Mo. 915, 149 S. W. (2d) 800 (1941).
60. 348 Mo. 516, 154 S. W. (2d) 58 (1941).
61.

348 Mo. 53, 152 S. W. (2d) 135 (1941).
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WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In the case of Murphy v. Doniphan Telephone Co., 62 an action by the
members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission to recover contributions allegedly due under the Unemployment Compensation Act, it is
held that the court, sitting as a jury, was not required to believe the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, even if their testimony was not impeached or
contradicted and that the rule would apply to the testimony-of defendant's
president although offered as a witness by the plaintiff.
In Carpenter v. Kurn,68 an action for death of a person struck by a
train while sitting on a railroad track, the court held that the jury had the
right to disbelieve defendants' evidence.
In Murphy v. Fred Wolfernu, Inc.,64 the court announced the rule
that a court may properly reject evidence which is contrary to the physical
facts or to known physical laws, or which is the result of evident mistake
or ignorance, or, in short, when the evidence itself, or the other established
facts, discloses its inherent infirmities, but that it requires an extraordinary
case to authorize the court to regard sworn testimony as manifestly impossible and untrue. In the particular case it was held that the testimony
of defendant's witnesses that the plaintiff after a fall from a stair landing
was lying three or four feet from the steps leading to the landing, was not
contrary to physical law; that there was a mere conflict of evidence and
the jury was the judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
In Long v. Mild, 5 involving a collison between an automobile and a
truck making a left-hand turn in front of the approaching automobile, the
supreme court held that the testimony of the truck driver that he was
driving 10 to 15 miles per hour before making the turn and that when the
collision occurred he was driving about 5 miles per hour, was not required
to be disregarded as contrary to physical laws and the physical facts on the
ground that the testimony amounted to a claim that while the truck
traveled about 30 feet at 10 miles per hour before the collision, the automobile in which plaintiff was traveling, traveled more than 300 feet, or in
excess of 100 miles per hour, greatly in excess of the speed the automobile
was able to make. The court points out that the speeds and distances testified to were all estimates and not accurate measurements.
62.
63.
64.
65.

347
348
347
347

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

372, 147 S. W. (2d) 616 (1941).
1132, 157 S. W. (2d) 213 (1941).
634, 148 S. W. (2d) 481 (1941).
1002, 149 S. W. (2d) 853 (1941).
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Thompson,68

In Mickel v.
a personal injury action, several physicians
testified as witnesses for the defendant, their testimony being to the effect
that plaintiff's injuries were not very serious. In connection with such testimony the court points out that the jury was the sole judge of the weight
of the medical evidence regarding plaintiff's injuries and of the credibility
of the witnesses.
In the case of McCall v. Thompson,67 involving the death of a motorist
at a railroad crossing, the plaintiff introduced the locomotive engineer as his
own witness. The engineer testified that when he was 500 feet from the
crossing and when deceased was 40 feet from the crossing, he realized that
the automobile was not going to stop, gave the alarm whistle and at the
same-time turned on the valve for the emergency brakes. The court held
that plaintiff was not bound by the engineer's testimony, insofar as it was
contradicted by evidence of other witnesses and that the jury was at liberty
to believe part of the engineer's testimony and disbelieve any part that conflicted with plaintiff's other evidence. In brief, the jury could disbelieve the
engineer's testimony that he immediately applied the emergency brakes and
believe the other testimony of the engineer and of other witnesses. The
court likewise held that the evidence was sufficient to make a case for the
jury.
In Richeson v. Roebber,8 a malpractice suit, the plaintiff introduced
the deposition of the defendant. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was bound by the evidence thus introduced and, therefore, plaintiff's
case must fail. The court held, however, that the plaintiff would only be
bound by the evidence contained in the deposition, if the deposition contained the only evidence on a particular essential point, but that if other
witnesses contradicted the evidence contained in such deposition the plaintiff was not bound thereby; that the plaintiff had the right to introduce
evidence contradicting that given by the defendant even though the plaintiff called the defendant as a witness; that by so doing the rule that a party
may not directly impeach his own witness, is not violated.
In Walter v. Alt,"' a will contest action, the supreme court defines "substantial evidence" as evidence from which the triers of the fact reasonably
could find the issue in harmony therewith. The court also rules that in
66.
67.
68.
69.

348
348
159
348

Mo. 991, 156 S. W. (2d) 721 (1941).
Mo. 795, 155 S. W. (2d) 161 (1941).
S. W. (2d) 658 (Mo. 1941).
Mo. 53, 152 S. W. (2d) 135 (1941).
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determining the sufficiency of contestants' evidence in a will case, on motion for directed verdict, the contestants' evidence must be considered as
a whole, not merely part of it isolated from the rest, and outstanding conceded facts, may not be disregarded.70
In the case of Adams v. Adams,71 a partition suit, the appealing defendant filed a separate answer and cross bill claiming title to the real estate
involved through a resulting trust and also, in the alternative, asking credit
for taxes paid on the real estate over a period of about 25 years. The supreme
court upheld the chancellor in refusing to decree a resulting trust in favor
of appellant because the evidence was not of the clear and convincing character required by the law. But reversed and remanded the case in order
that an accounting could be made of all taxes on the lot shown by the record
to have been paid by appellant. The supreme court points out that the
appealing defendant is required to establish the fact of paying the taxes
and the intent with which he did it, by the greater weight of the evidence
only and not by the high degree of proof exacted when one attempts to
establish a resulting trust. In this connection the court states:
"There is nothing unique in requiring a litigant to establish
one branch of his case or defense by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence under the rule of law applicable thereto, and in holding
him only to proof by the greater weight of the evidence on another
branch, in conformity with a different rule applying in the latter
72
instance.1
In Steeley v. Kurn, 7 the plaintiff was injured when he and fellow employees were lifting a heavy rod and one of the fellow employees released
his hold on the rod. The plaintiff testified that the fellow employee "just
deliberately turned it loose." The defendant objected to such testimony and
the court sustained the objection. The defendant did not move to strike

70. Does not this rule undermine the form of res ipsa loquitur instruction
approved by Division 1 of the court in the case of Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104,
75 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1934), particularly that part of the instruction reading "unless
you find and believe from other facts and circumstances in evidence.".
71. 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S. IV. (2d) 610 (1941).
72. The above rule should not be confused with the rule announced and reaffirmed in Prentiss v. Illinois Life Insurance Co., 225 S. W. 695 (Mo. 1920), that
in civil cases, even where the cause of action or defense is based upon a criminal
charge a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient for recovery although the evidence is all circumstantial. The crime charged in a civil case need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Grand Lodge of United Brothers of Friendship v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 324 Mo. 938, 25 S. W. (2d) 783 (1930).
, 73. 348 Mo. 1142, 157 S. W. (2d) 212 (1941).
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the answer from the record. In this situation the court held that the answer
was evidence for the consideration of .the jury.
XI. WITNESSES

A. Attendance, competency and examination
In the contempt proceeding In re West, 74 an attorney failed to obey a
supreme court subpoenae duces tecnm to appear at a hearing before the
Advisory Committee of the Bar Administration on a charge of wrongfully
retaining a client's funds. The court held that the attorney was guilty of
contempt and it was no defense that his testimony before the committee
might incriminate him on charges of corruption in office as a justice of
the peace. In so ruling the court points out that the immunity afforded
a witness by the constitutional provision protecting him from self-incrimination is broad enough to protect him against such incrimination before any
tribunal in any proceeding-including a disbarment proceeding-and extends to preliminary proceedings as well as to final trial, but that such
constitutional provision against self-incrimination does not excuse one from
appearing before a designated tribunal when commanded so to do.
In State v. Oonway,75 a prosecution for grand larceny, the defendant
exercised her privilege against self-incrimination by not testifying at the
preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace and then later, at the trial,
testified as a witness in her own behalf. The prosecuting attorney, in crossexamining the defendant as a witness, was permitted, over objection, to
.show that the defendant had not testified at the preliminary hearing and
was likewise permitted, over objection, to argue to the jury that the defendant had not testified at the preliminary hearing. Defendant assigned
this as error. The supreme court ruled that the above conduct of the
prosecuting attorney constituted prejudicial error, as the privilege against
self-incrimination at a preliminary hearing is not waived by a defendant
who testifies at the trial after having availed himself of the privilege at
74. 348 Mo. 30, 152 S. W. (2d) 69 (1941). Compare with In re Fenn, 235
Mo. App. 24, 128 S. W. (2d) 657 (1939), where, in a disbarment proceeding, it is
held that when a lawyer charged with professional misconduct refuses to testify
at the hearing on charges made against him, his refusal is to be taken as a strong
circumstance against him and his silence is in and of itself an act of professional
misconduct warranting the severest condemnation of the court, and compare with
In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S. W. (2d) 594 (1937), where it is announced
that the hearing iii a disbarment proceeding should not be limited or circumscribed
by the strict rules of evidence.
75. 348 Mo. 580, 154 S. W. (2d) 128 (1941).
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the preliminary hearing; that it is prejudicial error under such circumstances to advise the jury that the defendant exercised her privilege against
self-incrimination at the preliminary hearing. The court points out that
there are no criminal cases in this state passing directly on the point here
involved. In passing on the case, the supreme court recognizes the broad
rule and constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as announced
in the West case, sipra.7T The c6urt also recognizes that a defendant who
voluntarily testifies at a coroner's inquest or other preliminary proceedings,
waives the privilege against self-incrimination but distinguishes the situation involved in the particular case.
In Demonbruzn v. McHaffle,"7 an action against a physician because of
an alleged abortion performed upon plaintiffs wife without plaintiff's consent, the plaintiff called as a witness a doctor who had treated plaintiff's
wife immediately after the alleged abortion and some time prior thereto.
This doctor testified that there was nothing to indicate, from his examination, an abortion, and that the wife's condition could be attributable to
something else. On cross-examination, over plaintiff's objection, the physician was permitted to testify that he had treated the wife at an earlier
date for an acute infection of the female organs and that he attributed the
wife's condition to such infection. The wife also testified as a witness for
plaintiff that she had been treated by the doctor above referred to and
that he had told her that she had an infection. On cross-examination the
plaintiff's wife also testified that the particular doctor had treated her
professionally some five months prior to the alleged abortion. The supreme
court held that the above evidence was properly admitted; that the jury,
plaintiff having opened the privileged domain, was entitled to the opinion
of the attending physician as to the cause of the wife's condition. Passing
upon the above matter the supreme court recognizes the rule that if a
patient waives the privilege respecting testimony by a physician concerning
information which the physician acquires from the patient while attending
patient in a professional character, the privilege ceases to exist, and such
privilege may not be waived in part and retained in part. The court in its
decision also points out that the objection to the cross-examination of the
physician on the ground of privilege was made by the plaintiff (the husband)
and not by the patient (the wife).
76. The same rule is also stated in State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S. W.
(2d) 749 (1941).
77. 348 Mo. 1120, 156 S. W. (2d) 923 (1941).
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State v. Koelzer,7T

In
it is held that a wife is a competent witness against
her husband in a prosecution for attempted murder by poisoning of the
wife by her husband.
B. Credibility, impeackment and corroboration
In the case of Arnold v. Alton R. R.,79 a personal injury action in
which the plaintiff sought damages for an injury to his left eye caused by
glass breaking in a window of an engine cab, the defendant sought to impeach the plaintiff as a witness by showing that he had had a prior accident.
The trial court excluded such proof but advised counsel that if the left eye
was injured in the prior accident this could be brought out. In upholding
the action of the trial court in excluding evidence as to the prior accident
the court recognized the rule that, subject to a judicial discretion of the
trial court, a witness may, for the purpose of impeachment, be asked
whether he has committed particular wrongful or immoral acts, subject to
his right to refuse to answer incriminating questions, even though such facts
or acts may be collateral to the principal controversy, but that in such
case the cross-examiner is bound by the witness's answer. The court held
in the particular case that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in
excluding the offered evidence. The supreme court likewise upheld the
action of the trial court in permitting the cross-examination of defendant's
witness, who had testified on direct examination that plaintiff's reputation
for truth and veracity in his home county was bad, to bring out that the
witness had sworn to an application for a change of venue on account of
the undue influence that plaintiff had over the inhabitants of his home
county. The court held that this was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Again, the supreme court upheld the action of the trial court in
permitting five jurors on the first trial to testify in the second trial that the
vision window (produced in court) did not move in its frame with the
ease that it did at the time of the first trial and in denying the defendant
cross-examination of said jurors to ascertain how they voted on the first
trial. The supreme court in this connection rules that the interest of a witness with respect to the issue on trial is never irrelevant but that how a
former juror voted is not an issue at a subsequent trial.
In the case of State v. Posey, 0 a homicide prosecution, a witnesq for
78. 348 Mo. 468, 154 S. W. (2d) 84 (1941).
79. 348 Mo. 516, 154 S. W. (2d) 58 (1941).
80. 347 Mo. 1088, 152 S. W. (2d) 34 (1941).
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the state on cross-examination was asked whether the witness had told a
designated person at a specified place, shortly after witness had been
released from jail, that "they didn't have the guilty parties". The question
was asked for the purpose of laying a foundation for the impeachment of
the witness. The supreme court held that the answer to the above question
was properly excluded as the question was too general in not specifying to
whom the word "they" referred or what crime the "parties" had been guilty
of, or who the "parties" were. In this case the supreme court also upheld
the trial court in sustaining an objection to a question asked a witness for
the state on cross-examination as to why the prosecuting attorney had not
used the witness at the preliminary hearing. The question was excluded on
the ground that the state would not be bound by the witness's conclusion.
In the case of Palm v. Maguire,8' a will contest, the supreme court held
testimony that the chief beneficiary under the will had held church membership and executed legal documents under an assumed name, was properly
admitted to impeach his testimony that he never assumed such name.
XII.

CRIMINAL LAW

A. Presumptionsand burden of proof

In the case of State v. Peterson,82 a first degree murder prosecution, the
defendant pleaded insanity. In upholding the action of the trial court in
refusing defendant's instruction with reference to insanity, the supreme court
held that the burden of showing that an accused was insane at the time of
the commission of the particular act charged is upon the defendant and that
proof of mere temporary or recurrent insanity at a prior time is not sufficient to rebut or overcome the legal presumption of sanity and to impose
on the state the burden of producing evidence that at the time the act was
committed, the defendant was sane. With reference to the facts in the
particular case the court held that though the defendant was adjudged
insane in another state nearly five years prior to the homicide, in the absence
of a showing of the form of that insanity, no presumption or inference would
be indulged that it was chronic or permanent or of a nature from which
there could be no recovery or that such insanity continued down to and
at the very time of the killing.
81. 347 Mo. 189, 146 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941).
82. 154 S. W. (2d) 134 (Mo. 1941).
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B. Materiality, relevancy and competency

In State v. Conway, 3 a prosecution for grand larceny, a witness for
the state was asked if the person who claimed to having been robbed made
complaint and the witness answered in the affirmative. The defendant
objected on the ground that the question called for hearsay, a self-serving
declaration not a part of the res gestae and was prejudicial. In ruling the
point the supreme court recognized the general rule that statements or
declarations of the person injured by a crime are not admissible unless they
are a part of the res gestae or unless they come within one of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as dying declarations or admissions by
the accused, or for the purpose of impeachment. In the particular case it
was held that, though the statement was made an hour after the occurrence,
it did not accuse the defendants or in any way connect them with the
larceny and that there was no dispute that a larceny occurred. The error
in admitting the above evidence was therefore held harmless and not prejudicial.
In the case of State v. Koelzer,8 4 a prosecution for attempted murder,
the evidence showed that police officers had been called to the defendant's
house where poison capsules were pointed out to them and they were given
permission by defendant's wife to take possession of the capsules. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress, any evidence with reference to the
capsules on the theory that the officers obtained the exhibits by an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court admitted the evidence and the
supreme court in upholding-the trial court, based upon the above facts,
held that the officers did not in fact make a search of defendant's premises.
The court in this case also held that the admission in evidence of said
exhibits was not error on the ground that the exhibits were not properly
identified where all persons who had had possession of the exhibits testified
and identified the exhibits.
C. Evidence of character and other offenses

In State v. Nienaber,8 ' the accused introduced evidence that his reputation for honesty and for being a law-abiding citizen was good. The court held
that an accused may show good character by evidence of general reputation.
In the case of State v. Patterson,"" a prosecution for grand larceny, a
83. 348 Mo. 580, 154 S. W. (2d) 128 (1941).

84. 348 Mo. 468, 154 S. W. (2d) 84 (1941).

85. 347 Mo. 541, 148 S. W. (2d) 537 (1941).
86. 347 Mo. 802, 149 S. W. (2d) 332 (1941).
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witness testified that the accused had made statements to him that he had
killed the former owner of the property with respect to which he was on
trial. There was no proof that the other crime had been committed (no
corpus delicit proven). The court in ruling that said evidence was improperly admitted stated the general rule that evidence of other crimes,
independent of that for which defendant is on trial, is not admissible, but
that such rule does not apply where the evidence tends directly to prove
the guilt of the crime charged. In the particular case the court held that the
defendant's statement, if it be regarded as an extrajudicial confession, was
not admissible to show the other crime, in the absence of proof that such
other crime had been committed.
D. Admissions and confessions
In the case of State v. Dowling,8" a prosecution for assault with intent
to kill, a detective was permitted to testify that the defendant, while under
arrest, had stated, when questioned as to his whereabouts, that he was not
going to say anything until he had seen an attorney. The supreme court
in holding that the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error,
analyzes and states the various rules with respect to both express and silent
or implied admissions made by a defendant in a criminal case. The following
rules were recognized by the court: (a) silence of the accused when not
under arrest, and in circumstances such that only a guilty person would have
remained silent, may be shown, but after arrest or while in custody the
evidence is inadmissible because the accused is under no duty to speak;
(b) in a criminal prosecution, it cannot be proven that an accused said he
declined to answer on advice of counsel, oi refused to give a statement, or
declared that he had nothing to say, or had been warned his statement would
be used against him; (c) voluntary admissions against interest made by a
defendant while under arrest are admissible in evidence but proof of a
defendant's refusal, oral or mute, to make damaging admissions against
interest while under arrest does not show voluntary action on his part; (d)
the rule that the state is entitled to prove an entire conversation where part
of it is shown applies only where part of the same conversation is incriminating and part is not.
In the case of State v. Di Stefano,"" a prosecution for murder, the court
87. 348 Mo. 589, 154 S. W. (2d) 749 (1941).
88. 152 S. W. (2d) 20 (Mo. 1941).
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laid down the following rules concerning confessions: (a) the state has the
burden of proving that the alleged confession of defendant was voluntarily
made in order to authorize .the admission of the confession in evidence; (b)
if the defendant objects to the admission of the confession on the ground
that it is involuntary, and requests a preliminary inquiry out of the presence
of the jury, the same should be granted; (c) if at the preliminary inquiry
the evidence is conflicting and substantial, the court may determine the
mixed question of law and fact by weighing the evidence, and if convinced
one way or the other should rule accordingly; (d) if there be substantial
'conflicting evidence at the preliminary inquiry, and the question is close,
it is better to refer the underlying issue of voluntariness to the jury rather
than to exclude the confession; and (e) unless manifest error has been
committed, the reviewing court will defer to the trial court's ruling in view
of its better opportunity to arrive at the truth.
In State v. La Mance,89 a murder prosecution, the defendant introduced
evidence to the effect that two days prior to the alleged murder, the deceased,
while attempting to enter an auto, struck her head causing her great pain.
The state introduced evidence of statements alleged to have been made
by the same witness which contradicted his evidence. Defendant called
another witness and offered to prove that the deceased two days prior to the
alleged murder complained of her head hurting and stated that she had
struck it against tlhe auto that afternoon. This offer of proof was rejected
by the trial court on the ground of hearsay. The supreme court held that
the evidence should have been admtted. The injury to the head was one of
the causes that might have contributed to her death. The evidence was
therefore of vital importance to the defense. The court ruled that conversations had between a person whose health or bodily condition is in question
and a witness, are admissible, even though made to a person other than a
medical attendant.
E. Opinionm evidence
In the case of State v. La Mance just referred to, an undertaker of 14
years experience, who had served as a coroner, and who testified that he had
observed bodies in a state of decomposition, was held competent to express
an opinion as to the conditions that are usually found in such bodies, the
value and weight of such opinion being for the jury. The supreme court
held, however, that the opinion of said witness, who was not a medical expert,
89. 348 Mo. 484, 154 S. W. (2d) 110 (1941).
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as regards the cause of the bruise found on the head of deceased or of the
injury to the head of the deceased, was properly rejected.
F. Weight-Circumstantialevidence
In State v. Schrum,9" defendant was convicted of stealing chickens in
the night-time. Defendant admitted that he owned the automobile in which
the thief or thieves made their get away. Defendant was not identified as
being at the scene of the crime. The supreme court held that the evidence
was insufficient to support the conviction and in so doing stated the rule
that where a conviction is sought on circumstantial evidence alone, the
circumstances must be consistent with each other and with the hypothesis
of the defendant's guilt, and inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis, including that of innocence-that they must be irreconcilable with
the innocence of the accused.

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
RUSH H. LIMBAUGH*
I.

CERTIORARI

A. Used by Circuit Court and Reviewed by Supreme Court on. Appeal
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1940,1 it was
pointed out that the statutory powers with which the supreme court is
vested in the use of the extraordinary writ of certiorariare like the common
law powers with which the judiciary is vested in the use of that writ. The
court used the writ in that case to review proceedings of tax assessment
agencies, a use that is unique in that it is directed against an agency not
altogether judicial in character.2 That circuit courts may make the same
use of the writ against agencies of a quasi-judicial character and the
supreme court review their decisions on appeal as in other cases, was held
in State ex rel. Lane v. Corneli.3 In that case the writ was issued originally
by the circuit court and it was directed to the members of the county board
90. 347 Mo. 1060, 152 S. W. (2d) 17 (1941).
*Attorney, Cape Girardeau. A.B., University of Missouri, 1916. Author of
PLEADING, PRACrIcE, PROCEDURE AND FoiMs IN MissouRI (1937).
1. State ex rel. St Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 139 S. W.

(2d) 958 (1940).

2. Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1940
(Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1941) 6 Mo. L. REV. 432-433.
3. 347 Mo. 932, 149 S. W. (2d) 815 (1941).
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of equalization to review proceedings in which the board had made an order
for the assessment of personal property belonging to the estate of a decedent.
After a hearing the circuit court held that the board exceeded its authority
in entering the order for the assessment of the property, and quashed the
record of the board making the order for the assessment. When the case
reached the supreme court on appeal, that court confined its review to the
record made by the board and found that according to that record the
board did not exceed its jurisdiction in making the order of assessment, and
remanded the cause to the circuit court with directions to quash the writ
and dismiss relator's petition.
In State ex rel. Moore v. Glassco,4 the supreme court reviewed on
appeal the action of a circuit court in using the writ of certiorarito review
a record of the members of the Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement
System of the City of St. Louis in which that board denied an application
by the widow of a former member of the St. Louis police force for an allowance of accidental death benefits. The circuit court quashed the record
of the board and directed the board to allow the claim, but the supreme
court held that the action of the board denying the claim was correct, and
it reversed the cause.
Where a circuit court issued a writ of certiorarito a probate court to
review a proceeding in the probate court in which an order had been entered
confirming the proof of a will made in vacation, and after reviewing the
proceeding quashed its writ, the supreme court, to which the case was taken
by appeal, held, in State ex rel. Callahan v. Hess,5 that the probate court
had jurisdiction and power to enter the order and affirmed the judgment
quashing the writ. Judge Ellison filed a dissent in the case, in which he
contended that where a probate court made an order admitting a will to
probate in vacation but did not enter an order in term time confirming
the vacation order, following which a suit was brought to contest the will,
which suit failed because the order had not been made in term time confirming the vacation order, and, pending the appeal in the will contest case
and without notice to the parties, the probate court entered an order in
term time confirming the vacation order admitting the will to probate
and the time within which a suit to contest a will may be filed expired
before the contestants learned of the term-time order admitting the will to
4. 347 Mo. 977, 149 S. W. (2d) 848 (1941).
5. 348 Mo. 388, 153 S. W. (2d) 713 (1941).
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probate, such order was contemptuous and void as a matter of public
policy.
B. To Review Records of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals
Proceedings of the State Tax Commission of Missouri assessing a
corporation franchise tax, and the certification by the state tax commission
to the state auditor and the latter's certification to the state treasurer
of the amount of such tax, are subject to review by the supreme court under
a writ of certiorari. In State ex tel. Central Surety Insurance Corp. v. State
Tax Commission and State ex tel. Central Surety Fire Corp. v. State Tax
Comnission,6 two cases involving the same character of proceedings and
Which were consolidated and determined together, the records assessing such
tax against the relators, one engaged in writing general casualty insurance
and the other engaged in writing fire insurance, were quashed. The tax
assessments were held void for the reason that under the statute the relators
are exempt from paying the annual franchise tax because they pay an annual tax on their gross premium receipts. This use of the writ to review
7
the proceedings of the state tax commission is not new.
C. To Review Records of Circuit Courts
In a case that attracted wide public interest and extensive lay discussion, State ex tel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman,8 the supreme court used

the extraordinary writ of certiorari to review contempt proceedings in a
circuit court. After certain criminal proceedings were had in one of the
divisions of the circuit court in the city of St. Louis, in which the trial judge
directed the acquittal of a defendant, following which the circuit attorney
dismissed a case pending, against another defendant charged with the same
offense, and before cases pending against two other defendants on similar
charges had been reached for trial, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published
editorials and cartoons which were scathingly critical of the action of the
judge presiding over the division of the circuit court where this action
occurred and these cases were pending and of -the circuit attorney who
was prosecuting the cases. The circuit attorney filed informations charging
the newspaper, its editor and its cartoonist with contempt. The court
found the parties proceeded against guilty as charged. The issuance of
the extraordinary writ followed. While the proceedings were pending the
6. 348 Mo. 171, 153 S. W. (2d) 43 (1941).
7. Limbaugh, supra note 2, at 432-434.
8. 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941).
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circuit judge died and another was substituted in his place. After reviewing the contempt proceeding brought up from the circuit court, the supreme court quashed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that to
rule otherwise would be to narrow the limits of permissible criticism so
greatly that the right to criticise would cease to have practical value. This
case presents an excellent example of judicial restraint wisely exercised
in defense of an ancient principle of liberty in America, the freedom of
the press.
D. To Review Records of Courts'of Appeals
1. Summary of Opinions Reviewed in 1941
The number and result of the opinions of the courts of appeals reviewed
by certiorarivaries. In 1941 the supreme court reviewed seventeen opinions
by the courts of appeals. In 1940 it reviewed fourteen, 9 in 1939 twentysix'0 in 1938 eighteen,1 1 and in 1937.12 Two of the cases reviewed in 1941
were reviewed by division two of the court, eight were reviewed by division
one of the court, and seven were reviewed by the court en bane. Twelve
of the cases reviewed were decisions of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, and
five were decisions of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. As a result of the
review the writ was quashed in nine cases, and the record was quashed,
either as a whole or in part, in eight cases.
2. Nature of Remedy
The use of the extraordinary writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court
of Missouri to review opinions and decisions of the courts of appeals has
been so frequent in recent years that the availability of the remedy for
other purposes is likely to be overlooked and its importance minimized.
The broad powers that may be exercised by the court in the use of the
writ of certiorari against other courts and agencies have been revealed
anew and reemphasized by the court in recent important decisions that
illustrate the searching review that may be made of proceedings of other
courts and quasi-judicial agencies and the staying hand that may be laid
9. Limbaugh, supra note 2, at 435.
10. Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1939
(Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 433.

11. Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 389.
12. Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1937
(Extraordinary Legal Remedies) (1938) 3 Mo..L. REv. 383.
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authority.' 3

upon their actions when exercised without
In fact, these lessfrequent uses of the remedy are the more natural, and they are more in
keeping with the original purpose of the remedy than that use made of
the remedy in our recent appellate practice.
The cases actually decided by the supreme court do not indicate the
extent to which the labors of the court have been increased by the use of
the certiorari writ against the courts of appeals, for the cases herein referred
to represent those cases only where writs were actually granted. The reported decisions of the court do not disclose the number of applications
made to the court for writs of certiorariwherein no writ was granted. But
the applications are of necessity numerous, for the remedy is now almost
always sought by the losing litigant in a court of appeals as an improvised
additional appeal.
Except for the inquiry as to the jurisdictional power of a court of
appeals to decide a case, 14 the supreme court is concerned in its review
of a court of appeals decision only with the question as to whether the
decision conflicts with a former decision of the supreme court. In none of
the cases considered by the court on certiorariin 1941 was the jurisdiction
of the court of appeals to decide, the case under review, apart from the
question of conflict, challenged. The cases subsequently discussed under
this topic, therefore, have to do with the sole question of conflict. Where
that question arose in these cases the court considered: (1) The purpose
of review where the question of conflict is raised; (2) the essentials of
conflict; (3) the limitations of the inquiry as to conflict; (4) rules observed
in determining whether there is conflict; (5) specific instances of conflict;
and (6) cases where no conflict exists.
13. In State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 139 S. V.

(2d) 958 (1940); State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans, 346 Mo. 209, 139 S. W.
(2d) 967 (1940); and in State ex rel. Lane v. Corneli, 347 Mo. 932, 149 S. W. (2d)

815 (1941), the court has discussed the nature and extent of these broad powers

vested in the court to be exercised in connection with the use of the writ of
certiorariagainst courts and agencies other than the courts of appeals, and in State
ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941)
the court has illustrated by decisive action the effectiveness of the remedy when
used against a circuit court.
14. For a citation and discussion of recent cases where the supreme court on
certiorari has passed on the jurisdictional power of the courts of appeals to decide
a case under review even when there are no elements of conflict present, see Limbaugh, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938 (Extraordinary
Legal Remedies) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 389 at 392; Limbaugh, The Work of the
Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1940 (ExtraordinaryLegal Remedies) (1941)
6 Mo. L. REv. 435-436
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3. Purpose of Review
When used by the supreme court to review decisions of the courts of
appeals to ascertain whether there is conflict, the purpose of certiorari is to
secure uniformity in opinions and harmony in the law.",
4. Essentials of Conflict
In the interest of securing uniformity in opinions and harmony in the
law, the supreme court on certiorariwill quash opinions of courts of appeals
which declare some general principle of law contrary to a prior controlling
announcement upon the same principle by the supreme court, or which, on
a given state of facts, make some ruling contrary to a prior controlling
decision by the supreme court on equivalent or similar facts. The essential
elements of conflict necessary to authorize the supreme court to quashoan
opinion of a court of appeals were thus repeated in a statement of the
existing rule in State ex rel. Kurn v. Httghes."'
To constitute conflict the facts of the case under review must be the
same as or similar to the facts embraced in the case with which it is compared.17 Obviously the facts do not have to be identical.18 It is sufficient
if the facts are essentially similar.19 Facts in the case under review and in
the case with which it is compared are sufficiently similar if both sets of
20
facts as a matter of law require the application of the same rule.
5. Limitations of Inquiry As To Conflict
In determining whether there is conflict, the supreme court is limited
to a consideration of such facts as appear in the opinion of the court of
appeals under review,2 ' and in the record documents such as pleadings,
instructions, and to other documents specifically referred to in such opinion,22 such as the insurance policy and application where the action involves
15. State ex rel. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Shain, 348 Mo. 650,
154 S. W. (2d) 775 (1941).
16. 348 Mo. 177, 153 S. W. (2d) 46 (1941). See also a statement of the
rule in State ex rel. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Shain, 348 Mo. 650,
154 S. W. (2d) 775 (1941).
17. Ibid.; State ex rel. Chapman v. Shain, 347 Mo. 308, 147 S. W. (2d) 457
(1941).
18. Ibid.
19. State ex rel. Chapman v. Shain, 347 Mo. 308, 147 S. W. (2d) 457 (1941).

20. State ex rel. Kum v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 177, 153 S. W. (2d) 46 (1941).
21. State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S.W.

(2d) 251 (1941); State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes, 347 Mo. 968, 149 S. W. (2d) 836

(1941).

22. State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain, and State ex rel. Rosanbalm v. Shain,

159 S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1941).
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an insurance policy and such documents are referred to in the opinion.23
The supreme court cannot go to the original record to ascertain any facts
not stated in the opinion of the court of appeals. 24 Even though the supreme
court finds that a statement by the court of appeals of the facts underlying
the case is meager and does not detail all the evidence, it is, nevertheless,
bound by such statement and will not search for the excluded facts beyond
the court of appeals' opinion.25 As the court said in State ex rel. Emery,
Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Shan,2 it is limited to a consideration of
the facts as found in the opinion by the court of appeals and to the issues
presented to that court.
6. Rules Observed in Determining Whether There Is Conflict
In reviewing an opinion of a court of appeals on certiorari to determine whether there is a conflict between it and a prior controlling opinion
of the supreme court, rules in addition to those pertaining to procedure are
observed. Thus, as was repeated- in State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Hughzes, 27 the supreme court cannot consider the merits of the
opinion under review. And, as stated in State ex rel. Robb v. Shain,28 and
in State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes,2 9 a portion of an opinion that is obiter
dictum and which deals with a situation which the court did not have before
it in deciding a case that is being compared with a decision of a court of
appeals under review, will not be considered. Such portion of an opinion
is not a decision of a question before the supreme court. When a court of
appeals makes a statement as to how it proceeded in considering a case, as
where it stated that it had followed the rule requiring an appellate court
to take plaintiff's evidence as true, to give plaintiff the benefit of favorable
inferences arising from all evidence, and to disregard defendant's evidence
where it conflicts with plaintiff's evidence, the supreme court in reviewing
the opinion on certiorariwill assume that the court of appeals observed the
rule in deciding the case. This rule or policy was announced in State ex rel.
St. Louis Car Co. v. Hughes.30
23. State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S. W. (2d)
132 (Mo. 1941).
24. State ex rel. 'rhompson v. Shain and State ex rel. Rosanbalm v. Shain, 159
S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1941).
25. Ibid.
26. 348 Mo. 650, 154 S.W. (2d) 775 (1941).
27. 348 Mo.829, 155 S.W. (2d) 250 (1941).
28. 347 Mo.928, 149 S.W. (2d) 812 (1941).
29. 347 Mo.968, 149 S.W. (2d) 836 (1941).
30. 348 Mo.125, 152 S.W. (2d) 193 (1941).
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In State ex -el. Nevin v. Hughes, ' the court repeated the rule that an
opinion of a division of the supreme court does not overrule a prior decision
of the court en banc. But, as stated in State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp.
v. Hostetter,3 2 in the absence of an authoritative expression by the supreme
court en banc upon a point decided by a division of the court, a court of
appeals must follow the decision of the division of the supreme court.
7.

Specific Instances of Conflict

A decision by a court of appeals that in an action for injuries to a guest
in an automobile which collided with the rear end of a truck loaded with
hay, which was being transported'to defendant's farm, whether the relation
of master and servant existed between defendant and truck owner's employee driving truck was a question for the jury, even though the evidence
showed that the truck owner exercised some control, was held to be in
conflict with prior decisions of the supreme court, in the case of State ex iel.
83
Chapman v. Shain.
Where a court of appeals decided that a decision of another court of
appeals reversing outright a judgment for an insured on a group insurance
policy did not bar a subsequent action by the insured on the same policy,
the supreme court, in State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes,8 '
held that the decision was in conflict with prior decisions of the supreme
court to the effect that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to an
appellate court as well as to a trial court.
In State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes," it was
held that a decision by a court of appeals imposing the statutory penalty
for vexatious refusal to pay against an insurer who refused payment on a
policy because of misrepresentations made in the application regarding the
insured's health, on the ground that the insurer was charged with knowledge
of the facts concerning the insured's health, since the soliciting agent had
knowingly written false answers in the application without the insured's
knowledge, was in conflict with prior controlling decisions of the supreme
court.
A decision that an agreement of release of an employer by an injured
employee was made by the signing of the release, regardless of the terms of
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

347 Mo. 968, 149 S. W. (2d)
348 Mo. 841, 156 S. W. (2d)
347 Mo. 308, 147 S. W. (2d)
347 Mo. 549, 148 S. W. (2d)
152 S. W. (2d) 132 (1941).
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the release and the facts surrounding its procurement, was held, in State
ex rel. St. Louis Car Co. v. Hughes,8 to be in conflict with prior controlling
decisions of the supreme court, where it appeared that there was no meeting
of the minds, no agreement by employee and no consideration for the promise
of lifetime employment by the employer.
In State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes,3 it was held that
a decision by a court of appeals in a workmen's compensation proceeding
for disability of a carpenter due to coronary occlusion, resulting from the
carrying of a five-gallon bucket of water about 60 feet, which was a part of
a carpenter's regular duty, that such injury constituted an accident warranting an award of compensation on the theory that disability need not
result from mere accident but may result from accidental means, was in
conflict with supreme court's decisions.
A decision of a court of appeals that the failure of a railroad to remedy
a dangerous condition at a grade crossing or to take any precautions to
protect the traveling public against danger was wilful and justified an award
of punitive damages, notwithstanding truck driver's negligence in driving
upon the crossing, was held in conflict with a decision of the supreme court.88
In State ex rel. W. E. CallahanConst. Co. v. Hugh-es,39 it was held that
a decision by a court of appeals that the question as to whether a stone
quarry owner, whose employees left the handle on a cooper's bucket in an
upright and unlocked position, resulting in the death of a boy on whom the
handle fell when he jumped from the bucket to the ground, maintained an
"cattractive nuisance," was for the jury, should be quashed as in conflict
with controlling decisions of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain,40 it was held, in an action for the
death of a driver of an automobile struck by defendant's train at a railroad crossing, that a decision of a court of appeals on an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff that an instruction, given at plaintiff's request, was
erroneous as submitting two inconsistent theories of negligence in failing to
sound alarm and failure to slacken speed, was in conflict with previous
supreme court decisions.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

348 Mo. 125, 152 S.W. (2d) 193 (1941).
348 Mo. 319, 153 S. W. (2d) 40 (1941).
State ex rel. Kum v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 177, 153 S. W. (2d) 46 (1941).
348 Mo. 1209, 159 S.W. (2d) 251 (1941).
159 S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1941).-

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942

59

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1942], Art. 1

386

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

8. Cases Where There Is No Conflict
A decision that the common law rule requiring joint obligees to join
in a suit is not changed by statute requiring that all contracts which, by
common law, are joint only be construed to be joint and several, was held
not to conflict with decisions of the supreme court, in State ex rel. Elmer
41
v. Huges.
In State ex rel. Robb v. Shain,42 it was held that a decision that a valid
judgment rendered in Illinois is valid in Missouri and must be given full
faith and credit in Missouri, was not in conflict with a decision of the
supreme court holding that neither the "full faith and credit clause" nor any
act passed pursuant thereto prevents inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court in which the foreign judgment offered in evidence was rendered.
In State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes,43 itwas held, in an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when defendant's automobile in which plaintiff was riding collided with automobile operated by co-defendant, that
a decision that defendant could complain of trial court's action in giving
peremptory instruction in favor of co-defendant was not in conflict with
supreme court decisions.
In State ex tel. Ede v. Shain,44 the court held that a decision of a court
of appeals in an ejectment action did not disregard the trial court's findings
of fact so as to conflict with prior decisions of the supreme court holding
that a finding of fact by a trial judge in an action at law has weight and
effect of a jury verdict and is binding on an appellate court when supported
by substantial credible evidence.
A decision to the effect that evidence that a portion of a metal strip
on the step of a store was torn and that there was dirt under the strip was
sufficient to make fact issue for jury concerning question of notice of the
defect on the part of the store owner, was held in State ex rel. Emery, Bird,
Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. ShaiiO5 not in conflict with decisions of the supreme court against piling an inference on an inference.
In State ex rel. Bennett v. Hughes, 4 it was held that a decision that if
the petition in a libel action shows on its face that the bar of the statute
41. 347 Mo. 237, 146 S. W. (2d) 889 (1941).
42. 347 Mo. 928, 149 S.W. (2d) 812 (1941).

43. 347 Mo.968, 149 S.NV. (2d) 836 (1941).

44. 348 Mo.119, 152 S.W. (2d) 174 (1941).
45. 348 Mo.650, 154 S.W. (2d) 775 (1941).
46. 348 Mo.667, 155 S.W. (2d) 184 (1941).
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of limitations has become complete, a demurrer thereto on such ground
is proper and that statutory exceptions relieving plaintiff from such bar
should be pleaded by him, was not in conflict with opinions by the supreme
court.
Where it was held that statements in a physician's certificate were not
conclusive against the beneficiary in an action on a life policy on the issue
of sound health, where the physician explained and contradicted the certificate by his testimony, the supreme court said, in State ex rel. Johin
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes,47 that the decision was not in conflict with its prior decisions.
A decision that an appeal lies from an order overruling a motion to
set aside a judgment filed out of time and not ruled on at the same term
was held in State ex rel. Higginbotlam v. Hughes"8 not in conflict with
decisions by the supreme court.
And in State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hostetter,49 it was held
that a decision remanding for a new trial against a filling station owner
a case in which a jury exonerated such owner's lessee from liability to one
suing both owner and lessee for injuries sustained as a result of a fall on
an icy sloping driveway through the sidewalk adjoining the station, was
not in conflict with prior supreme court decisions.
II.

HABEAS

CORPUS

In Ex parte Rody,50 a convict in the state penitentiary sought a discharge from the penitentiary by a habeas corpus proceeding in which he
contended that he had served three-fourths of the term for which he had
been committed and, under the statute, was entitled to be released. His
application was opposed on the ground that while he was serving his term
and while he was being transferred under guard from the penitentiary to
a saw mill operated by the penitentiary, the petitioner escaped and was not
apprehended for three days. The warden of the penitentiary contended
that this conduct deprived the prisoner of the benefit of the three-fourths
rule by virtue of the provisions of the statute.51 The case involved a construction of the statute, and the court held that, under the provisions of
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

348 Mo. 829, 155 S. W. (2d) 250 (1941).
348 Mo. 1073, 156 S. W. (2d) 650 (1941).
348 Mo. 841, 156 S. W. (2d) 673 (1941).
348 Mo. 1, 152 S. W. (2d) 657 (1941).
Mo. REv. STAT. (.1939) § 9086.
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the statute requiring that a prisoner seeking the benefit of the threefourths rule must conduct himself in "an orderly and peaceable manner,
without having any infraction of the rules of the prison or law of the same
recorded against [him]," the petitioner was not entitled to his discharge.
The writ was quashed and the prisoner remanded to the custody of the
prison officials.
In Mattes v. Taylor52 the supreme court issued a habeas corpus writ
at the instance of a prisoner in the custody of officials of a foreign state.
The petitioner had been sentenced for a crime committed in Missouri and,
during the term for which he was sentenced, he had been granted ;Lparole
or conditional pardon by the governor, following which the governor issued
a rendition warrant and delivered the petitioner to the custody of officers
of the State of Washington. The petitioner contended that, sifice he had
been sentenced by a Missouri court and the sentence had been suspended
by executive parole, he was within the custody of the court and the governor
could not waive the jurisdiction of the state except by pardon. The court
held that it was not for a convict to say which state shall punish him when
he has violated the criminal law of two states, but that it is the right of
the asylum state to decide whether it will punish the prisoner or waive the
punishment and deliver him to the demanding state. The Governor of
Missouri had a right to waive the jurisdiction and custody of the prisoner,
and the officers of the State of Washington, into whose custody he had
been delivered, had the right to hold him. Having thus decided, the supreme
court quashed its writ of habeas corpus and remanded the petitioner to the
custody of the officers of the State of Washington.
Two additional cases of importance involving the use of the writ of
habeas corpus were decided by the supreme court in 1941. These cases,
Fitzpatrickv. Fitzsimmons and Coghlanv. Fitzsimmons5 8 were consolidated
with State ex rel. Pultizer Pub. Co. v. Coleman5 4 heretofore considered
under the discussion of cases in which the supreme court had reviewed
records of circuit courts by the use of the writ of certiorari." Fitzpatrick
and Coghlan, petitioners, were, respectively, cartoonist and editor of the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which had published material criticising action of
a circuit court and the circuit attorney in St. Louis in certain criminal
52. 348 Mo. 434, 153 S. W. (2d) 833 (1941).
53. 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941).
54. Ibid.

55. See discussion of this case in this division, supra at note 8.
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cases. For their part in this, the circuit court found these petitioners guilty
of contempt and sentenced them to imprisonment. The petitioners sough
release by habeas corpus. Holding that the published material related to
a case that was closed, and that publication, however scandalous, concerning a case which has been closed, is not punishable as a contempt; that,
even though the publication of the material for which the petitioners had
been found guilty and sentenced for contempt related to one of a series of
similar cases, some of which had not yet been determined, the published
material did not directly interfere with or influence the pending cases in the
series; and that the publications with which petitioners were connected did
not constitute punishable contempt, the court ordered that the petitioners
be discharged.
III.

MANDAMUS

By the use of the writ of nzdamus, in the case of State ex rel. Donnell
v. Osburn,5 6 the supreme court in the early part of 1941 terminated a
political controversy as to who had been elected Governor of Missouri
in the general election of 1940, by directing the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of Missouri to perform the duty the constitution imposed
upon him of opening and publishing the election returns for the office- of
governor, and declaring that the relator in that action, who had the highest
number of votes on the face of the election returns, had been elected governor. The events leading up to the decision in this case were given the
widest publicity and the decision by the court received nation-wide notice.
The election returns showed relator was elected governor by a plurality
of 3613 votes. When the general assembly convened for its regular session
and elected the speaker of the house, the official election returns for the
chief state officers were delivered to the speaker. Thereupon the senate and
the house met to witness the opening of the election returns. The speaker
declared the other state officers elected as shown by the returns, but he
declined to declare relator elected governor, even though the returns showed
his election, because the general assembly directed that he not do so until
a recount could be made pursuant to a resolution passed by the general
assembly charging fraud in the election and praying that there be an investigation and recount made under the supervision of a committee
appointed by the assembly.
On the day the term of office of the new governor began, he filed his
56. 347 Mo. 469, 147 S. W. (2d) 1065 (1941).
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petition in the supreme court for a writ of inandamus against the speaker
to compel him to open and publish the election returns for the office of
governor and to declare elected the person who received the highest number
of votes. The- court held that mndamus was the only remedy available
to the relator; that the constitution positively imposed on the speaker the
duty to open and publish the returns of the election and declare him eleced
to office who had received the highest number of votes; that the duty was
peremptory and ministerial, and in the performance of the duty the canvassers had no right to go behind the returns to determine the legality of
the votes cast; that wandamus lies to compel the speaker to perform the
duty imposed on him by the constitution; that the use of the writ of
mandamas for that purpose is not a judicial encroachment upon legislative
power contrary to our basic constitutional doctrine of the separation of
powers, for the reason that the nature of the action to be enforced involves
neither legislative duty -nor discretion. The court issued its peremptory
writ.

The public policy of the state embraced in its constitution and statutes
to segregate the white and negro races for the purpose of education was
again challenged in the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1941 in a mnandamus
action originating in the Circuit Court of Boone County and appealed to
the supreme court in State ex rel. Bluford v. Canada.57 The relator sought
to compel the registrar of the University of Missouri to admit her as a
student in the school of journalism of the University. An earlier case,68
wherein a colored applicant for admission to the school of law of the University used the same remedy, established a precedent on the chief issues
raised in this case. In affirming the judgment of the circuit court quashing
an alternative writ and denying a permanent writ, the supreme court held
that if, upon a proper demand by relator and after a reasonable time, the
course relator sought to pursue at the University of Missouri was not available at Lincoln University, she would be entitled to take that course if
offered at the University of Missouri.
A purchaser of real estate at a tax sale after the redemption period
57. 348 Mo. 298, 153 S. W. (2d) 12 (1941).
58. State ex Tel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W. (2d) 783 (1938),

rev'd, 305 U. S. 337 (1938), 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939). See comment on this case in Smith, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year
1939 (Corporations) (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 400-401, and Limbaugh, The Work of
the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1939 (Extraordinary Legal Remedies)
(1940) 5 Mo. L. Ray. 441.
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has expired under the Jones-Munger Act may use the writ of mandamus
to compel the collector who sells the real estate for taxes to make him a
deed.6 0 And if the purchaser is a municipality it is entitled to the deed
without paying taxes that were assessed and levied prior to the assessment
and levy of the taxes for which the property was sold, and without paying
the taxes which accrued during the period of redemption.
Mandamus was used successfully by St. Charles County, Missouri,
against the State Auditor of Missouri to compel the registration of refunding revenue bonds issued for the purpose of retiring outstanding toll bridge
61
revenue bonds, in State ex rel. St. Charles County v. Smith.
The same remedy was used unsuccessfully by Jefferson City, Missouri,
against the state auditor in State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Smith,62 in an
attempt to compel the registration of municipal bonds issued for the purpose
of constructing a building to house the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri. Holding that the bonds were not issued for municipal
purposes and were invalid, the court denied a peremptory writ of mandamus.
In State ex rel. Bank of Nashlua v. Holt6 3 the supreme court, in deciding
an appeal from the circuit court in a mandamus action, reversed a judgment
quashing the writ where the relator sought to compel the Commissioner
of Finance of the State of Missouri to issue his certificate showing that
the relator had complied with statutory provisions governing changes made
in relator's articles of incorporation. By proper action of its stockholders,
the bank changed its name and its location and increased its capital stock
and the personnel of its board and asked the commissioner for his certificate
of approval. The commissioner declined to issue his certificate, on the
ground that his investigation revealed an insufficiency of probale volume
of business of the bank under the proposed changes. The supreme court
held that under the statute existing at the time the change was made the
commissioner had no discretionary authority to refuse an existing bank
a certificate following changes made like those of the relator bank, and it
reversed the judgment and granted a peremptory writ.
In State ex rel. Smith v. Husl" an application for a writ of mandamus

59. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939), §§ 11117 et seq.

60. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Baumann, 348 Mo. 164, 153 S. W. (2d)
31 (1941).
61. 348 Mo. 7, 152 S. W. (2d) 1 (1941).
62. 348 Mo. 554, 154 S. W. (2d) 101 (1941).
63. 348 Mo. 982, 156 S. W. (2d) 708 (1941).
64. 348 Mo. 48, 152 S.W. (2d) 106 (1941).
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was made originally in a court of appeals. The purpose of the application
was to compel a probate court to remove an administrator of the estate
of a deceased person and appoint another. The court of appeals denied a
peremptory writ but, because of a dissent on the part of one of the judges
of the court of appeals, the case was transferred to the supreme court, which
held that it had no authority to compel the probate court to make an
order affecting the appointment of an administrator. The court denied the
peremptory writ.
In State ex rel. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lucas", the court denied a
peremptory writ of mandamus against the Superintendent of the Insurance
Department of Missouri, sought for the purpose of compelling him to cancel
the assessment of a two per cent premium tax on Missouri annuity premiums
collected during the year 1936.
IV.

PROHMBTON

In an effort made to stop a circuit judge from proceeding to restrain
the public service commission and state officers from arresting under the
Bus and Truck Act certain carriers who were exempt from such law because
operating wholly within one city and its adjacent suburban territory, by the
use of the extraordinary writ of prohibition, the supreme court held in State
ex rel. and to use of Public Service Commission v. Blair" that the circuit

court did not exceed its jurisdiction because the public service commission
was engaged in making arrests or causing arrests to be made of persons
exempt from the operation of the law over which it had exclusive original
jurisdiction, and, since its acts were beyond the scope of its powers, the
circuit court could enjoin it and could not be prevented from doing so by
prohibition.
A probate judge may be stopped by a writ of prohibition from proceeding to distribute an estate according to the provisions of a will where a
statute bars the probate of a will after the lapse of one year from the date
of the first publication of notice of granting letters testamenary, and the
probate judge undertakes to admit the will for the purpose of distributing
the estate after the statutory peribd has elapsed. This was held in Wyers v.
Arnold,67 a case in which a circuit court denied the application for a writ of
prohibition. The case went to the supreme court on appeal. It involved
65. 348 Mo. 286, 153 S. W. (2d) 10 (1941).
66. 347 Mo. 220, 146 S. W. (2d) 865 (1941).
67. 347 Mo. 413, 147 S. W. (2d) 644 (1941).
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a will executed in Germany, admitted to probate there, and offered for
probate in a probate court in this state. The supreme court held that the
statute barring the probate of the will was mandatory on the probate judge,
and directed that the writ of prohibition be made absolute.
Prohibition lies to prevent a county court from proceeding beyond
its jurisdiction. In State ex rel. Association for Convalescent Crippled Ckildren v. Corneli,68 a county court had entered an order revoking a building
permit and enjoining the construction of a building, and was stopped in its
effort to enforce its order on the ground that it had no statutory power to
grant a permanent injunction as was contemplated by its order. Prohibition
was held the proper remedy to prevent the unauthorized action.
It is the function of the supreme court, under the writ of prohibition
against a circuit court, to inquire into the jurisdiction assumed by that
court, and if it finds that the circuit court is exercising jurisdiction sought
to be conferred by consent when the law does not permit the vesting of
jurisdiction by consent, it will stop the further attempts to exercise such
jurisdiction. Thus, in State ex rel. Lambert v. Fynn,69 a provisional rule
in prohibition was made absolute against a circuit judge.
Where a circuit court is proceeding in a suit against a party to a case
who is not the party against whom the alleged cause of action lies, prohibition may be used to stop the proceeding.70
A case involving the use of the writ of prohibition as a part of the
same controversy determined by State ex rel. Donnell v. Osbur T l resulted
in the discharged of the preliminary rule, where it appeared that the controversy had become moot.72
Prohibition does not lie against a circuit judge to prevent him from
entertaining a pending suit against police officers to enjoin them from sending a plaintiff's fingerprints and photographs to bureaus of criminal identification. The damage from such use of a person's fingerprints and photographs may be continuous and irreparable, and the right of innocent persons
to a return of their fingerprints and photographs from the possession of a
68. 347 Mo. 1164, 152 S. W. (2d) 83 (1941).
69. 348 Mo. 525, 154 S.W. (2d) 52 (1941).
70. State ex rel. General Mills, Inc., v. Waltner, 348 Mo. 852, 156 S. W. (2d)
664 (1941).
71. Discussed herein suipra at note 56.
72. State ex rel. Donnell v. Searcy, 347 Mo. 1052, 152 S. W. (2d) 8 (1941);
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Hay, 153 S. W. (2d) 837 (Mo. 1941).
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police department is recognized by the courts. This was held by the su78
preme court in State ex rel. Reed v. Harris.
Prohibition cannot be used to stop a circuit court from proceeding
with a suit to restrain commissioner of parks of the City of St. Louis from
discharging park department employees because of political affiliations7 4
V.

Quo WARRNTO

Where an election was held to dissolve a consolidated school district,
following which proceedings were taken to organize a common school
district and elect officers of such district, and where the records show that
such proceedings were not had in accordance with the law, the officers of
such common school district may be ousted from office and the proceedings
under which they claim the right to hold their offices declared void in a quo
warranto proceeding. In such proceeding-the supreme court has the power
to inquire into questions of fraud, to take judicial notice of the number of
inhabitants in a village in the state and the number of districts embraced
within a consolidated school district, and to determine whether a school district election has been held under such circumstances as afford a free and
fair expression of the popular will and comply with mandatory statutory
requirements. 5
In State v. Murphy,78 quo warranto was used upon the information of
the .attorney general against the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri to oust the commission from locating or attempting to
lacate or maintain the central office of the commission outside the city of
Jefferson City. The opinion in this case contains a valuable discussion of
the origin, nature, purpose and extent of the quo warranto remedy and
shows how the writ, which is not a substitute for inandamus, or injunction
or an appeal or writ of error, may be used to prevent a corporation or officer
from usurping a power he does not have. The court found that, by provision of the law under which the commission was operating, the commission had no power to maintain its central office outside Jefferson City, and
fined the commission $1.00 and the costs of the proceedings for attempting
to exercise a function it did not have.
73.
74.
(2d) 67.
75.
76.

348 Mo. 426, 153 . W. (2d) 834 (1941).
State ex rel. and to use of Baumes v. Mason, 348 Mo. 436, 154 S. W.
State ex rel. Martin v. Ctoner, 347 Mo. 242, 146 S. W. (2d) 891 (1941).
347 Mo. 484, 148 S. W. (2d) 527 (1941).
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It was held in State ex rel. McDonald v. Moore, that quo warranto
would not lie to oust a township collector from the office of county treasurer
when her office of township collector expired before the commencement of
her term as county treasurer. An action by quo warranto to oust an ex
8
officio recorder of deeds failed in State ex rel. Harrison v. Tenwson, because it was held that, under the facts shown, there was no vacancy in the
office of recorder of deeds.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLIAM

H. BECKER, JR.*

The decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court for the year 1941 continued to make no distinction between the true Missouri humanitarian
rule and the common law last clear chance rule.
The logical basis for the humanitarian rule remained as much a mystery
as ever because of the failure of the court to establish any clear logical basis
for the humanitarian doctrine. The decision with respect to the giving
of instructions to the jury remained subject to change without notice. In
1941 the ferment was most noticeable in regard to the use of the so-called
sole cause instruction in humanitarian cases. Practitioners noticed the
instability of the rules regarding instructions of this type and wondered
what would come next.'
With the rule with respect to sole cause instructions confused by conflicting and constantly changing rulings, it is not safe to advise the practitioner what instruction may be safely given. It seems to be safe prophecy
to say that, because the doctrine relating to the sole cause instructions is
so confused, there will be and must be, further change. The difficulty with
the instruction stems from the lack of logic in the present statement of the
doctrine. Until the court decides whether the humanitarian doctrine is an
exception to the rule of contributory negligence, a doctrine of comparative
negligence, a rule of proximate cause, a doctrine of responsibility without
fault, a device to administer the risk, concealed in words of art or something else, there will continue to be illogical and mystical decisions with re77. 347 Mo. 1170, 152 S. W. (2d) 86 (1941).
78. 347 Mo. 1024, 151 S. W. (2d) 1090 (1941).
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.

1. See Spaun, Sole Cause Negligence Instructions (1942) 13 Mo. B. J. 19;
Ball, The Vanished Sole Cause Instruction (1942) -13 Mo. B. J. 50.
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spect to instructions. Some day the court will have to determine whether
two oblivious automobile operators, each with ample opportunity to avoid
collision, who collide with each other at an intersection can recover simultaneously from each other for personal injuries sustained in the collision.
Until that or a similar question is answered, we will continue to wonder
what the logical basis for the rule is, and the court will continue to reverse
itself frequently regarding instructions. It may ultimately be declared that
the doctrine is intended in its function to administer the risk of operating
modem machinery; and that negligence and fault and causation in the
nineteenth century sense are not valid concepts. Certainly an unwillingness to apply the harsh common law rule of contributory negligence is at
the bottom of the rule.
At the end of 1941 it seemed that the court might reexamine and restate the humanitarian rule in such a manner as to lose none of its humanitarian functions and at the same time to establish a firm basis for its
administration. Unless this is done, instructions which are good under the
decisions&at the time they are given in the trial court will continue to be
held erroneous because of changes occurring before they are passed upon
on appeal.
The formula of the humanitarian doctrine created in the heyday of
the railroad train when there were no automobiles was not sufficient in
logic to meet the needs of 1941. The underlying unrest was felt chiefly in
the changing decisions regarding questions of practice and application. It
appeared that some day, somehow, the court must meet the question of
restatement of the doctrine, without losing any of the humanitarian social
principles inherent in its application.
I. THE COURT EN BANC

State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain2 was a death action arising out of an
automobile-train crossing collision. The case was submitted solely on the
humanitarian doctrine in failing to slacken and in failing to warn. It was
held that two and one-half seconds was sufficient time to sound an effective
warning after the instant the fireman should have discovered the position
of imminent peril. Since this case was before the court on certiorari, the
opinion is not particularly strong on this point and simply holds that there
2. 159 S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1941).
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is no decision of the supreme court conflicting with the decision of the court
of appeals that the time was sufficient.
The doctrine of Kick v. Franklii (first appeal) was explained by the
court in quashing an application of the Kick case by the court of appeals
to the case at bar.
The court of appeals had assumed that the Kick case held that failure
to warn and failure to slacken might never be joined in a humanitarian
case because such assignments were in their nature always inconsistent. In
the case under discussion it was held that the submission of humanitarian
failure to warn and failure to slacken in the same instruction in the conjunctive was not inconsistent under the facts of the case; that the inconsistency discussed in the Kick case depended upon the facts of the particular case. The interpretation of the Kick case seems to be sound.
II. DmvxsioN NUMBER 1
Evans v. Farmers Elevator Company4 is an action for personal injuries
by a guest riding in a passenger car which collided head on with the defendant's truck. Defendant's truck turned to the left of the center of the
highway causing plaintiff's host to turn to his left to avoid a collision. At
the same time, defendant's truck lurned back, creating a situation of imminent peril. The evidence favorable to the plaintiff showed that the defendant's truck might have been stopped or turned aside and the collision
thereby averted.
The plaintiff's principal instruction contained the phraseology condemned in Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Company" and cases which have
followed the Buehler case. The words used in plaintiff's instruction in the
instant case were "approaching and in a position of imminent peril and
danger of being struck." Plaintiff sought to justify the instruction under
the decision of Kick v. Franklin6 (second appeal). The court held the instruction erroneous, apparently distinguishing the present case from the
Kick-case for the Kick case was not overruled. It is apparent that the
decision of the Kick case holding a similar instruction not to be reversible
error is out of line with the decision which followed the Buehler case. In
its effect the Kick case held that use of the words "immediately coming into
3.
4.
5.
6.

342
347
343
345

Mo. 715,
Mo. 326,
Mo. 139,
Mo. 752,

117 S. W.
147 S. W.
119 S. W.
137 S. W.

(2d)
(2d)
(2d)
(2d)

284
593
961
512

(1938).
(1941).
(1938).
(1940).
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and were in a position of imminent peril and danger" in a humanitarian
instruction is error but not reversible error. The Buehler case and the case
at bar refused to approve an instruction containing such a phrase as harmless error. The Springfield Court of Appeals had refused to follow the doctrine of the Kick case and now the division which rendered it ignores it.7
Reding v. Russell" involved a pedestrian-automobile collision. It was
submitted solely under the humanitarian doctrine. The verdict was for the
plaintiff. The principal instruction, otherwise unassailed, contained this
introductory paragraph:
"'The Court instructs the jury that under the laws of this
state, it is the duty of persons operating automobiles on any public
highway in this state, to exercise the highest degree of care by
which is meant that degree of care which a very careful and prudent
person would use under the same or similar circumstances, and the
failure to exercise the highest degree of care would constitute negligence.' "
The inclusion of this paragraph is held to be reversible error because
it injects primary negligence into the case.
The case is notable for its clear statement of the circumstances under
which the word "approaching" may be used in a humanitarian instruction.
It is certainly sound on this point, saying:
"Defendants object to the remaining portion of plaintiff's
instruction No. 1 because of the word 'approaching,' the contention
being that the use of that word required defendants to act while
plaintiff was approaching, and before he had reached, a place of
imminent peril. There is no merit in this contention. The instruction did not require defendants to act while plaintiff was approaching a position of peril; it required them to act while plaintiff was
in the street and approaching the center of the street and defendants' automobile was approaching the same place, provided they
further found that plaintiff 'was then and there in a position of
imminent peril.' The instruction is vastly different from those considered in the cases cited by defendants, to-wit: Perkins v. Terminal
Ry. Ass'n, 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d) 915; Buehler v. Festus
Merc. Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S.W. (2d) 961; Kick v. Franklin, 345
Mo. 752, 137 S. W. (2d) 512; Hilton v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n., 345
Mo. 987, 137 S. W. (2d) 520. State ex rel. Snider v. Shain, 345 Mo.
950, 137 S.W. (2d) 527."10
7. Hanks v. Anderson-Parks, Inc., 143 S. W. (2d) 314 (Mo. App. 1940).
8. 348 Mo. 279, 153 S. W. (2d) 6 (1941).
9. Id. at 281, 153 S. W. (2d) at 7-8.
10. Id. at 285, 153 S. W. (2d) at 10.
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Shields v. Keller"
involved the striking of a pedestrian by an automobile while the pedestrian was crossing a street in the City of St. Louis.
The cause was submitted solely on the humanitarian rule. The verdict was
for the defendant. It was reversed and remanded for error in the instructions of the defendant. The defendant's instruction directing a verdict for
the defendant, if the jury found that the driver of the automobile "was
exercising due care ir the operation of said automobile" after the plaintiff
reached a position of peril, was held to be erroneous because it ignored the
duty of the defendant to keep a lookout.
In this case the court again had difficulty with the "sole cause" instruction. Dilallo v. Lync 12 was overruled in part. A new formula for
the defendant's sole cause instruction is announced in the case at bar. It
holds that it is not necessary that the sole cause instruction in a humanitarian case contain a direction that contributory negligence is not to be
considered. Under this case the plaintiff may ask such a direction but the
defendant needf not include it in the sole cause instruction.
McCall v. Thompson,"8 an automobile-train crossing collision case, was
submitted on humanitarian negligence in failing to stop or slacken the speed
of the train. There was no sole cause issue submitted. Under these circumstances an instruction of the defendant was held to be error which stated
that the driver of an automobile was required to exercise the highest degree
of care and that the engineer's conduct should be judged in the light of
the duty of the automobile driver. This charge was held to inject contributory negligence into the case.
The automobile driver in the McCall case was hard of hearing and had
defective eye sight. It was held error for the defendant to give an instruction directing a verdict for the railroad if the automobile driver's defective senses caused her to fail to see or to hear the train.
Wolverton v. Karm"4 grew out of a wagon-train collision at a public
crossing. The plaintiff was riding in a wagon drawn by mules which ran
away on a road parallel to the railroad track, then suddenly turned and ran
into the path of the train. The court held that the occupants of the wagon
were not in imminent peril until the mules turned toward the track. The
evidence was held to be insufficient to make a case of humanitarian negli-

11.
12.
13.
14.

348 Mo. 326, 153 S. W. (2d) 60 (1941).
340 Mo. 82, 101 S. W. (2d) 7 (1936).
348 Mo. 795, 155 S. W. (2d) 161 (1941).
348 Mo. 908, 156 S. W. (2d) 638 (1941).
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gence in failing to slacken the speed of the train since there was no substantial evidence that slackening would have averted a collision.
Rentfrow v. Thompsov1 5 was a death action arising from a train-truck
collision. The truck which the deceased was driving stalled on a railroad
track and twelve to fifteen seconds later was struck by defendant's train.
The case was submitted on primary and humanitarian negligence.
The plaintiff caused to be given an instruction requiring the jury to
judge plaintiff's conduct in the light of the emergency created by the stalling
of a truck on a railroad track. Plaintiff's humanitarian instruction required
the jury to find that the plaintiff was oblivious to her peril. It was charged
that the emergency instruction and the humanitarian instruction conflicted.
The court held that under such circumstances the instructions did not conflict because the plaintiff was entitled to submit his case on two alternative
theories. The humanitarian submission assumed obliviousness. The primary
negligence submission permitted a finding that the deceased was not oblivious but was confronted by a sudden emergency in the light of which
his conduct was not negligent. This submission on inconsistent alternative
theories was held not to be erroneous. Compare this case with State ex rel.
1 0 which concerns
Thompson v. Shainm
submission in the conjunctive of
alleged inconsistent grounds of humanitarian negligence in the same inI I01VI
struction.
7
Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms Co. was an action for personal
injuries growing out of a passenger car-dairy truck collision at a city street
intersection. The plaintiff was a guest in the passenger car. The case was
submitted to the jury on primary negligence of the truck driver in failing
to keep a lookout and upon humanitarian negligence in failing to stop or
swerve. The defendant had a verdict which was set aside and a new trial
was granted because of a sole cause instruction given at the instance of the
defendants. The instruction directed a verdict against the plaintiff if the
jury found that the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding negligently drove at a high, excessive rate of speed and that such negligence
and not any negligence of the defendants was the sole and proximate cause
of the collision.
The instruction was held to be erroneous. The court said that it did
not contain the expression "sole cause" or its equivalent. The instruction
15. 348 Mo. 970, 156 S. W. (2d) 700 (1941).
16. 159 S. W. (2d) 582 (Mo. 1941).
17. 159 S. W. (2d) 254 (Mo. 1941).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1

74

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1941

401

was held to be susceptible of a construction that plaintiff was not entitled
to recover if the collision resulted from concurrent negligence of plaintiff's
host and defendant, and therefore was erroneous.
III. DrwsIoN

NuMBER

Two

Zickefoose v. Thompso iz 8 was a death action growing out of a trainautomobile collision occurring when the truck plaintiff's intestate was driving
ran into the side of defendant's freight train at night. The case was submitted on primary negligence in failing to give the statutory crossing signal
and humanitarian negligence in failing to warn. The train was blocking the
crossing in the path of the truck. The train had begun to move backwards
when it was struck. The fireman had called the attention of the engineer that
the truck was coming toward, the train in the dark. The court held that
seven seconds were available for the warning to have been given.
This case should be compared with the prior holding of the court that
a humanitarian case cannot be made when an automobile runs into the
side of a street car.19
White v. Kansas City Public Service Company20 involved the 'Striking
of a pedestrian by a street car. It was held to be reversible error to include
in a principal instruction, otherwise unchallenged, the following language:
"'And if you further find that defendant's operator failed to
exercise ordinary care, and negligently, if so failed to stop said street
car, if so, and negligently, if so, failed to sound an audible warning
of the approach of said street car, if so, and that as a direct result of
such negligent failure, if so, to stop said street car, if so, or to sound
a warning of its approach, if so, it struck plaintiff, if so, and as a
direct result thereof she was injured, if you so find, then your
verdict must be for plaintiff....-21
This language followed the first paragraph of the principal instruction
which, for the purpose of the case, hypothesized the peril, notice to the
defendant and the duty to warn or to stop. On the ground that the quoted
language injected primary negligence into the consideration of the jury
and permitted a verdict on negligence occurring prior to the situation of
imminent peril, the court held that the giving of the instruction was re18. 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. (2d)
19. Lotta v. Kansas City Public
(2d) 296 (1938).
20. 347 Mo. 895, 149 S.W. (2d)
21. Id. at 897-8, 149 S. W. (2d)

784 (1941).
Service Company, 342 Mo. 743, 117 S. W.
375 (1941).
at 376.
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versible error. The case came to the supreme court on certificate from the
22
Kansas City Court of Appeals.
Everyone connected with the case, so far as the opinion shows, seems
to have conceded that a more judicious use of the word "so" would have
made the instruction good on appeal. While the line must be drawn somewhere between harmless and reversible error, it is hard to believe that the
adding of "so" in two places would have materially affected the verdict
in the cause. Much more grevious error has occurred in humanitarian
instructions and found to be harmless on appeal.
Chastain v. Winton28 is a case involving the injury of an oblivious
pedestrian on a travelled highway by an automobile approaching from
behind. It was held that a humanitarian case was made and that instructions withdrawing abandoned assignments of primary negligence in driving
too fast and in failing to watch were misleading and erroneous. The case
is notable for the statement of a formula regarding withdrawal instructions
in a case submitted under the humanitarian doctrine.
The court said in part:
"Yet, if the plaintiff has already presented to the jury damaging evidence on the abandoned issues, it undoubtedly is proper to
inform the jury that those issues are no longer open to their determination. However, when the abandoned assignments of primary
or antecedent negligence involve the same kind of dereliction before
the plaintiff's peril began, as is charged on the humanitarian ground
after the peril arose-such as excessive speed, failure to warn, etc.
-it will not do to write them out of the case altogether, and thereby
''
undermine plaintiff's humanitarian cause of action. 24
No withdrawal instruction should be given in a humanitarian case
without satisfying the requirements of this case.
Bebout v. Kuri25 involved an automobile-train crossing collision. The
case was properly submitted under the humanitarian rule in failing to stop.
and to give emergency warnings.
The plaintiff in the Bebout case was a passenger in the automobile. An
instruction given at plaintiff's request that the negligence of the driver
of the automobile could not be imputed to plaintiff was held to be im22. White v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 140 S. W. (2d) 711 (Mo. App.

1940).

23. 347 Mo. 1211, 152 S.W. (2d) 165 (1941).
24. Id. at 1221, 152 S. W. (2d) at 170.
25. 348 Mo. 501, 154 S. W. (2d) 120 (1941).
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proper in a case where there was a live sole cause issue. The case was reversed because the plaintiff gave an instruction requiring the trainman to
keep a lookout as they approached the crossing without limiting its application to persons in imminent peril.
Hollister v. A. S. Aloe Co. 28 involved a truck-automobile collision at a
city street intersection. The plaintiff, a passenger in the automobile, was
held to have made a humanitarian case of failure to stop and failure to turn
aside. A sole cause issue was injected into this case by the defendant. An
instruction given at the instance of the plaintiff submitting the sole cause
issue in a light favorable to the plaintiff was approved by the court.
Rosenburg v. Terminal R. R. Ass'ln of St. Louis 27 was a novel case sub-

mitted under humanitarian doctrine for failure to warn. The plaintiff was
injured in an underground lobby where mail trucks were drawn by defendant's employees and post office employees, of which plaintiff was one. The
defendant's employee released a moving truck loaded with mail in the direction of the plaintiff who was oblivious of the approach. The loaded truck
struck the plaintiff. The court found that there were approximately two
seconds for defendant's employee to warn plaintiff, and that a humanitarian case was made.
In Eisenbartk v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, Inc.,28 the passenger car
in which plaintiff was riding collided with a truck moving in the opposite
direction at night on a public highway. Evidence favorable to the plaintiff
showed that the truck lights were not burning and that the truck was moving on the wrong side of the road until a moment before the collision when
it turned abruptly back to its right.
The court held that a humanitarian case was made.
INSURANCE
ORRIN B. EvANS*
I. FoaxIGN LAW

It now being well settled law that the rights and obligations of the
members of a fraternal benefit association against and to the association
must be determined by the law of the association domicile, because the
26. 348 Mo. 1055, 156 S. W. (2d) 606 (1941).
27. 159 S.W. (2d) 633 (Mo. 1941).
28. 161 S. W. (2d) 263 (Mo. 1941).
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of
Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
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federal constitution so requires, it would seem that the declaration of the
trial court that it was following the domiciliary law would be no more conclusive of the question that it had accorded that law "full faith and credit"
than it would be conclusive of the question of the accuracy of his interpretation of the foreign law. In other words, any attack on the trial court's
construction of or conclusion as to the foreign law necessarily asserts a
denial of full faith and credit to that law, raises a constitutional question,
and gives the Missouri Supreme Court jurisdiction on appeal. On the other
hand, when the law of the domiciliary state is not clear and certain, it is hard
to see what is being denied credit. Indeed, in that situation the distinction
between Missouri and foreign law may be more a matter of theoretical
jurisprudence than substantial reality, but the supreme court should still
have jurisdiction to ascertain the status, as well as the rule, of the foreign
law and to test the decision by its version of the general law, which for this
purpose is deemed the domiciliary law.
The opinion in Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of. Ry. Trainmen r is very
abbreviated and the rule of the case indefinite. It being conceded that by
the domiciliary law the defendant association was both authorized to pay the
disability benefits sued for, and also to define "total disability" in its constitution so as to exclude benefits for the particular disability suffered by
plaintiff, the controversy at trial centered on the question of whether the
constitutional limitation on liability was incorporated in and became part
of the contract. A judgment for the plaintiff was held to raise no question
of the federal constitution and the case was transferred to the court of
appeals. The Bolin2 case and others were said to be distinguishable on the
facts, but the only point of distinction suggested was that in those cases
the issue had been the charter authority of the association, which authority
had been defined and limited by judgments of the states in which they were
domiciled. We are left to speculate on whether the distinction rests upon
the certainty of the foreign law or upon the relation of the controversy to the
power of the association under its charter and the laws of the state. The
first alternative has already been commented on. As to the second, it is
pertinent to recall that in Modern Woodmens v. Miver s the fountain head
1. 147 S. W. (2d) 601 (Mo. 1941).
2. Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 119 A. L. R. 478 (1938). A companion case was before the Missouri Supreme Court in the past year and was
disposed of accordingly. Walsh v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 152 S. W. (2d)
127 (Mo. 1941).
3. 267 U. S. 544 (1925).
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of these cases, Mr. Justice Holmes laid down the basis of the doctrine in
these words. "The act of becoming a member is something more than a
contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation and as marriage
looks to domicile, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of
the State granting the incorporation. We need not consider what other
states may refuse to do, but we deem it established that they cannot *attach
to membership rights against the Company that are refused by the law of
the domicil." 4 As the determination of membership and the rights inter
.re depends upon the agreement, that case must be authority that the
federal constitution allocates the determination of the terms of the contract
to the law of the domicile.
I have pointed out before 5 that the line between constitutional law
and private "conflicts" law is hazy and arbitrary. Apparently our supreme
court has concluded not to extend the domain of constitutional law beyond
the precise precedents of the United States Supreme Court. In Kellogg v.
National Protective Ins. Co.6 the court declined jurisdiction where the
defendant was not a fraternal benefit association and the application of
foreign law was not required, under the authorities, by the United States
Constitution.
II. NoN-FoRFETURE PROVISIONS
In Magers v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.7 Judge Hyde wrote
another of his informative and enlightening opinions. As is well known,
life insurance premiums represent a charge for the administrative expense
and agents commission, called "loading," as well as the cost of the insurance
under the mortality tables. As the mortality cost increases with age, it is
apparent that when insurance is written on the "level premium" plan the
charge in the early years of the policy must exceed the actual cost of insurance for those years, thus creating a reserve to take care of the deficiency
in the premium during the later years of the policy. Investment of this
reserve brings income, to the extent of which it is possible to discount the
future cost of ihe insurance in calculating the present amount-of premium.
As the one certain thing about life insurance is that the insurer will ultimately be called upon to pay the full face amount of the policies issued to
4. Ibid., at 551.
5. Evans, The Work of the Mirsouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(Insurance) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 410, 416.

6. 347 Mo. 553, 148-S. W. (2d) 751 (1941).
7. 348 Mo. 96, 152 S. W. (2d) 148 (1941).
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every insured who satisfies the conditions thereof-primarily, who pays his
premiums-, calculation of the premium becomes a matter of totalling the
amount of such potential liability on a given type of policy, dividing by the
total number of premium payments to be expected from all insured parties
under the mortality tables for such contracts (premiums paid each succeeding year must decrease as the policy holders of the class die), discounting
to the extent of expected income from investments, and adding loading
charges. If the mortality table is accurate, if income is realized as expected,
and if the loading represents the actual expense incurred, when the last
insured in the class dies exactly enough will have been received to have
paid all claims. To the extent that deaths occur less rapidly than premium
payments are made by the class, a reserve for the whole class accumulates,
which may be divided by the number of outstanding policies to determine
the reserve attributable to any one policy. By Missouri law8 this reserve
may not be forfeited to the insurer upon non-payment of premiums, but
must accrue to the benefit of the insured in one of the ways there enumerated.
The statute uses the words "net value of the policy" rather than "reserve." In the case under discussion, plaintiff contended that the net value
should be calculated on the basis of the entire premium paid, including
the loading factor. The court, however, rejected this argument, held that
"net value" was the same as reserve, and in accordance with the practice of
insurance companies generally, considered only the proportion of the premium represented by mortality costs and interest. The decision is thoroughly sound, for the loading factor is a somewhat arbitrary one and has
nothing to do with the actuarial aspects of insurance principles.
The interpretation does permit a surrender charge of 25%7 of the net
value. (Plaintiff would have treated the 25% deduction authorized under
the statute as an allowance for the "loading" factor.) Enacted as a remedial
measure, at a time when many companies claimed a forfeiture of the entire
reserve in case of lapse, the statute now requires less than most companies
voluntarily promise by contract. Thus, in Bramble v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co.,9 a "twenty payment" life policy by its terms was really a one
year term policy, renewable at the end of the year as a "nineteen payment"
policy. The effect was to postpone the accumulation of the reserve (there

8. Mo. Rav.

STAT. (1939) § 5852.
9. 160 S. W. (2d) 746 (Mo. 1941).
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is obviously no necessity for a reserve to meet future risks after the term
has expired) so that by the terms of the contract there was less available for
the purchase of extended insurance when the policy lapsed than if, as in a
true "twenty pay life" policy, the aggregation began when the insurance
first went in effect. As the premium charged was the same throughout (the
Ccone year term" premium evidently not being limited to the actual mortality risk for the year), the policy was a virtual, if not a legal, fraud on
the insured. But the surrender values promised by the insurer, even on a
nineteen year basis, exceeded those required by the inadequate statute on a
twenty year basis, so that the court could not help the beneficiary.
The court also pointed out that the "reserves" deposited with the
insurance department to guarantee the solvency of the company had nothing
to do with the reserve on the policy .available in case of surrender, and
that the excess of premium resulting from favorable mortality experience
of the company was-not to be added to such net values, but accrued to the
insured, if at all, only through the dividends of a mutual company.
The case was peculiar in that the insurer, rather than the insured, was
contending that lapse had been waived by the custom of accepting tardy
premium payments. The court held there was nothing in the non-forfeiture
statutes to prevent the parties from agreeing, after the lapse had occurred,
as to the disposition of the net value of the policy, and if they so wished,
they could treat the policy as still in force, supported by that reserve.
III. VExATIOUS DELAY

When an agent with personal knowledge of the facts falsely fills in the
application for life insurance, which application the insured signed without
reading and after having disclosed the truth in good faith, the personal
knowledge of the agent becomes the constructive knowledge of the insurer,
who is thereafter estopped to claim a forfeiture of the policy for material
misrepresentation. But the insurer is not chargeable with knowledge of the
agent's fraud in the transaction, so as to be'subject to penalty for vexatious
delay in refusing payment until a jury is convinced of the circumstances,
where on the face on the records of the company it appeared there had been
a clear misrepresentation. 10
However, when the insurer, in substantial compliance with the policy
requirement of written, detailed claim, had been given notice of the cir10. State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S. W. (2d)
132 (Mo. 1941).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942

81

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1942], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

408

(Vol. 7

cumstances, invited to make its own investigation, and asked if further
information were required, failed to acknowledge or reply to insured's
correspondence, it could not rely on breach of this condition and was
liable for vexatious delay in compensating insured for his loss."1

IV. TRLU..

PRACTicEs

In Davis v. F. M. Stamper Co.,1 2 it was held reversible error to permit

plaintiff's counsel, who on voir dire had closely questioned the prospective
jurors on their interest in, connection with, or knowledge of certain insurance
companies and insurance men, to address the jury in these words.
"(He is) afraid that this jury is going to reach their hand into the pocket
of F. M. Stamper Company. I want to allay your fears. We will never
have to reach into [his] client's pocket to take out a dime. We will get the
$25,000 without putting a hand into [his] client's pocket ......
Until the law is changed to recognize the interest of the insurer (in at
least one state he can be joined as a co-defendant), it should be an ethical
obligation of an attorney to refrain from suggesting what is now considered
an irrelevant fact solely to prejudice the jury. It is not enough to penalize
only the client whose attorney goes too far. The ethical responsibility is
present in all cases.
PROPERTY
G. V.

HEAD*

The cases of Tidwel v. Waidrup,' State ex rel. State Highway Comtnission v. Union Electric

Co.,2

Tilfman v. Hutcherson," Brown v. Wilson0 and

State ex rel. Edie v. Shaim involve claims of title by adverse possession. In
Tidwell v. Waldrup6 the claim is denied, on the ground that the possession
of the occupant was not hostile or adverse. The controversy developed out
11. Lemay Ferry Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 347 Mo. 793, 149
S. W. (2d) 328 (1941).
12. 347 Mo. 761, 148 S. W. (2d) 765 (1941).
*General Counsel, Farm Credit Administration of St. Louis, formerly Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of Missouri, 1914; LL.B.,
Harvard, 1917; S.J.D., Harvard, 1932.
1. 347 Mo. 1028, 151 S. NV. (2d) 1092 (1941).
2. 347 Mo. 690, 148 S. W. (2d) 503 (1941).
3. 348 Mo. 473, 154 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
4. 348 Mo. 658, 155 S. W. (2d) 176 (1941).
5. 348 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. (2d) 174'(1941).
6. 347 Mo. 1028, 151 S. W. (2d) 1092 (1941).
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of an error made in 1919 by commissioners in partitioning land among the
heirs of a deceased owner. In dividing the land, the commissioners placed
stakes marking boundaries between the various tracts in such a way that
five and one-half acres were taken from land of plaintiff's predecessor- in
title and added to land of defendant's predecessor. A fence conforming to the
stakes was erected in 1920, and the respective owners cultivated the land
up to the fence. Subsequently the mistake was discovered, and defendant's
predecessor in title thereupon promised to "straighten it out." In 1929
defendant's predecessor executed a deed of trust covering her tract, not including, however, the five and one-half acres. In 1936, plaintiff's predecessor
in title conveyed her land by deed, and included in the conveyance the five
and one-half acre tract. Under these circumstances, defendant's claim of
title to the five and one-half acre tract by adverse possession is denied.
In State ex rel. State Highway Comnission v. Union Electric Co 7 defendant claims to have acquired by prescription a transmission line easement on an interurban railway company's abandoned right of way. The
court concludes, however, from the dealings between the railway company
and defendant, that defendant's occupancy was at most only permissive and
not adverse.
Tilhman v. Hutcherson," Brown v. WilsonP and State ex rel. Edie v.
Shai' involve an additional element. They are boundary line disputes
in which the person asserting title by adverse possession occupies land belonging to another in ignorance of the fact that the established boundary
is incorrect. The contention is made in each case that if the adjoining owners
supposed the fence separating the tracts to be the true line, and for that reason alone claimed the land up to the fence, neither could acquire title against
the other by adverse possession. The court repudiates the argument, and,
2
in so doing, expressly overrules Owens v. Tkomas11 and Corriganv. Early.'
The court concedes, however, that if the owners claimed to the fence
provided it was the true line, their possession was not hostile; but states
that if either owner claimed to the fence unconditionally, his occupancy was
hostile, even though he mistakenly believed the fence to be the true line.
The court's position in this regard seems sound. One's occupancy is hostile
7. 347 Mo. 690, 148 S.W. (2d) 503 (1941).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

348
348
348
339
183

Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d)
Mo. 658, 155 S.W. (2d)
Mo. 119, 152 S. W. (2d)
Mo. 532, 98 S. W. (2d)
S. W. 574 (Mo. 1916).

104
176
174
561

(1941).
(1941).
(1941).
(1936).
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or adverse if he is in possession claiming to be the owner. The fact that he
believes himself to be the owner, and would not otherwise have claimed
ownership, does not negative his claim of ownership.
From the language of the opinions in thes& three cases, one might conclude that the court considers the claim of ownership to be a mere matter
of the occupant's intention. In State ex rel Edie v. Shain 3 the court says:
"Such a mental state on the part of the alleged adverse possessor is sufficient
4
to make his possessory claim hostile and adverse .... " In Brown v. Wilson'
the language is: "Conceding that defendant did not purposely intend to lay
claim to any land that he knew was not his own, the fact nevertheless
remains... that he did at all times intend to claim up to the slough...
The occupant's intention should, it seems, be immaterial. The issue should
be one as to whether the occupant has, by words or actions, treated or dealt
with the land as his own. Objective acts, and not subjective intent, should
be controlling.
Tiliman v. Hutchersoni' involves a further complication. The action is
one to determine title to a twenty-foot strip on one side of a boundary line
fence. The plaintiff relies upon adverse possession. Plaintiff's evidence tends
to establish merely her exclusive and continuous use and occupancy of the
strip, up to the fence, for a period of fifty years. The defendant introduces
no evidence, but stands upon a motion in the nature of a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence and appeals from an adverse judgment. The issue on appeal
is, therefore, whether plaintiff made out a prina facie, case. The court
reverses the judgment on the ground that the land in dispute is not described
with sufficient definiteness in the judgment, and remands the case with
directions that additional evidence on the identity of the tract be submitted;
but the court holds that plaintiff made out a prima facie case on the issue
of adverse possession. The court relies upon the doctrine that long acquiescence in a fence as a boundary line will warrant a presumption that it is the
true line. No definite, fixed period of acquiescence is required, says the court,
but certainly acquiescence for forty years is more than enough to establish
the fence as an agreed boundary line, with the result that plaintiff's occupancy for at least the last ten years was adverse.
The court considers at some length the question whether the period of
acquiescence required to establish an agreed boundary line can run concur13. 348 Mo. 119, 125, 152 S. W. (2d) 174, 177 (1941).
14. 348 Mo. 658, 666, 155 S. W. (2d) 176, 180 (1941).
15. 348 Mo. 473, 154 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
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rently with the period of adverse possession prescribed by Section 1002 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939. The court concludes that in order
to characterize plaintiff's possession as adverse when the statute of limitations began to run, plaintiff was required to prove that the fence had then
become established as the agreed boundary line by long acquiescence theretofore. The court is troubled somewhat by the rule that in order to claim
by adverse possession one whose possession at its inception is not adverse
must, by his conduct, overtly evidence the change to adverse possession. The
court states, however, that Missouri Lumber & Mining Co. v. Jewel 6 indicates that the rule applies only if the adverse holder had originally claimed
in subservience to the true title, whereas here plaintiff did not hold in subordination to defendant. It seems doubtful whether Missouri Lumber &
Mining Co. v. Jewell stands for the proposition for which it is cited. And in
any event, there seems little escape from the conclusion that if possession is
not adverse at the outset the occupant must do something to change the
character of his possession before he can make any valid claim as an
adverse possessor.
It is submitted that the court becomes involved in the controversy
unnecessarily. The court concedes that if there were an express agreement
establishing a common boundary line, the possession of each owner thenceforward would be adverse. The proper view would seem to be that acquiescence in a fence as a boundary line is evidence of an implied agreement
establishing the boundary, that is to say, of an actual agreement, evidenced
by acts rather than words. On this theory adverse possession begins when
acquiescence commences.
The cases of State ex tel. Marlowe v. Nolan,17 Tillman v. Hutcherson,s
Lankford v. Lankford,19 Harwellv. Magill,20 City of University City v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry.,21 State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Union
Electric Co.,22 Brown v. Weare23 and Leeper v. Leeper24 deal with problems

of interpretation. In State ex rel. Marlowe v. Nolan,25 a suit to enforce the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

200 Mo. 707, 98 S. W. 578 (1906).
347 Mo. 124, 146 S. W. (2d) 598 (1941).
348 Mo. 473, 154 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
348 Mo. 1170, 159 S.W. (2d) 264 (1941).
348 Mo. 365, 153 S. W. (2d) 362 (1941).
347 Mo. 814, 149 S. W. (2d) 321 (1941).
347 Mo. 690, 148 S. W. (2d) 503 (1941).
348 Mo. 135, 152 S. W. (2d) 649 (1941).
347 Mo. 442, 147 S. W. (2d) 660 (1941).
347 Mo. 124, 146 S. W. (2d) 598 (1941).
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state's lien for taxes, the lands in question are described in the petition, and
in the judgment rendered in favor of the state, as the "north part of the
southwest quarter of the southeast quarter" and the "north part of the
southeast quarter of the southeast quarter" of a certain section, township
and range. The proceedings are held to be void by reason of the indefiniteness
of the description in the petition and judgment.
In Tillmana v. Hutcherson,6' an action to determine title to land, the
judgment below described the subject matter of the suit as follows:
"A tract of land known and described as the Southeast Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 1, Township 41, Range 26, (in
Henry County, Missouri) and extending west up to a certain partition fence heretofore existing and dividing the lands used by the
plaintiff under her ownership of said tract, and by her predecessors
in title to said tract, as the partition fence between said tract and
the Southwest Quarter of the said Northeast Quarter, and particularly of a strip -of land between said old fence and a certain new
fence erected by the said defendants on or about the ................ day
of October, 1936, east of said old fence."
The court holds that the judgment fails properly to describe the land in
dispute, since the description does not locate the new fence and the old
fence with reference to each other or with reference to any government
survey or natural monuments; and the court remands the case with directions that further evidence be taken as to the location of the fences.
,Lankford v. Lankford27 is a partition action involving the construction
of a will. The will devised the real estate in question to the testator's
daughter for life, with remainder to her surviving child or children or their
descendants, and devised the residuary estate to the wife and daughter of
the testator. The trial court permitted a witness to testify as to a statement
made by the testator at the time of the execution of the will concerning
the wishes of the testator with respect to the disposition of the property
should his daughter leave no children surviving her. The upper court holds
the evidence incompetent, on the ground that the will is not ambiguous.
It is submitted that the evidence is clearly incompetent, but not for the
reason stated. It should be incompetent, no matter how ambiguous the
will might be. Hundreds of courts in thousands of cases have talked very
loosely about the role of intention in the field of interpretation. The inten26. 348 Mo. 473, 154 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
27. 348 Mo. 1170, 159 S. W. (2d) 264 (1941).
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tion of the testator, of the contracting parties, of the legislator, is said to
control in the interpretation of wills, contracts, statutes. The fact is that
intention as such is immaterial, not only in the interpretation of wills and
statutes and of contracts which, to be enforcible, must be in writing, but
even in the interpretation of oral contracts. And when the question squarely
arises, the courts so hold. Unexpressed intention has no legal significance in
the interpretation of documents. The problem is to arrive at the meaning
of the words used, in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Evidence
as to what the testator, the contracting party or the legislator meant to say,
or evidence as to what he meant by the words used, is incompetent, because
immaterial. To receive evidence as to 'vhat the testator in this case meant
by the language of his will would be as improper as to receive evidence in
2 8 as to what the attorney who drew the
State ex rel. Marlowe v. Nolaie
petition and the judge who drafted the judgment entry meant by the "north
part" of the southeast quarter, or, in Tillman v. Hutc erson,29 to receive
evidence as to what land the court had in mind when, in the judgment, it
sought to identify a strip between two unlocated fences.
Harwell v. Magillso is a suit to construe a will and to determine title to
real estate. The will, executed in 1917, gives to the wife of the testator, for
life and during her widowhood, with remainder to the heirs of the testator,
"the home place upon which we may be residing at the time of my death."
The testator died in 1932. In 1881 he purchased 265 acres of land, known
and referred to in the evidence as the "Keener farm." He lived on this place
until the date of his death. From time to time, prior to 1912, he purchased
land adjoining the Keener place until, at the time of his death, he owned,
and farmed and fenced as one unit, with the Keener farm as a -nucleus, 1025
acres. He also owned 1900 acres in other tracts, not contiguous to the
Keener unit. The county assessor was permitted to testify that he knew
the testator in his lifetime and assessed his property; that he discussed with
the testator his property and knew what property the testator referred to
as the "home place"; that the testator often referred to the 1025 acre tract as
the home place; and that the testator had wanted to put the entire 1025 acres
under one assessment, but that this was impossible because the land was
located in various sections. The court finds that the testator, by the term
28. 347 Mo. 124, 146 S. W. (2d) 598 (1941).
29. 348 Mo. 473, 154 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).
30. 348 Mo. 365, 153 S. W. (2d) 362 (1941).
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"home place," "meant to include" therein the 1025 acre tract, and consequently holds that the entire tract passes to the widow for life or widowhood, with remainder to the heirs of the testator.
The fact that the testator "meant to include" the 1025 acres in the
designation, if he did so intend, has no bearing on the interpretation of the
will; and if evidence of any such intention had been admitted below, the
upper court would certainly have held its admission improper. However,
evidence to the effect that the testator often referred to the 1025 acre tract
as the "home place" is quite proper. Sich evidence shows the meaning of the
phrase in the will. It identifies the property to which the phrase refers. The
identification is strengthened by the circumstance that the tract of 1025 acres,
was farmed, fenced and operated as a unit.
In City of University City v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry.3 ' a deed to a railroad
company, granting "the right of way over" the grantor's land,".., to and for
the location construction and operation of its Railroad ..." ... and for
that use and purpose only...", "... this license ..... to cease with their
non use of the same for such purpose," is held to convey an easement only.
The court reaches this result through the process of interpretation, and not,
apparently, on the ground that the statute empowers the railroad company
to acquire only an easement.
Brown v. Weare32 is an action to quiet title to a certain tract formerly
used by a railroad company for station purposes. One Weare, in 1883, conveyed to the railroad company a right of way one hundred feet in width,
and the tract in question, described by metes and bounds, "for station
grounds," "to have and to hold the same for all the uses and purposes of said
railroad company so long as the same shall be used for the construction, use
and occupation of said railroad company . . ." Subsequently Weare conveyed to plaintiff's grantor the tract of land from which the right of way
and station grounds had been taken, the deed containing the following
clause: "excepting from the foregoing the right of way 100 feet wide and the
station grounds of the St. Louis, Hannibal and Keokuk Railroad, said station
grounds being" (then follows a metes and bounds description of the station
grounds). The same tract was acquired by plaintiff, the deed containing
the same "excepting" clause. Subsequently the railroad company abandoned
the right of way and station grounds, and quit-claimed the station grounds
31.
32.

347 Mo. 814, 149 S. W. (2d) 321 (1941).
348 Mo. 135, 152 S. W. (2d) 649 (1941).
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to defendant. Plaintiff prevailed below, and the judgment is affirmed. The
court says that the Weare deed to the railroad company conveyed only an
easement, not only in the right of way, but in the station grounds, since the
deed limited the use of the land to railroad purposes; and that the easement
terminated upon abandonment by the railroad company. Defendant argues
that even so plaintiff must prevail, if at all, upon the validity of his own
title, and that here plaintiff cannot own the station grounds, since they were
excepted in the deeds through which plaintiff claims. The court's answer is
that Weare did not intend to retain the title of the station grounds when he
conveyed the tract, less the right of way and station grounds, to plaintiff's
predecessor in title. Says the court: "The question is whether the grantor
intended to keep the title in the right of way and station grounds in himself
or intended to transfer it along with the conveyance of the tract. We cannot
conceive that it was the intention of the grantor to retain the title to the
servient estate.... Our conclusion is that the tract was conveyed subject
to the easement for the right of way and station grounds and did not except
the fee itself."
It is to be noted that although the conveyance from Weare to the
railroad company was for railroad purposes only, there is no such limitation in the exception contained in the deed from Weare to plaintiff's grantor.
The phrase "right of way," in the exception, implies an easement; but in so
far as concerns the station grounds, the exception contains nothing to
indicate that the reference is to an easement only.
The court's language concerning the intention of the grantor is unfortunate. The court has no way of ascertaining the grantor's intention; and
the grantor's intention, even if ascertained, is immaterial. The case should
have turned upon the answer to this inquiry: In the light of Weare's deed
to the railroad company, conveying the station grounds for railroad purposes
only, can the exception in Weare's deed to plaintiff's grantor be interpreted
to apply only to the easement created by the former deed?
State ex rel. State Higlkway Commission v. Union Electric Co.s3 is an
action to condemn certain land for state highway purposes. The lower court
found that defendant was entitled to no damages, for the reason that it had
no right, title or interest in or to the real estate in question. Defendant
maintained a transmission line across the property, by virtue of an agreement
with a railway company which operated a railway over the property, at the
33. 347 Mo. 690, 148 S. W. (2d) 503 (1941).
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time the agreement was entered into. The interest of the railway company
originated with general warranty deeds from Frederick Luecke and wife and
William Branneky and wife, purporting to convey the fee title to one strip
of land twenty-five feet in width and another strip fifty feet in width. The
grantee in the deeds was a railroad company, but neither deed made mention
of a right of way or of the use of the land for railroad purposes. At the time
of the filing of the condemnation suit the land was no longer used for railroad purposes. The state had acquired by deed whatever interest, if any,
reverted to the Lueckes and Brannekys when railroad operations over the
land ceased. The decision of the lower court is affirmed. The Luecke and
Branneky deeds are held to have conveyed an easement only, with the
result that upon abandonment of the tracts for railroad purposes the easement terminated, and all rights in the land reverted to the Lueckes and
Brannekys.
The court reaches this result at least partially on the ground of interpretation. The opinion quotes Corpus Juris to the effect that "where there
has been a grant or conveyance of land to a railroad company, the question
as to what estate or interest is thereby acquired by the company must be
determined from the intention of the parties as shown by the whole instrument, as construed in connection with the railroad company's charter or
governing statutes, and, in case of ambiguity, with the accompanying circumstances. '' a The statute under which the grantee railroad was organized
empowered it "to acquire by grant a right of way not to exceed fifty feet
in width." The court states that a right of way, within the meaning of the
statute, is a mere easement, and that the statute limits to an easement the
interest conveyed by the Luecke and Branneky deeds. It is difficult to
understand how this result can be reached on any sound theory of interpretation, since the deeds clearly purport to convey a fee. Whether the conveyance of a fee, invalid as such by reason of the inability of the grantee
to acquire more than an easement, operates as a valid conveyance of an
easement, is a question outside the scope of this inquiry.
Leeper v. Leeper" involves the interpretation of a deed, executed in
1900, conveying certain real estate to the son of the grantor "during his
natural life and at his death to his heirs, but should he die without children
then to his full brothers and their heirs." At the time of the conveyance the
33a. 51 C J. 535, 536.
34. 347 Mo. 442, 147 S. W. (2d) 660 (1941).
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son was single. He married in 1907, but no children were born of the marriage. In 1934 he and his wife adopted a child, pursuant to the terms of the
1917 adoption statute, which purports to make the adopted child a child for
every purpose of the adopting parent. Thereafter the grantor's son died.
In a contest between the adopted child and the brothers of the grantor's
son, the court holds that the adopted child does not come within the word
"children" as used in the deed, and that the title is vested in the brothers.
The decision is based upon the circumstance that the adoption statute in
force at the time of the execution of the deed merely gives the adopted
child the rights of a child against the adopting parents, instead of making
the adopted person a child of the adopting parents as fully as if born to
them in lawful wedlock. The court states that the grantor is presumed
to have known the adoption statutes in force and effect at the time the
deed was written, and to have prepared the deed accordingly. "From the
deed and surrounding circumstances," says the court, "we hold that the
grantor did not intend to include an adopted child of William F. Leeper
within the meaning of the word 'children' as that word was used in the deed."
The only "surrounding circumstance" discussed is the wording of the adoption statutes.
The reasoning of the opinion seems very remarkable. If the deed had
dealt with adopted childrn, there might be some point in looking to the
statutes for a definition of the term, an adopted child being a creature of the
law. But the word "children" certainly has no technical connotation.
Neither the adoption statutes nor any other legislative enactments define the
term.
It would result from the court's reasoning that if the deed had been
executed subsequent to 1917 the person adopted would come within the
term "children." None of the cases referred to in the opinion go this far,
however. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 5 discussed by the court, involved the construction of a will executed in 1918, devising property to the
children of the testator for life, and on their death to their heirs at law.
An adopted child of the testator's son was held to take the share of the
deceased adopting parent. The term "heir" is perhaps a technical- term.
It ordinarily means a person entitled to inherit on the death of another.
Rights of inheritance are statutory. There is therefore some basis for taking
the statute into account in interpreting the word "heir."
35. 336 Mo. 17, 76 S. W. (2d) 685 (1934).
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At the time of the conveyance the grantor's son was single. There is
hothing to indicate that the deed was drafted in the light of the possibility
that the son's future wife might bear him no children and that the son and
wife might resort to adoption. No mention is made of any adopted children
in the grantor's family at the time of the execution of the deed. The court's
decision, it would seem, should have been based upon the simple proposition
that, so far as appears, the term "children" was used in the deed in the ordinary sense of the term, and that therefore the reference is to natural
children.
TAXATION
PAUL

G.

OCHTERBECK*

-

During the year 1941 the cases on taxation decided by the Supreme
Court of Missouri did not produce any startling changes in the established
precedents. The cases decided do, however, re-announce many rules of law
which are of prime importance to most practicing attorneys. Limitations of
space prevent a detailed analysis of the facts involved in each case. The
cases have been divided on a topical basis, and the principles announced
are discussed in as brief a space as possible. The writer has endeavored
merely to give a brief clear statement of the point or principle involved.
I.

INHERITANCE

TAXEs ON

INTANGIBLES OWNED

By NoN-RESIDENT

DECEDENTS

In 1929 our legislature nacted a reciprocity statute whereby the State
of Missouri exempted intangibles of non-resident decedents from Missouri
inheritance taxes where the state of the domicile of the non-resident decedent
granted a like exemption to decedents domiciled in Missouri.' Starting
about 1930, the Supreme Court of the United States read into the Fourteenth
Amendment a rule of immunity from taxation by more than one state. 2
The above" statute was apparently thought not to be needed by our legislature and it was repealed by a bill approved May 26, 1939.3 Three days later
the Supreme Court of the United States rendered two decisions which on
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.
1. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 576; Mo. LAWS 1929, p. 102.
2. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 65 A. L. R. 1000
(1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 72 A. L. R. 1303 (1930); First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 77 A. L. R. 1401 (1932).
3. Mo. LAWS 1939, p. 182.
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the basis of principles announced permitted taxation of intangibles by more
than one state.4 Due to the above state of the law, the State of Missouri in
the case of St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. State of Missouri' sought to tax
intangibles situate in Missouri belonging to a non-resident trustor who died
in 1935. In this case the Supreme Court of Missouri held: first, that the fact
that intangible personal property held by trustees domiciled in Missouri
may have acquired a business situs in Missouri did not preclude the application of the reciprocity statute; second, that the reciprocity statute,
being in effect at the time of trustor's death, was applicable even though
repealed prior to the time of the actual transfer of the property; and third,
that reciprocity statutes are constitutional. This decision has added significance since the legislature in 1941 specifically exempted intangibles of nonresident decedents from Missouri inheritance taxes. Due to the fact that
many states have reciprocity statutes, the new law and the above decision
will greatly facilitate the administration of many estates in Missouri.
II.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TAXEs

In the case of A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com.
-mission of Missouri,7 .the court held that a real estate broker's salesman
working on a commission basis without written contract, drawing account,
specified hours or supervision and who was permitted to do outside work was
an independent contractor not entitled to unemployment compensation;
and that the usual tests for determining the relationship of independent
contractor applied to the Unemployment Compensation Act. In Murphy
v. Doniphan Telephone Co.,8 it was held that the fact that an individual
employer (having six employees) was also president, manager, principal
stockholder and one of three directors of a corporation (having seven employees) did not compel the conclusion that the individual employer controlled the corporation so as to make both employers taxable as one employing unit under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
In Murphy v. ConcordiaPublishingHouse,9 it was held that a corporation

4. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 123 A. L. R. 162 (1939); Graves v.
Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939); see also State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich,
62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942).
5. 348 Mo. 725, 155 S.W. (2d) 107 (1941).
6. Mo. LAws 1941, p. 281 (amending Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 571).
7. 348 Mo. 147, 152 S. W. (2d) 184 (1941).
8. 347 Mo. 372, 147 S. W. (2d) 616 (1941).
9. 348 Mo. 753, 155 S. W. (2d) 122 (1941).
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organized under the "Manufacturing and Business Companies" article was
subject to unemployment compensation taxes even though it was wholly
owned by a religious corporation and its profits paid to the religious corporation. Even though this decision reaches a somewhat undesirable result, it
is based on the wording of the act and is the only one which could have been
correctly entered. In Lucas v. Murpky,10 it was held that Section 5075 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939, enacted in 1937, did not give the
State of Missouri a lien for unemployment compensation taxes which would
be superior to a deed of trust executed and recorded in 1935. This decision
is based wholly upon the premise that to do so would make this statute
retrospective. The effect of the above statute and the principles announced
in this decision are discussed in the next subdivision.ll
III. LIEN OF CORPORATE TAXES AND FEES ON CORPORATE PROPERTY.
EFFECT OF SECTION 5075 Mo. REV. STAT.

(1939)

UPON MORTGAGES

AND DEEDS OF TRUST OF CORPORATIONS

From the discussion contained in Lucas v. Murphy.1 2 it is apparent that
the supreme court will probably hold that all mortgages and deeds of trust

executed by corporations after September 28, 1937 will be subject to all
taxes and fees of every character and description owing to the State of
Missouri or any political subdivision thereof. This means that the holders
of corporate mortgages must practically audit such corporation's books
each year to see that all income, franchise, unemployment, etc. taxes are
paid. In the above case the unemployment taxes alone amounted to
$4,660.00 for a two year period. It is suggested that it would probably
be prudent practice to insert a provision in corporate mortgages requiring
the mortgagee to furnish a statement each year from a certified public
accountant certifying that all taxes and fees, etc., covered by the above
statute have been paid.
IV. TAXATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
In State ex rel. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lucas,'8 the court held that a
statute imposing a tax of 2% on premiums received for "insurance of life"
included premiums paid on annuity business-in other words, annuities were
10. 348 Mo. 1078, 156 S. W. (2d) 686 (1941).
11. See III.
12. 348 Mo. 1078, 156 S. W. (2d) 686 (1941).
13. 348 Mo. 286, 153 S. W. (2d) 10 (1941).
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held to be "insurance of life." In State ex rel. Central Surety Ins. Corp. v.
State Tax Commission,14 the court held that a domestic insurance company
paying an annual tax on gross .premium receipts was not subject to the
corporation franchise tax. This decision will be helpful in construing other
tax statutes where the provisions are apparently in conflcit. The statute
levying the franchise tax exempted insurance companies paying an annual
tax on their gross premium receipts in this state from the franchise tax. The
statute levying the gross premium receipts tax stated that such tax should
be in lieu of all other taxes except taxes on franchise, etc. The court correctly held that the non-exemption provision of the gross premium receipts
tax statute did not levy a franchise tax on the insurance company.
V. SCHOOL TAXES

In Russell v. Frank,"5 the court held that school taxes voted for building purposes could not be transferred to and used for general school purposes; and that the extension of a levy of taxes for building purposes was
properly enjoined as in violation of Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri where the evidence showed a consistent practice of levying
annual taxes for building fund purposes and then using the building fund
to pay deficits in ordinary operating expenses and where the evidence also
showed that literature issued with the consent of the board at the special
election stated that the additional tax was necessary to keep the schools
in operation.
VI. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AGAINST CEMETERIES

In the case of Troost Avenue Cemetery Co. v. Kansas City,' 6 the court
held that cemeteries operated for profit are subject to special benefit assessments; that special assessment judgments should be levied against the land
as a whole subject to the rights of the grave lot owners; that such judgments can be enforced only by special execution-that is, the judgments are
not personal judgments; and that the purchaser at the execution sale takes
title subject to the purposes for which the cemetery was dedicated, grave
lot rights (graves sold), and necessary appurtenances, such as avenues,
drives and walks.
14. 348 Mo. 171, 153 S. W. (2d) 43 (1941).
15.

348 Mo. 533, 154 S. W. (2d) 63 (1941).

16. 348 Mo. 561, 154 S. W. (2d) 90 (1941).
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VII. LICENsE TAxEs

In St. Louis Amusement Co. v. St. Louis County,1 7 the court held that
a moving picture theater of today is in the same legal category as the
"opera house" of 1885 so that moving picture theaters in any village or
city of the third or fourth class were exempt from license taxes under the
provisions of Section 15450 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939. This
statute was subsequently repealed.18 In City of St. Louis v. Laclede Power
& Light Co. 19 the court held that a charge of five per cent on the gross
receipts of utilities pursuant to a city ordinance which required acceptance
of its terms was a rental charge and not a license tax; and that such charge
could not be collected from a utility which had not accepted the terms of
such ordinance. In State ex rel. Young v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,2 ° the court
held that suit to forfeit merchant's bonds for false statements could not be
maintained where board of equalization approved the valuations in the
merchant's statements and made such statements part of board's final assessment judgment; and that such suit could only be maintained where the
merchant's statement was shown to be false before the assessment judgment
became final. In Edmonds v. City of St. Louis,21 the court upheld the
validity of an ordinance imposing a license tax on slot machines wherein slot
machines were divided into different classifications for taxation purposes.
VIII. MUNICIiAL BoNDs AND TAxEs
In State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Smith,22 the court held that a bond
issue and tax levy voted by the people of Jefferson City for the erection
of a municipal office building were invalid where the primary purpose of the
bond issue and the tax was to provide for the construction of an office building for the Unemployment Compensation Commission. The court correctly
held that the tax was not levied for a municipal public purpose within the
meaning of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri.
IX.

GENERAL RULES

A. Strict Construction. Tax laws are to be construed strictly against
the taxing authorities.23
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

347 Mo. 456, 147 S. W. (2d) 667 (1941).
Mo. LAws 1941, p. 565.
347 Mo. 1066, 152 S. W. (2d) 23 (1941).
348 Mo. 1180, 159 S. W. (2d) 297 (1941).
348 Mo. 1063, 156 S. W. (2d) 619 (1941).

22. 348 Mo. 554, 154 S. W. (2d) 101 (1941).

23. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 348 Mo. 147,
162, 152 S. W. (2d) 184, 191 (1941).
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B. Clear Authorization By Statute. The right of the taxing authorities
to levy a particular tax must be clearly authorized by statute. 4
C. Non-exemption. Non-exemption from taxation does not carry
with it the right of taxation in the absence of a statute authorizing
the tax.25
D. Equitable Title. Equitable title is sufficient upon which to base
an assessment for taxes.26
X. TAx SAYtEs AND TrlES
During the year 1941, the supreme court rendered four decisions holding that tax sales were void due to the failure of the officials in question to
27
strictly comply with the particular statutes involved. In Beckwith v. Curd,
a tax sale was held void because the notice of sale did not include all delinquent taxes against the property in question as required by statute. 28 In
State ex rel. Marlowe v. Nolan,29 a tax judgment was held void nine years
after the date of its entry in a Writ of- Error proceeding brought by a
minor within three years after she became twenty-one years of age because
no guardian ad litem had been appointed for her as required by statute 0
and because the description of the land was insufficient to support the judg8 1 the order of publication, the judgment. In Delta Realty Co. v. Hunter,
ment by default, and the sale were held void because sheriff's non-est return
was made prior to the return day. In Davison v. Arne,8 the tax judgment
and sale were held void because the affidavit for service by publication was
not properly sworn to.
In Hawkins v. Heagerty,8 a petition to set aside a sale of real estate for
delinquent taxes was held fatally defective because the petition did not
24. A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 348 Mo. 147,
162, 152 S. W. (2d) 184, 191 (1941); State ex rel. Central Surety Insurance Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 348 Mo. 171, 173, 153 S. W. (2d) 43, 44 (1941).
25. State ex rel. Central Surety Insurance Corp. v. State Tax Commission,
348 Mo. 171, 174, 153 S. W. (2d) 43, 44 (1941).
26. Varney River Drainage Dist. v. Spiedel, 347 Mo. 1124, 1130, 152 S. W.
(2d) 54, 58 (1941); State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Baumann, 348 Mo. 164, 169,
153 S. W. (2d) 31, 35 (1941).
27. 347 Mo. 602, 148 S. W. (2d) 800 (1941).
28. Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1929) § 6208.
29. 347 Mo. 124, 146 S. W. (2d) 598 (1941).
30. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 716.
31. 347 Mo. 1108, 152 S. W. (2d) 45 (1941).
32. 348 Mo. 790, 155 S. W. (2d) 155 (1941).
33. 348 Mo. 914, 156 S. W. (2d) 642 (1941).
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contain an offer to refund the taxes paid by the defendant as required by
statute8 4
In case of Gilmore v. Hibbs,-5 the Jones-Munger Law was held applicable to cities of the third class. This is in accord with a previous decision36 holding that law applicable to cities of the fourth class. In the case of
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Bauman, 3 7 it was held that it was unnecessary for a city purchasing property sold for delinquent taxes under the
Jones-Munger Law to pay taxes accruing prior to the sale or after the
sale in order to secure a deed to the property as required by statute"8 in
view of the constitutional provision"0 exempting the property of cities, etc.,
from taxation. In the case of Campbell v. Daub,40 a sale under the JonesMunger Law was set aside where the basis of the fraud consisted of misinformation given by the county collector and the purchaser keeping the sale
a secret until the two year period elapsed.
AsIDE TAx ASSESSMENTS
A. CertiorariTo Review Action of Board of Equalization. In the case
of State ex rel. Lane v. Corneli,4 1 the Supreme Court of Missouri
again reaffirmed the well established doctrine that a Writ of
Certiorarionly brings up the board's record for review and that
the only questions that can be presented are questions of law arising on the face of the record. A careful reading of this case will
disclose how dangerous it is to rely on this remedy-not even
conceded facts can be considered.
B. Suits In Equity. In State ex rel. Merritt v. Gardner,42 the supreme
court again held that a taxpayer could not bring a suit in equity
to set 'side an alleged excessive assessment until he had exhausted
all of his statutory administrative remedies. This case is extremely valuable to the practicing attorneys in that Judge Ellison
discusses the various steps that must be taken by a taxpayer before he can bring a suit to set aside an excessive assessment.
XI. PROCEEDINGS

To

SET

34. Mo.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

REV. STAT. (1939) § 11179.
347 Mo. 1072, 152 S. W. (2d) 26 (1941).
State ex rel. Steed v. Nolte, 345 Mo. 1103, 138 S. W. (2d) 1016 (1940).
348 Mo. 164, 153 S. W. (2d) 31 (1941).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11152.
Mo. Const, art. X, § 6.
159 S. W. (2d) 683 (Mo. 1941).
347 Mo. 932, 149 S. W. (2d) 815 (1941).
347 Mo. 569, 148 S. W. (2d) 780 (1941).
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However, in the case of Washington, University v.

4

Corman,

where

the plaintiff's charter exempted all of its property from taxation,
the court did not compel the plaintiff to exhaust all of its administrative remedies before applying to the court for relief. This is
an unusual situation and the course pursued should not be relied
upon where the taxpayer is seeking to avoid part of an assessment
on the grounds of fraud or excessiveness.
C. Necessary and Proper Parties. In the case of School District No.
24 of St. Louis County v. Neaf,-" which was a suit to prevent disbursements outside of the plaintiff's district, the supreme court
held that all of the taxing units affected by the suit were necessary
parties and that the taxpayers in such units were proper but not
necessary parties. It is believed that this rule is sound in principle
and will prove practicable in operation.
TORTS
GLENN A. McCLEARY*

T6rt cases were more numerous during 1941 than in any year since
surveys of the work of the court have been made in the Review. There
were approximately sixty-five decisions in which the principal issue was that
of tort liability. This number does not include the cases dealing with the
humanitarian doctrine, since special study is given to this particular aspect
of tort law at another place in this survey of the work of the court so that
the doctrine may be examined more critically.'
There was an unusual number of well reasoned opinions in this area of
the law in this period. But in the main the court applied well settled
doctrines to factual situations which varied slightly from situations previously dealt with. For this reason, and due to the large number of cases in
this field of the law, many of the decisions will be passed over with little or
no treatment, reserving for special comment those decisions which seem
more significant either in the factual aspects or in the application of well
43. 348 Mo. 310, 153 S. W. (2d) 35 (1941).
44. 347 Mo. 700, 148 S. W. (2d) 554 (1941).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D.,
Harvard, 1936.
1. Mr. Becker's survey at p. 395.
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settled tort principles. The court having accepted the attractive nuisance
doctrine, or the possessor's responsibility to a child trespasser for injuries
received on the premises, is now to be confronted with marking out the
proper limits and scope of that principle of law. The drafting of sole cause
instructions is also a very live problem in a number of cases.
The attention of the bar has been called on previous occasions to the
influence which the Restatement of the Law of Torts has had in a number
of the decisions, although in most cases there has been ample Missouri
authority to base the decision. Each year there is further evidence that the
Restatements are a very persuasive source of law, especially where new
ground is being broken in the law or in its application to new sets of facts. 2
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of Land
Two significant decisions dealing with tort liability had to do with
determining the applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine to new
types of situations. In Emery v. Thompson,' the child trespasser was injured while playing among piles of railroad ties upon a railroad right-of-way.
He was there with the knowledge of the railroad company. In State ex rel.
W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hfghes,4 a boy was killed while playing with
other boys around cooper's buckets in the defendant's stone quarry. The
heavy handle of the bucket, left in an upright position, fell and struck the
nine year old boy across the back of the neck, killing him instantly. The
handle was so heavy that it required the full strength of four or five boys
to lift it off the deceased's neck. Children habitually and almost daily played
around these buckets to the knowledge of, and without objection from, the
2. For example, see recent decisions in the tort field: Hull v. Gillioz, 344

Mo. 1227, 130 S. W. (2d) 623 (1939), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 466; Taycr
v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 342 Mo. 112, 119 S. W. (2d) 240 (1937); Bragg v.

Ohio Chemical & Mfg. Co., 162 S. W. (2d) 832 (Mo. 1941); State ex rel. W. E.
Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S. W. (2d) 251 (1941); Stevenson v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S. W. (2d) 260 (1941); Lloyd
v. Alton R. R., 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S. W. (2d) 267 (1941); State ex rel. Chapman v.
Shain, 347 Mo. 308, 147 S. W. (2d) 457 (1941); Bass v. Kansas City Journal Post

Co., 347 Mo. 687, 148 S. W. (2d) 548 (1941); McFarland v. Dixie Machinery &
Equipment Co., 348 Mo. 347, 153 S. W. (2d) 67 (1941); Teel v. May Department

Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S. W. (2d) 74 (1941).
3. 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W. (2d) 479 (1941).
4. 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S. W. (2d) -251 (1941) (quashing the opinion by the
court of appeals).
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defendant's employees. The St. Louis Court of Appeals had held this to
constitute an attractive nuisance. In both cases the supreme court held
that there was nothing more than "casual negligence?' and the conditions
were not sufficiently inherently dangerous to constitute an attractive nuisance. In the second case the court said "There cannot be a nuisance, attractive or otherwise, except from a condition maintained over an unreasonable period of time." Is not the court here taking the word nuisance too
literally, whereas the whole concept of an attractive nuisance is a fiction
merely to base an exception to the nonliability of possessors of land to
trespassers in case of children, who are unable to appreciate the dangers involved but which should have been realized by the possessor as attractive
to children.
These- two decisions give little to guide in future cases as to which
label will be applied to varying sets of facts. An attempt was made in the
landmark decision of Hzll v. Gillioz6 to explain these two ideas:
"Inherently dangerous means that danger inheres in the instrumentality or condition itself at all times so as to require special
precautions to be taken with regard to it to prevent injury, instead
of danger arising from mere casual or collateral negligence of
others with respect to it under particular circumstances."
On rehearing in the Hull case there was an attempt to distinguish further
between "inherently dangerous" and "casual negligence."
It would seem that a more helpful distinction between these two situations might be made by comparing the magnitude of the recognizable risk
to the children with the usefulness or utility to the possessor in maintaining
the condition, although dangerous. Not all recognizable dangers must be
made safe under the doctrine of attractive nuisance. If the social usefulness
in maintaining the condition, although dangerous, is great enough and
precautionary measures to make safe too burdensome, so as to seriously
interfere with the social utility of the thing, the court might well conclude
that the doctrine of attractive nuisance should not be applied. This would
explain such dangers as were mentioned in the Hull case as falling outside
of the doctrine, namely, wheelbarrows, lawnmowers, upturned rakes, scythes,
farm implements left in a field, haystacks and hay chutes. Perhaps railroad
5. Street v. Callahan Const. Co., 147 S. W. (2d) 153 (Mo. App. 1941).
6. 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S. W. (2d) 623 (1939), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv.
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ties cannot be piled or placed in other formations which would make them
quite safe from trespassing children without seriously interfering with the
usefulness or utility to the company in preparing for their future use. On
the other hand, it would seem that very little precaution would be necessary
in seeing that the handles of the cooper's buckets were left in a safe conditiori when they were no longer in use. Such precautionary measures could
not be said to interfere with the usefulness or utility of the buckets to the
operators of the quarry. In the latter case, the evidence did not seem to be
clear as to whether or not the handles were left in a dangerous position in
the first place, although the court said it would assume that such fact had
been found by the court of appeals. To be sure this weakens the entire dis7
cussion of whether or not this was a genuine attractive nuisance case at all.
The Emery case seemed to be ruled by the earlier decision of Kelly v.
Benas,8 in which a pile of lumber was held not to fall within the attractive
nuisance doctrine. It concluded that there was no distinction between a pile
of lumber and a pile of ties similarly situated. One might differ with this
conclusion. However, the more important matter here is in giving weight
to cases decided prior to the Hull case in 1939, which were decided in a
period when our court was expressly refusing to extend the doctrine beyond
the turntable cases. It is indeed very questionable how far these former
precedents should be considered in controlling similar situations arising since
1939, when the whole doctrine was thrown open under the more liberal
guidance of the Restatement of tke Law of Torts, with slight limitations.
If the earlier precedents are still controlling, what is the significance of the
Hadl case except as to the very facts of that case? But the Hidi decision
dearly laid down new doctrine which points to a new growth in this phase of
liability.
There was the usual number of decisions involving the liability of a
proprietor of a place of business to his business guests while they were on
the premises, but in none of these cases was there any contribution to
existing case law. In two cases, the business visitor knew of the condition
in the step or floor so that there was no duty to give an additional warning."
The dismissal of a customer's action against a store owner for injuries re7. Similar observations are made on these cases at p. 480.
8. 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557 (1909).
9. Murray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., 347 Mo. 365, 147 S. W. (2d) 623 (1941)
(slippery condition in hallway where janitor was cleaning); Lamberton v. Fish,
148 S. W. (2d) 544 (Mo. 1941) (position of step combined with insufficient light
in a residence).
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ceived when the customer was thrown from a chair, in which she was sitting
in the aisle of the store during a sale, when another customer knocked the
chair from under her, was upheld on the ground that the proximate cause
of the fall was the intervening negligent act of a third person.'0 The force
against the chair seemed sufficient to have swept the chair from underneath
plaintiff regardless of rubber mats or safety caps. It would seem that in the
use of "proximate cause" the court was dealing with cause in fact rather
than with limits of liability, or in other words, the same accident might well
have taken place even if the defendant had not been negligent. Where the
customer fell over a box of sweet potatoes in a vestibule exit from the defendant's store, but the evidence did not show how the box came to be
in that position, constructive notice to the proprietor was not made out by
showing that the box was placed in the exit passageway during the ten or
fifteen minutes the plaintiff was in the store. 1 But where the evidence
showed that a portion of a metal strip on a step in the store was torn and
jagged along the top, that there was dirt under the strip and that it looked
dirty where it was torn, it was held sufficient to make an issue of fact for
the jury on the question of notice of the defect on the part of the store
owner.12 In Murphy v. Fred Wolferman, law.,'8 the question was whether
the customer had abandoned her status as a business visitor and had
become a licensee by going to a landing, which was used at the time for
storing and for wrapping parcels, to use a public telephone. This turned
on whether oi not she should have known, in exercising ordinary care, that
the landing telephones were withdrawn from public use and no longer within
the scope of the invitation.
The respective responsibilities of both a landlord and a tenant for
injuries resulting from a condition of the premises are fully set forth in
Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate & Investment Co' 4 There the plaintiff was
struck while sitting on the sidewalk by a piece of terra cotta which fell from
the building wall above the sidewalk. The petition charged joint and several liability of the lessor and lessee. The interesting aspect of the decision
is, on the appeal by the lessor, in holding error to have been committed by
10. Pellett v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 152 S. W. (2d) 172 (Mo. 1941).
11. Robinson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 347 Mo. 421, 147 S. W.
(2d) 648 (1941).
12. State ex rel. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Shain, 348 Mo. 650,
154 S. W. (2d) 775 (1941).

13. 347 Mo. 634, 148 S. W. (2d) 481 (1941).
14. 348 Mo. 407, 155 S. W. (2d) 90 (1941).
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the trial court in directing a verdict for the lessee, on the ground that the
defense of the lessor, that the piece of terra cotta fell solely because of
negligence of the lessee, was effectively cut off. There was basis in the evidence that the jury might have found the dangerous condition arose subsequent to the lease, for which condition the lessor would not have been
responsible. The tenant was relieved from responsibility in Morgan v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.' 5 for the condition of a ten foot strip of cement
between the front of the store and the regular sidewalk on the ground that
the evidence showed the space covered by the cement, irrespective of whether
it was included in the lease, had been dedicated and accepted by public user.
There was no evidence that the strip of sidewalk was maintained by the
owner or the tenant, or that it served any private purpose other than to
cover what would otherwise have been bare ground and to furnish a passageway to the store.
An interesting question, was involved in Stevenson v. Kansas City
Southern Ry.16 as to the status of the plaintiff in relation to the owner of
the premises, who had been promised a job by a subcontractor when the
work was ready., The plaintiff had gone on the premises of the defendant
owner for his own purpose to see how much work there would be to do.
The defendant had reserved the right in its contract with the general contractor to approve or disapprove all subcontracts. The general contractor
had entered into a contract with a subcontractor for the painting of the
building without the approval of the defendant. Under these facts the
plaintiff was not a business visitor of the defendant and, therefore, was not
entitled to recover for injtiries sustained when the building collapsed.
The court, in State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hostetter,17 indicated a disposition to hold abutting owners or occupants of abutting premises
for dangerous conditions in sidewalks more responsible, perhaps, than in
the previous decisions, where the structures in the sidewalk are part of the
sidewalk but benefit the abutting property owner. The courts have in the
past distinguished between those cases where the use of the sidewalk by
the adjoining proprietor is completely foreign to its normal use as a sidewalk, and where the private use is in no way foreign to its primary use as
a public sidewalk. In the latter situation, the only duty is owed by the
municipalit, as if the structure was in no way used for the benefit of the
15. 348 Mo. 542, 154 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941).
16. 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S. W. (2d) 260 (1941).
17. 348 Mo. 841, 156 S. W. (2d) 673 (1941).
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adjoining building and had been constructed by the city. In those cases,
the court has reasoned that while there is a secondary use being made of
these structures by the abutting proprietor, still the primary use made of
them is as public sidewalks, and that there is nothing in these secondary uses
which is foreign to the use as a public sidewalk. In the above case, a filling
station had constructed a ramplike incline of seven and six-tenths inches in
six feet in that portion of the sidewalk which was used as a driveway approach from the street to the station. The plaintiff sustained injuries when
she slipped and fell as she was passing over this driveway which formed a
part of the public sidewalk and was covered with snow and ice.' 8
2. Automobiles
No new principles of law pertaining to liability arising out of automobile accidents were developed in this period under review. The principal
issues, in many instances, were not peculiar to automobile cases. In a number of the cases, the proper drafting of a sole cause instruction was the
9
principal issue on appeal. Of these the more instructive are Long v. M401
20
and Stanictk v. Western Union Telegrapk Co Sole cause instructions are
becoming an important problem in the recent decisions but only a full
length treatment of the subject can begin adequately -to present it.21 Of
equal significance is the use of sole cause instructions in the humanitarian
cases discussed elsewhere in this survey. The prhma facie case made by a
plaintiff on proof of the defendant's name printed on a truck involved in the
collision was sufficiently overcome, in Arnold v. HaskinS,2 2 by the plaintiff's
own evidence, so that the question of the defendant's liability could be taken
from the jury. In Mann v. Payne,2 3 an instruction that it is the duty of
a driver of an automobile to give an arm signal when making a left turn
to plaintiff's automobile which was attempting to pass was erroneous, where
there was evidence to justify a finding that the defendant gave a signal
both by arm and by tail-light, and the statute and city ordinance required
only that a signal be given either by arm or by mechanical or electrical
18. For a more complete analysis of the Missouri cases, see (1941) 6 Mo.
L. REv. 122.
19. 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S. W. (2d) 853 (1941).
20. 348 Mo. 188, 153 S. W. (2d) 54 (1941).
21. Also see treatment of a sole cause instruction in Mendenhall v. Neyer,
347 Mo. 881, 149 S. W. (2d) 366 (1941); Schroeder v. Rawlings, 348 Mo. 824, 155

S. W. (2d) 189 (1941).

22. 347 Mo. 320, 147 S. W. (2d) 469 (1941).
23. 159 S. W. (2d) 602 (Mo. 1941).
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device. 2- Dictum in an earlier decision by the court en banc, that one defendant cannot complain of instructions given at the request of a codefendant
which affect the former prejudically, was corrected in State ex rel. Nevzis v.
Hughes.25 The question came up in a novel fashion as to which was the
"latest controlling decision" of the court to be considered in determining
whether a decision by the St. Louis Court of Appeals conflicted with it. The
court found that the earlier decision by the court en banc being dictum made
subsequent decision of the court in division the "latest controlling decision."'20
3. Municipal Corporations
In Guthrie v. City of St. Charles,27 the city was held responsible for
injuries sustained in an explosion of sewer gas emanating from a flooded
sanitary sewer in a basement of a home. The city officials were held to know
that all sanitary sewers contain gas, some of which is explosive when mixed
with air and exposed to open flame, and that when the sewer is filled to
capacity with moving water, the water will push the gas ahead of it. The
fact that similar accidents had never happened before in the city does not
mean that the officials should not have anticipated that some injury might
result. The decision makes a contribution to the factors involved in any
situation, in determining whether a risk of injury may have been foreseen
in establishing a-duty on which the negligent act may be predicated. 28
4. Railroads
The liability of railroads for injuries caused on the premises was raised
in many cases, some of which are not discussed here, either because the
issues were governed by the law of other states 2 9 or because nothing new was
24. Cheffer v. Eagle Discount Stamp Co., 348 Mo. 1023, 156 S. W. (2d)
591 (1941) (in action for injuries sustained, when automobile driven by plaintiff's
husband collided with an approaching automobile, against both the driver of the
other automobile and the employer of plaintiff's husband, a refusal to direct a
verdict in favor of the driver of the other automobile, at the request of the
husband's employer, was not prejudicial to the employer).
25. 347 Mo. 968, 149 S.W. (2d) 836 (1941).
26. In La Banca v. Pundmann, 147 S.W. (2d) 466 (Mo. 1941), evidence
that driving automobile in street with left rear door open, striking the plaintiff
who was a member of a band on parade, made a submissible case of actionable
negligence.
27. 347 Mo. 1175, 152 S.W. (2d) 91 (1941).
28. For another helpful decision on the same question, see Lloyd v. Alton
R. R., 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S.W. (2d) 267 (1941) (habits of dogs).
29. McGlothin v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 708, 148 S.W. (2d) 558 (1941) (comparative negligence law of Arkansas); Wolf v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 347
Mo. 622, 148 S.W. (2d) 1032 (1941) (Illinois law); Draper v. Louisville & N. R. R.,
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a
In Lloyd v. Alton R.
contributed by the facts or by the
railroad employee was injured while riding a motorcar when it struck a dog,
resulting in derailment. The question was whether the operator of the
motorcar was negligent in failing to slow down upon seeing the dog's approach. Just what is deemed common knowledge relative to the habits of
dogs chasing noisy vehicles is well discussed, as well as the factors which determine generally when a duty exists upon which negligence may be based.
2 involved the difficult question as to whether a
Osment v. PitcairiP
master is liable to an employee for injuries caused by unnecessarily rough
horseplay of another employee which was committed outside the employment of the latter employee. Plaintiff was a member of an interstate switching crew. While standing in the freight house he was seized from behind by
a messenger boy who squeezed him so tightly that the plaintiff lost consciousness and fell, fracturing his head on the concrete floor. There were two
specifications of negligence: (1) retaining in employment a dangerous person who had propensities to show his strength by rough horseplay exercised
toward other employees; and (2) the failure of a special policeman in the
employ of the defendant, who was sitting nearby at the time of the assault
and who knew of the propensities of the messenger boy, to make an effort
to prevent the assault. The plaintiff contended that even if this act was
outside the employment the defendant was responsible on his first theory
of negligence. The court denied this contention on the ground that the case
fell under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the federal cases interpreting that act. However, those decisions would seem to be distinguishable
on the ground that the evidence did not show a course of dangerous conduct
on the part of the assaulting employee prior to the injuries to the 'plaintiff.
In the instant decision, there was considerable evidence to that effect.
There is authority that a duty is owed by an employer so to control his
servant, while acting outside the course of his employment, as to prevent

348 Mo. 886, 156 S.W. (2d) 626 (1941) (Kentucky last chance theory); Carpenter
v. Kum, 348 Mo. 1132, 157 S. W. (2d) 213 (1941) (last chance doctrine of Oklahoma); Trower v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 347 Mo. 900, 149 S. W. (2d)
792 (1941) (Kansas last chance doctrine).
30. See Wild v. Pitcaim, 347 Mo. 915, 149 S. W. (2d) 800 (1941) (duty to
furnish efficient handbrakes under Federal Safety Appliance Act); West v. Kum,
148 S. W. (2d) 752 (Mo. 1941) (negligence of switch foreman in violating a custom
relating to switching a second cut of cars onto track on which plaintiff was riding
a former cut, for purpose of stopping cars by means of handbrakes).
31. 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S. W. (2d) 267 (1941).
32. 159 S. W. (2d) 666 (Mo. 1941).
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him from intentionally harming others, or from conducting himself as to
create risks of harm to others, if the servant is on the premises of the employer, and the master knows or should know of his ability to control the
servant, and knows or should know of the necessity for exercising such control.33 But once the court's premise is taken that the employer was not
responsible for the conduct of the employee in this particular situation, the
presence of the spedial policeman did not change the rule or add to the
employer's responsibility.
Cockran v. TIompsonP8 added nothing new to the case law of Missouri,
but the decision created concern in some quarters, on the ground that it
represented a considerable change in the humanitarian doctrine of the
state.35 There the plaintiff was struck and killed by defendant's train at a
place on the track located in the open country, which was completely fenced
and guarded. Deceased had been drinking and sat down on the track to rest.
There was not sufficient habitual use by the public as to impose a duty of
lookout at this point, hence the defendant had the right to expect a clear
track. The case is quite distinguishable from the early case of Werner v.
Citizen' Ry., 0 where the intoxicated man lay, or fell down, on the defendant's track in the public street. The court further held that the mere
discovery of an object on the track, not discernible to be a human being, does
not require employees in charge to stop or slacken speed unless circumstances
would lead a reasonable man to believe that the object was probably a human
being. Since there was no duty of lookout at the point in question, there
were no such circumstances. The insufficient probabilities of the presence
of people to impose a duty of lookout were also influential in determining
what interpretation the trainmen are held to make of any object they did
see. Here the object first appeared to the members of the train crew as a
roll of brown paper. The case is more fully analyzed elsewhere in the
Review. 37

Other cases peculiar to the liability of railroads involved questions of
interest but space forbids separate treatment. Thus the failure by a railroad to install an automatic bell signal or danger lights, or to take other
33. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 317.
34. 347 Mo. 649, 148 S. W. (2d) 532 (1941).
35. See Signifcant Trends in Judicial Decisions in BENCH AND BAR, December, 1941, and February, 1942.
36. 81 Mo. 368 (1884), and see discussion by McCleary, The Bases of the
Huwmanitarian Doctrine Reexamined (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 56, at 77.
37. *Noted in (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 320.
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steps to make a grade crossing over a country road reasonably safe for
motorists, may constitute negligence, but the act cannot be designated as
willful, wanton and reckless misconduct so as to authorize punitive damages
or to deprive the defendant of the defense of contributory negligence.38 The
rule that the master must furnish a reasonably safe place to work for his
servants was held to have no application where the very work the servant
is employed to do consists in making a dangerous place safe.39 In Steeley
v. Ku-rn,'0 the court assumed from the experience of the case that the word
"negligence" within the meaning of the Federal Employer's Liability Act
"includes a deliberate and intentional injury of an employee by another
employee of equal station." The court in its first review of the cast ruled
that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendants on
the plaintiff's contention that the fellow employee deliberately and intentionally dropped the rod which the employees were, carrying together, causing
the injuries, on the theory that such act was not in furtherance of the
master's business. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, in
a per curiam opinion, the judgment was reversed, that Court citing one of its
earlier opinions as controlling without giving any other reason for its ruling.," However, the nature of the intentional conduct in the two cases was
so clearly different that it is difficult to see why the United States Supreme
Court reversed the earlier Missouri decision without helpful discussion.
5. Supplier of a chattel
In Bragg v. Ohio Clremical & Mfg. Co.,' 2 the liability of a manufacturer
38. State ex rel. Kum v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 177, 153 S. W. (2d) 46 (1941)
(the court clearly pointing out the difference between these two types of misconduct).
39. Pritchard v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 832, 156 S. W. (2d) 652 (1941) (bridge
carpenter injured while assisting in putting new stringers in bridge which fell when
an outside stringer extending over the shims and resting on top of caps tilted over
and knocked the carpenter from the end of the cap). The case fell under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Assurmption of risk was also in the case.
40. 157 S. W. (2d) 212 (1941).
41. Another decision held that a member of a switching crew was not engaged in interstate commerce so as to render the Federal Employers' Liability
Act applicable to injuries received while riding on the side of a coal car loaded
with sand, consigned to an intrastate point, and which was being moved for weighing before it was sent out on an interstate freight train if time permitted. The facts
were held not to bring it within the rule of the cases holding that a switch movement of intrastate cars, made for the very purpose of connecting with interstate
cars and thereafter forming an interstate train, is a movement in interstate commerce. The fact that some six hours after the accident the particular car left on
a train which carried four cars destined for points in other states was not controlling. Compare with Sibert v. Litchfield and Madison Ry., 159 S. W. (2d)
612 (Mo. 1941)
Published
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was based on negligent misrepresentations involving risks of bodily harm
instead of the usual theory of implied warranty. Here the oral representation
by a representative of the manufacturer of an analgesor, used by dentists in
the administration of nitrous oxide gas to patients, that such machines could
be used for such purpose with absolute safety, construed with literature left
with the machine by the representative, was held as a matter of law not
to mean that the dentist alone could safely administer gas to himself through
the analgesor under any and all conditions. The court recognized that liability may be based on negligent representations if the representor, though
believing the representations to be accurate, failed to exercise reasonable care
to ascertain their accuracy or was negligent in phrasing them, thereby inducing action by the injured party. But the action of the one relying on the
representations in this case did not fall within the scope of the representations made.43
B. Res Ipsa Loquit-ur
The application of res ipsa loquitur was made in only the more common
situatioins such as the falling of a piece of terra cotta from the building
above the sidewalk striking the plaintiff, 44 and the breaking of a rail while
the engine, on the footboard of which the plaintiff was riding, passed over
45
it.
In Benner v. Terminal R. R. Ass' n of St. Louis, 46 the question whether
the plaintiff pleaded general or specific negligence and, if the latter, whether
he had abandoned the benefit of res ipsa loquitur,was discussed in connection
with its application to the law of master and servant under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. Besides the usual analysis in determining whether
the allegations were general or specific, the court applied another test:
assuming there were no question of res ipsa loquitur in the case and it was

43. The court cited Section 311 of the

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW

OF

TORTS

which provides: "(1) One a part of whose business or profession it is to give
information upon which the bodily security of others depends and who in his
business or professional capacity gives false information to another is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused by the action taken in reliance upon such information by the recipient or by a third person to whom the actor should expect the
information to be communicated if the actor, although believing the information to be accurate, has failed to exercise reasonable care (a) to ascertain its
accuracy, or (b) in his choice of the language in which it is given. (2) The actor
is subject to liability under the statement in Subsection (1) not only to the recipient or to a third person who expectably acts in reliance upon it but also to such
third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken."
44. Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate & Investment Co., 348 Mo. 407, 155 S.W.
(2d) 90 (1941).
45. Sibert v. Litchfield & Madison Ry., 159 S. W. (2d) 612 (Mo. 1941).
46. 348 Mo. 928, 156 S.W. (2d) 657 (1941).
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necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific negligence, would the present allegation stand up against a motion to make it definite and certain, and if not,
then it must be held'to be an allegation of general negligence. There was
also the question whether the doctrine applied to cases arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. The court held that there was no reason
why it should not be applied in the same manner and to the same extent to
injuries caused by one employee to another as it would apply in favor of
a stranger. The further question as to whether a court could direct a verdict
in defendant's favor under this act where res ipsa loquitur was considered
47
but not directly treated.
C. Imputed Negligence
The troublesome problem in determining who is responsible for the
harms of a borrowed servant is well considered in McFarlandv. Dixie Machinery & Equipment Co.-" There the owner of a tractor which was rented
with the driver to the city for use on a WPA project, under the direction
of the WPA supervisory personnel, was held not liable as the master. The
various factors to be weighed in determining the extent of his severance of
employment as far as the original, lending, employer is concerned are set
forth. The same factors furnish the essential basis for determining "either
who is the master of a particular servant as to any -questioned act, or
whether the relationship is that of servant or independent contractor."
49
Both of these questions were presented in State ex rel. Chapman v. Shan,
where one who had been engaged as an independent trucker for a long time
had been engaged on the occasion in question by the defendant for the special service of furnishing and operating at his own expense one or more trucks
to haul alfalfa during the last day of the harvesting. He was present on the
job supervising, to some extent, the work of, and exercising control over, his
47. Negligence may also be shown by proving the violation of a statute which
was designed to prevent injuries of the kind suffered by the plaintiff and was intended to protect persons of the class to which the plaintiff belongs. In Cantwell
v. Cremins, 347 Mo. 836, 149 S. W. (2d) 343 (1941), the court stated the effect
of violation of a statute requiring drivers of automobiles to keep to their half of the
highway to be evidence of negligence. Although the case is governed by Illinois
law the court said that "The rule in both Illinois and in Missouri and in most of
the states is that a violation of a statute is evidence of negligence." This seems
to be a misstatement of the Missouri rule because violation of a statutory duty
makes out negligence and the fact of negligence is no longer for the jury. Whether
the negligence was the legal or proximate cause of the injury is a fact still to be
established. See cases collected in Mo. DIG. (1930) tit. NEGLIGENCE, § 6.
48. 348 Mo. 341, 153- S. W. (2d) 67 (1941).
49. 347 Mo. 308, 147 S. W. (2d) 457 (1941).
-I
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own servant who was the driver of the truck involved in the highway accident. Furthermore, the trucker was paid for the work done on a tonnage
,basis. In neither of these cases is the more difficult question of joint or several control as to the particular act raised or discussed.
The court in Bass v. Kansas City Journal Post Co.50 held the owner of
a newspaper route, who had agreed with the publisher to deliver bundles
of papers to carriers within his territory for a specified weekly sum of money
and in addition he was to receive from the publisher certain other papers
which were to be delivered to subscribers, an independent contractor as to
injuries caused by a minor who had been employed with automobile by
the route owner to drive over the route while the route owner delivered the
papers. But it was a jury question a to whether the relationship between the
owner of the taxicab and the driver was that of master and servant or independent contractor, so that the owner would be liable for the driver's
negligence, where the evidence showed that the driver paid the owner a
fixed sum per day for the use of the taxicab, retaining all additional earnings,
that the cab was serviced by the owner, and that the owner retained
a large measure of control over the driver's physical conduct together with
the right to discharge him."' There was also the question of deviation from
his route, assuming the relationship of master and servant, where, after
delivering the last passenger before quitting work for the day, the driver
picked up his wife and baby intending to drive them home.
While the correct result would seem to have been reached in Mendenhai v. Neyer,52 the theory of liability may be questioned. In an action for
the death of the plaintiff's husband the evidence was that the husband had
taken his two sons to town to see county officials about securing medical
treatment for the minor son. The other son, an adult, was driving the truck
on the return trip when it was struck by defendant's truck, causing the death.
Instructions were upheld submitting factual issues involving a joint enterprise
between the deceased and his son who was driving so that the negligence
of the son could be imputed to the father. The theory of a joint enterprise
is the equal right of control, in this case the equal right to control the operation of the truck. On the above facts there would seem to be no such basis
of control by the sbn. It is true that there was a community of interest in
the purpose of the trip, but this is not the controlling factor to constitute
50. 347 Mo. 681, 148 S. W. (2d) 548 (1941).
51. Chastain v. Winton, 347 Mo. 1211, 152 S. W. (2d) 165 (1941).
52. 347 Mo. 881, 149 S. W. (2d) 366 (1941).
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a joint enterprise. The more applicable theory of liability would seem to be
that of imputing the negligence of the driver to the owner of the automobile,
especially where he is personally present in the automobile, on the basis of
principal and agent. The court relied on an earlier Missouri authority 3 in
which the facts were that the plaintiff owner of the automobile was riding
while his wife was driving at the time of the collision. They were returning
to their home from a visit with the plaintiff's mother-in-law. The court in
the instant case quoted from the earlier case: ". .

it is likewise the pre-

ponderance of juristic authority that the negligence of the driver of an
automobile is imputable and attributable, especially where, as in the instant
case, the owner is personally present in the automobile, and where the
owner and the driver of the automobile are engaged in a joint journey or
enterprise, either of business or pleasure." However, the court in the earlier
case went on to say that "The theory of the aforestated and prevailing rule
of imputable negligence is that the relation of principal and agent, or master
and servant, exists between the owner and the driver of the automobile,
and that the owner, being personally present in the automobile at the time,
and having the control and authority of a principal or mastei, is responsible
for, and bound by, the negligence of his servant or agent." The use of the
term "joint enterprise" in the earlier case was not intended to refer to the
legal relation where there is an equal right of control of the means or agency
which is employed for carrying out the enterprise for the purpose of imputing
the negligence of one to the other. Or, reversing the party in each case who
was driving, the relation between the parties would have to be such as to
give to the one not driving an equal right in law to control the car. Such
fact is essential before there is a joint enterprise in the law, but in neither
case was this fact found.
D. Causation
The absence of proximate or legal causation was held to rule the case
of Smith v. Mabrey.54 There, a seven-year-old child, because of the muddy
condition on the side of the street where there was no improved sidewalk in
the defendant city, chose to cross the street to utilize a concrete walk and
was struck by an automobile while crossing. The court assumed negligence
on the part of the city for not having improved that part of the street in
question ordinarily used for sidewalk purposes, so as to get to the question
53. Smith v. Wells, 326 Mo. 525, 547. 31 S. W. (2d) 1014, 1024 (1930).

54. 348 Mo. 644, 154 S. W. (2d) 770 (1941).
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of causation. It was then confronted with two analagous situations in which
the question of causation had been decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The
first situation was where pedestrians are compelled to walk into the street
to get around materials unlawfully piled on the sidewalk and where a temporary sidewalk was not provided as required by ordinance. The other
situation was where sidewalks had been constructed on both sides of the
street, but these were covered with mud about two and one-half feet deep,
caused by slides of dirt from adjoining embankments. Is it possible so to
distinguish the instant case from these situations on the ground of causation?
Query, does not the case turn on whether there was any negligence or not?
Can causation be in a labelled negligence case where the negligent act is
not found?
E. Defenses in Negligence Cases
No new developments or new situations involving defenses in negligence
cases appeared in the decisions under review. Reference has been made elsewhere to the proper drafting of a sole cause instruction which was the
principal issue on appeal in a number of cases.5 5 The court reaffirmed that
there is a continuing duty, in approaching a railroad track where the view
is obstructed, to continue to look until he can see, even up to the crossing,
or be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law.60 A pedestrian,
struck by an automobile immediately after she had crossed the highway and
when she was on the shoulder of the highway, sustained the burden of
showing she was not contributorily negligent, even though she may not have
looked as she crossed the highway, since she was at a place where she was
under no compulsion to expect an automobile to travelr 7 A person driving
an automobile into the side of a standing or moving train at a grade crossing,
even at night, is contributorily negligent as a matter of law in the absence
of special circumstances rendering the crossing peculiarly hazardous, on the
theory that if he had looked he could have seen the train and have avoided
the collision.: Testimony by other motorists, who came on the scene of the
accident, that they could see for a distance of one hundred to two hundred
and fifty feet the defendant's truck by the aid of their headlights, as the truck
55. See footnotes 19 and 20, supra.
56. Rischeck v. Lowden, 347 Mo. 426, 147 S. W. (2d) 650 (1941).
57. Goldbaum v. James Mulligan Printing & Pub. Co., 347 Mo. 844, 149
S.W. (2d) 348 (1941).
58. Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. (2d) 784 (1941), noted
in (1942) 7 Mo. L. Rzv. 185, on the application of the humanitarian doctrine to
the case and the subsequent history of the case.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1

114

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1941

441

proceeded along the highway immediately after the collision, resulting
allegedly from the absence of a red tail-light, did not establish contributory
negligence as a matter of law in an action by a guest in an automobile against
the owner of the truck for injuries received, since a motorist is required
under the statute to exercise the highest degree of care while a guest is
required only to exercise ordinary care. 59 Other cases involving the defense
of contributory negligence are noted below.60 The assumption of risk cases
fell under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and raised no questions of
moment. 61
F. Burden of Proof
The court a few years ago informed trial lawyers and judges as to
the nature of an instruction on the burden of proof which would be sufficient
and approved: "A short, simple instruction, telling the jury that the burden
is on plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance or greater weight of the
credible evidence, and that unless he has done so the jury must find for
defendant, ought to be sufficient to inform the jury what plaintiff is required
to do. A plain declaration to that effect will be easily understood by a jury.
The more the instruction is elaborated upon, the more complex it becomes
and the more it is likely to be. misunderstood. ... . Certainly all that ought
to be required, in addition to such a statement... should be a clear defini."62 In Trower v. Missouri-Kaiwastion of preponderance of evidence.
59. Davis v. F. M. Stamper Co., 347 Mo. 761, 148 S. W. (2d) 765 (1941).
60. Reichmuth v. Adler, 348 Mo. 812, 155 S. W. (2d) 181 (1941) (evidence
insufficient to establish contributory negligence where custom not sufficiently shown
among painters, working at the height at which the plaintiff was working, to equip
their scaffolds with guardrails or ropes, and to provide safety ropes suspended from
top of building); Russell v. Johnson, 160 S. W. (2d) .701 (Mo. 1941).
61. In Pritchard v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 832, 156 S. W. (2d) 652 (1941), a
bridge carpenter, assisting in putting new stringers in bridge, fell when an outside
stringer which extended over the shims resting on top of caps tilted over and
knocked carpenter from end of cap. The danger was held not so obvious as to
justify a holding that the carpenter assumed the risk as a matter of law. In Owen
v. Kurn, 347 Mo. 516, 148 S. W. (2d) 519 (Mo. 1941), a section foreman, in
attempting to remove a push car from the tracks before it could be struck by a
special train which came around a curve without whistling, was not assuming a
normal risk incidental to his employment, nor could it be said under the circumstances that he had assumed an obvious or fully known and appreciated extraordinary risk. In Jenkins v. Kum, 348 Mo. 942, 156 S. W. (2d) 668 (1941), the defense of assumption of risk not applicable where the injury arises from a single
act of negligence creating a sudden emergency without warning or where the injured employee has not sufficient opportunity to appreciate the danger. Contributory negligence under this act does not defeat recovery but only reduces the
damages.
62. Mengel v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 994, 111 S. W. (2d) 5 (1937).
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Texas R. R., 63 the instruction attempted to explain the meaning of preponderance of the evidence: "The court instructs the jury that the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff in this case to prove his case by a preponderance of
evidence, and by the terms burden of proof and preponderance of evidence,
as used in these instructions, the Court does not refer to the number of
witnesses sworn on either side, but means that in point of value and credibility the evidence to sustain the plaintiff's case must outweigh that for the
defendant, and the Court instructs you if you believe that the evidence is
evenly balanced, or that the evidence of plaintiff does not outweigl the
evidence of the defendant, then your verdict nmst be for the defendant."
The court felt that this instruction may well have prevented the jury from
properly considering testimony of the defendant's witnesses that was favorable to the plaintiff.
II. FALSE

IMPRISONMENT

An interesting decision involving false imprisonment is found in Teel
v. May Department Stores Co.,6" where it is held "that an owner of a store
or other premises has the right to detain a person therein, for a reasonable
time for a reasonable investigation, whom he has reasonable grounds to
believe has not paid for what he has received or is attempting to take goods
without payment." These statements of law were based upon a taking of
goods under false pretenses and would not be applicable to the situation
where the proprietor only suspects such taking.
The further question was also involved as to the effect on the original
privileged act, where there is an unreasonable delay in releasing the person,
or unreasonable delay in turning him over to the proper authorities. The
defendants, instead of calling the authorities when the goods were returned,
held the plaintiff for a further period and compelled them to sign confessions
under threat that they would be held until they did so. Here the court
adopted the view of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, in holding that
the subsequent wrongful act of the defendant did not go back to make
the entire course of conduct wrongful. Thus one taking custody of another
for a privileged purpose (here to obtain the return of its goods) is not privileged "to force the other to comply with any demand which has no relation
63. 347 Mo. 900, 149 S. W. (2d) 792 (1941).
64. 348 Mo. 696, 155 S. W. (2d) 74 (1941). The case has been criticized, see

Roberts, Privileged Detention in Actions for False Imprisonment in Missouri

(1942) 13 Mo. B. J. 63.
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to accomplishing the purpose for which the custody is privileged." The
instructions in the case had authorized the jury to make imprisonment shown
prior to the return of the goods a basis for recovery, instead of only what
occurred thereafter.
III. LIBEL

The cases of libel decided in this period were based on well-settled prin-

ciples. In Grossman v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 5 the scope of the
privilege to report court proceedings was presented. So long as the report remains fair and impartial, it does not lose its privileged character because it is
abridged and condensed, and there is no obligation on the part of the newspaper to go back of the judgment to determine the correctness thereof.68 In
determining the effect of a newspaper article complained of as defamatory,
the court, in Hylsky v. Globe-DemocratPublishing Co., 67 construed both the
8
headline and the article as one document.
This case has been discussed more fully elsewhere in the Review. 69 A
verdict of $25,000 punitive damages and one dollar as actual damages was
upheld in Edwards v. Nidsen."0 This was a companion case to the earlier
one of McDonald v. R. L. Polk & Co. 71 the issues of which have been set
72
forth elsewhere in the Review.
65. 347 Mo. 869, 149 S. W. (2d) 362 (1941).
66. The article contained headline "Wants J. P. to Explain Tax Receipt He
Issued" and statement to the effect that the state's attorney would question the
justice of the peace concerning receipt for taxes, together with a paragraph relating
to court proceedings for certain tax money paid to the justice. These were construed as constituting a report of a court proceeding and not as charging the justice,
who had properly accounted for tax money received, with corruption in public
office or embezzlement.
67. 348 Mo. 83, 152 S. W. (2d) 119 (1941).
68. (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 80.
69. 152 S. W. (2d) 28 (Mo. 1941).
70. 347 Mo. 1077, 152 S. W. (2d) 28 (1941).
71. 346 Mo. 615, 142 S. W. (2d) 635 (1940), discussed in (1941) 6 Mo. L.
Rav. 228, and id. 494.
72. There was one case involving principles of fraud but which presented
nothing noteworthy. In Weitzman v. Weitzman, 156 S. W. (2d) 906 (Mo. 1941),
a petition which alleged that plaintiff and defendant, brothers, owned all the stock
in a corporation, that plaintiff's illness for three years preceding the sale by the
plaintiff to the defendant of his shares of stock had prevented the plaintiff from
attending to the business, and that the defendant induced the plaintiff to sell his
stock at less than its true value, was insufficient to state a cause of action, in the
absence of any allegatioin as to the nature of the business in which the corporation
was engaged, or as to how plaintiff, after the sale of the stock, ascertained the true
value of the corporation, or why he was unable to determine that fact before he
sold the stock.
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TRUSTS
WILLiAm

L.

NELSON, JR.*

The cases involving the application of the law of trusts which were
decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1941 are primarily of interest
as indicating what evidence is considered necessary to show the existence of
the various types of trusts, express, resulting and constructive.
I. Exrnss

TRUSTS

Stein v. Mercantile Home Bank and Trust Co." was a suit to establish
a trust in money and bonds which plaintiff alleged were given to him by
his uncle, shortly before the latter's death, to hold in trust for certain
relatives. The defendant executor denied that such a gift had ever been
made. .The chancellor upheld the gifts and entered a decree establishing
the trusts.
In adopting the findings of the chancellor the supreme court referred
to the well-established requirements that an extra ordinary degree of proof
is necessary to establish a parol trust, stating that the testimony must be
"clear, cogent and convincing" so "as to leave no room for a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the chancellor."
In Cartall v. St. Louis Union Trust Company2 plaintiff brought suit
to establish that she was the owner of certain bearer notes and shares of stock
found in her husband's safe deposit box after his death. The basic theory
of the action was that her husband had made a gift inter vivos to her, and
the lower court so found. In seeking to uphold that judgment the plaintiff
also argued the case on the theory of an express trust.
After holding that the evidence tended only to establish an intention
to make a gift, which was unconsummated at the time of the husband's
death, the court discussed plaintiff's contention as to an express trust. It
pointed out that the evidence here was not sufficient to show that there was
an express trust, since a voluntary parol trust must be created by the donor,.
and not by a court of equity giving effect to an imperfect parol gift by
enforcing it as a trust, for the latter course would be giving effect to an
intention which the maker never contemplated.
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1. 347 Mo. 732, 148 S. W. (2d) 570 (1941).
2. 348 Mo. 372, 153 S. W. (2d) 370 (1941).
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IMPLIED TRUSTS

A. Resulting Trusts
3

Adams v. Adams was a partition suit in which one of the defendants

filed a cross-bill claiming title to real estate on the theory of a resulting trust.
Title to the property had been taken in the name of defendant's father,
but the evidence was that defendant had paid the purchase price by making
the down payment and paying off the notes for the balance which were
executed by his parents, and had advanced most of the money spent on
improvements and taxes.
The lower court refused to decree a resulting trust but reversed and
remanded the case on other grounds.
The court stated that the law will imply a resulting trust where a
person furnishes the purchase price of land and title is taken in the name of
another, but the facts necessary to raise the trust must be shown by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence, and the evidence in this case was not of
that character.
The court further enumerated the essentials necessary to establish
a resulting trust in the instant case, stating that the defendant should
adduce evidence of high probative value on the following fundamentals:
(1) His showing must be consistent with an intent to create a trust for his
benefit, (2) the intent, presumed or supposed, must have existed at the
time the property was acquired, and (3) the money advanced must have
been paid for that purpose and not as a loan or gift, because if the money
was loaned a resulting trust could not arise even if title was held by the
parents as security or on an agreement to share the profits.
B. Constructive Trusts
Kerber v.
a suit which plaintiff brought against the administrator of his father's estate and the executor of his mother's estate, for the
purpose of having himself declared to be the beneficiary of a trust and the
owner of certain shares of stock in a floral company. The petition alleged
(1) that the administrator, who had been a partner with plaintiff's father
in the floral business, had appropriated the personal property of the partnership which belonged to the father and of which the plaintiff was an heir, and
(2) that the executor was threatening to sell certain shares of stock which
Rowe 4 was

3. 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S. W. (2d) 610 (1941).
4. 348 Mo. 1125, 156 S. W. (2d) 925 (1941).
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in fact belonged to the plaintiff, the stock having been issued to his mother,
who had previously been appointed as his guardian, in return for the conveyance to the newly formed corporation of plaintiff's interest in the partnership.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the petition for the reason
that it failed to state a cause of action.
In affirming the action of the lower court on the ground that the suit
was barred by the statute of limitations, the supreme court discussed and
distinguished express, resulting and constructive trusts. It quoted the
Restatement and other authorities to the effect that an express trust
is created only if the settlor shows an intent to create it, that a resulting
trust "arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not
intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest in the property"5' and that "where a person holding title
to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it,
a constructive trust arises."s
The court held that the allegations of plaintiff's petition were sufficient
to establish a constructive trust in the property held by the administrator
and by he executor since the petition charged in effect that the defendants
were holding property which equitably belonged to the plaintiff, and that
they would be unjustly enriched at his expense if they were allowed to
retain it.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
R. BETTNER*
In the material to follow, there will be no comment upon cases incidentally involving wills, but primarily involving issues which can be discussed
more advantageously under other headings, such as Property or Trusts.
Furthermore, no material attention will be given to any case unless it is felt
that the case contributes substantially to the understanding, purpose, and
direction of our legal system.
WAYNE

5. 3 ScoTt, TRuSTS (1939) § 404.1, p. 2163; 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 404,
p. 1250.
6. REsTATEMENT, REsTrIrrioN § 160, p. 640.
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S. Northwester University, 1934; LL.B. University of Illinois, 1937; LL.M. Columbia University, 1939.
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I. DESCENT AND Disnu nu'r
In Mclntyre v. Hardesty,2 the question was whether a child promisee
of a contract to adopt could inherit from the ancestor of the promisor (the
parent), there having been no adoption in fact either under the law in force
before 1917, or the law in force since that date. The court held in the
negative. Although the court did not say so specifically, it would seem
that children adopted under the provisions of the present Adoption Laws3
may inherit from ancestors and collaterals of adoptive parents.In Prouse v. Schmidt,5 H and W married in 1904, and W's father advanced money with which to buy a farm. The farm was bought and title
taken in the name of H and W as tenants by the entirety. The grantees immediately executed a note and deed of trust with W's father and mother
as beneficiaries, apparently to secure the repayment of the money advanced
by the father. The father died in 1922. His will ordered the release and
cancellation of note and trust deed and also provided, "I give devise and
bequeath . . . [the farm mentioned above] . . . to my daughter W, etc."
His executrix (who was his wife) released the note and trust deed per the
order. In 1939 W died and by her will left one-half of "all my property
... , that I may have at my death" to her husband, the other one-half to go
to her mother. The mother sued H for partition of the farm, claiming
one-half thereof. Judgment was for H in the lower court and this was
affirmed upon appeal. The upper court said that H had not raised an estoppel against himself because he had engaged in no conduct which misled anyone. Nor did he bar himself under any doctrine of election. The court
said, "He exerts no right as a beneficiary under the will inconsistent with
his ownership as a tenant by the entirety." He therefore was not put to an
election. A better reason for the same result would seem to be that although,
1. Three cases, decided in 1941, involving descent and distribution are not
discussed herein. They are Decker's Estate, 348 Mo. 32, 152 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941);
Flynn v. Bryan, 154 S. W. (2d) 773 (Mo. 1941); Szombathy v. Merz, 347 Mo. 776,
148 S.W. (2d) 1028 (1941).
2. 347 Mo. 805, 149 S. W. (2d) 334 (1941).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 9614 provides: "When a child is adopted in
accordance with the provisions of this article, all legal relationship, and all rights
and duties, between such child and its natural parents, shall cease and determine.
Said child shall thereafter be deemed and held to be for every purpose, the child of
its parent or parents by adoption, as fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock ......
4. See Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Misouri (1937) 2 Mo. L.
REv. 300, 312, and cases cited therein.
5. 156 S. W. (2d) 919 (Mo. 1941).
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after the father-in-law's death, H actually was in a position of inconsistency
if he accepted the release of the note and trust deed, thus claiming under
his father-in-law's will, and also claimed as tenant by the entirety, yet he
had no choice but to accept such benefits, because of the peculiar nature of
a tenancy by entirety. He couldn't prevent W from taking such benefits
and yet if she took them, they would inevitably inure to his benefit, too.
All this assumes, as the court apparently does, that the father-in-law's will
did -notsimply make H alone a gift of the security interest, but rather was
intended to result in a release of the security interest, and to benefit both
H and W. If this assumption be wrong, and it might be, then the troublesome problem would be presented as to the effect of a transaction by which
the owner of a security interest under trust deed in land held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety transfers said interest to one of the tenants.
Does the'tenancy cease? 6 If so, how would this affect the disposition of the
case at bar? If not, would the tenancy be affected in any other way? The
court does not discuss this possible angle to the case.
II.

PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION

In view of the present war, a case of unusual interest is Wyers v. Arnold. In that case, a citizen and resident of Germany made a will in Germany disposing of personal property in Missouri. The will was not brought
in for probate until after the Missouri one-year Statute of Limitations8 regarding the probate of wills had run. The probate judge nevertheless
admitted the will to probate, feeling that he was bound to do so under the
provisions of the treaty between the United States and Germany to wit:0
7

"Nationals of either High Contracting Party may have full
power to dispose of their personal property of every kind within
the territories of the other, by testament, . . ."
Upon appeal the supreme court held that the treaty did not force such
a disposition of the case and denied probate. The court said that German
decedents were not denied "full power" to dispose of their property by a
6. A tenancy by the entirety is one species of joint tenancy. If one of two

joint tenants in some way or other become owner of a greater interest in the prop-

erty than the other owns, the joint tenansy ceases by virtue of the lack of unity
of interest. See 2 TiFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY (3 ed. 1939) § 425. The same
result should follow as to tenancies by the entirety.
7. 347 Mo. 413, 147 S.W. (2d) 644 (1941).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 532.
9. 44 STAT.2132, 2135 (1923).
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one-year Statute of Limitations on probate of wills and applying alike to
aliens and residents of Missouri. Two observations are pertinent: One is-would the United States Supreme Court have disposed of the case in the
same way? The war makes this question more difficult to answer and perhaps may make it moot. The other is-does the court's legal reasoning
cover up another possible basis for the decision-namely, that the treaty
was probably never directed to a situation where the aliens were sham
claimants and the German government was the real party in interest. This
decision is in line with tendencies in other states1 0
From the jurisprudential standpoint, the most important wills case decided in 1941 by the supreme court may be State ex rel. Callalnv. Hess,1
where a previous decision by the court upon an appeal in connection with
the same will12 arose to plague the court. In that case, T died leaving an instrument which was offered for probate to a probate judge in vacation time.
Probate was allowed and contestants started contest in the circuit court,
before the probate order had been confirmed by the probate judge in term
time. When the circuit court affirmed probate of the will, contestants appealed to the supreme court and then for the first time, apparently, argued
that the circuit court had no power to handle the case, since its jurisdiction
was derivative, and did not attach unless the appeal to it was from a judicial
order of the probate court, admitting will to probate, as distinguished from
a non-judicial order made in vacation time.'13 The supreme court was
persuaded by this argument to hold that the circuit court affirmance was
null and void. But while the supreme court was considering the case, the
probate court confirmed the order made in term time, without notice to the
contestants or the supreme court. Contestants did not learn of this confirmation until after the supreme court had disposed of the case. After so
learning of the order, contestants began proceedings in certiorari in the
circuit court to quash the confirmation order of the probate court. The
circuit court quashed the writ, and contestants appealed to the supreme
court.

The proper disposition of the appeal depended upon the answer to the
10. Cf. Matter of Weiberg, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939);
Matter of Bold, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 291 (1940). Cf. Matter of Blasi,

172 Misc. 587, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 682 (1939).

11. 348 Mo. 388, 153 S. W. (2d) 713 (1941).

12. Callahan v. Huhlman, 339 Mo. 634, 98 S. W. (2d) 704 (1936).

13. Citing Johnson v. Brewn, 277 Mo. 392, 210 S. W. 55 (1919), and several

other cases.
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question of whether the probate court had the power to make the confirmation order while the appeal from the probate court was pending in the circuit and supreme courts. The answer to this question depended in turn upon
the answer to one or more of several other questions, to wit:
(1)

Was it proper to appeal (by way of a contest under Section 538,
Missouri Revised Statutes 1939) from an order of the probate
judge made in vacation time, as distinguished from an order
made in term time?
(2) If such an appeal was improper, was such impropriety only a
matter of form, or did it completely prevent the circuit court
from going into the merits of the appeal?
(3) Assuming the circuit court had no power to handle the merits
on the appeal to it, did this necessarily mean that power remained with the probate court to enter the confirmation order
while the case was pending in the circuit and supreme courts?
(4) Assuming an affirmative answer to the immediately preceding
problem, did the Missouri one-year Statute of Limitations on
probate of wills"4 operate to prevent the probate court from
exercising the power to enter the confirmation order fourteen
months after the order in vacation time?
(5) Was it necessary to enter the confirmation order at the next succeeding term after the vacation order had been entered, in order
that the confirmation order be valid?
(6) Was the rendering of the confirmation order without notice a
deprivation of contestant's property without due process of law?
Let us consider each of the above questions in the order set out. The
court, again taking the position which it had taken on the first appeal, felt
that it was not proper to appeal to the circuit court (by way of contest
under Section 538, .Missouri Revised Statutes 1939) from an order made
in vacation time because such an order was not a judgment. A probate
judge acting in vacation time is not capable of rendering judgments. He
is not then acting as a court. He is in somewhat the same position as a person acting "coram won judice." He is capable of rendering only orders and
not judgments. Since the filing of a contest in circuit court is supposed
to vacate the "judgment" of the probate court, it follows that an attempted
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 532, cited supra note 8.
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contest of non-judicial "orders" is improper. Such vacation of judgment is
a preliminary but fundamental step in establishing the power of the circuit

court to proceed with the merits of the contest. This reasoning seems sound
in view of the confusion which would follow if contests of mere "orders"
made in vacation time could be instituted generally. Furthermore, if we
allow appeals before the probate court has finally made up its mind as to
whether to probate or refuse probate, the result would be to confiscate the
original jurisdiction of the probate court over the probate of. wills. These
considerations had peculiar weight in the Hess case because, on the first
appeal, the contestants had argued some of them at least, to the court, and
had persuaded the court that they were sound.
Now assuming it was not proper for the contestants to appeal from such
non-judicial orders, what was the effect of such improper appeal? The court
thought, in handling both appeals, that since the circuit court in cases involving will contests is a court of derivative jurisdiction, it followed that under
such circumstances jurisdiction over the subject 'matter was lacking. Doubtless the court, on the second appeal, was influenced by the fact that, on
the first appeal, contestants themselves contended that the circuit court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and won a ruling to that effect.
Such a ruling may not have been res judicataas to the issues of the second
appeal,' but it was nevertheless a most powerful precedent against contestants. As a matter of principle, it might seem fair to hold that an appeal
from an order made in vacation time is simply a defective one, subject to
being perfected by a double barrelled procedure-first, an application to the
circuit court that the appeal to it be held in abeyance; second, an application
in term time to the probate court for a confirmation order, made to relate..
back to the date of the order made in vacation time. As the law now stands,
it is doubtful if such procedure is permissible.1 6
It is obvious, then, that contestants, because of the position they had
taken on the first appeal, precluded themselves from getting a favorable
answer to questions (1) and (2). The court thought contestants had also
15. It is believed that both the issues and the parties on the second appeal
were not the same as on the first appeal.

16. See State v. Pemberton, 151 S. W. (2d) 111, 118 (Mo. App. 1941);

Hampshire Arms Hotel Co. v. Wells, 298 N. W. 452, 453 (Minn. 1941). It might

be supposed offhand that a "anunc pro tunc" order would be proper here, but it
is because the purpose of such an order is only to make the record- speak the truth,

not to make the record distort the truth. See Hours, Missouri
PRacrIcE (1938) § 609.
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precluded themselves from receiving a favorable answer to question (3).
The court reasoned that if the circuit court had no jurisdiction of subject
matter of the first appeal, it necessarily followed that complete power to
handle the case remained with the probate court. Hence, the confirmation
order was held valid by a majority in Division Two, one judge dissenting.
It is believed that here the majority were in error. It does not necessarily
follow, that because a court on appeal has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, that complete power remains, pending the appeal, in the lower
court. If this were true, the upper court, including our supreme court in
some instances, could not even dispose of the problem of whether the case
was properly before it. To prevent chaos in our legal system, some court
on appeal must have the power to handle the question of whether the case
is properly before the court, in order to dispose of the merits. Any other
approach means that such questions can never be decided at all, that gaps
in our law cannot be filled, and that void judgments on appeal would be
numerous. The majority opinion itself does not seem to admit that the
court lacked power to handle the jurisdictional element on the first appeal.
And if it had such power, it would necessarily seem to follow, as the minority
opinion indicates, that all exercise of power by the probate court which
would interfere with an orderly handling of the case by the supreme court
should have been denied. The majority opinion on this point sets a precedent for chaos. It seems wrong and should be cast aside at the first opportunity, or, if the court itself feels unable to prevent such waste of time
and energy, the legislature ought to remedy the situation. Particularly with
reference to probate court procedure, it would seem desirable to take steps
which will avoid the need for confirmation orders, or at least reduce them
to an absolute minimum. One way of accomplishing this would be to abolish
the outmoded terms in the probate court. Such a reform has been advocated
by .n authority on both Procedure and Wills.1 7 Such a reform will be in
line with proposals to limit, in the procedure of the circuit court, the effects
of terms,' 8s which cannot be completely abolished in the circuit court because
of constitutional provisions. 9 The constitution is probably no bar to the
20
complete abolition of terms in the probate court.
17. Atkinson, Old Principlesand New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure (1939) 23 J. AM. JuDIcATuRE Soc. 137, 140.
18. See Proposed General Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Missouri,
Plan II, Art. I, § 11 and 16; Art. VI, § 27; Art. IX, § 21; Art. XIII, § 5.
19. Mo. Const, Art. VI, § 22.
20. Mo. Const., Art VI, § 35, and Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 2441 and 2453.
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Contestants argued, somewhat feebly, that the Missouri one-year Statute of Limitations with reference to the probate of wills 2' operated to make

the confirmation order invalid, it being rendered fourteen months after the
order in vacation time and more than fourteen months after publication of
notice of letters testamentary. The court answered this contention conclusively by showing that under the express terms of the statute it has no
further application once the will is presented within one year after publication of notice of letters testamentary, and proof then taken, either before
the court itself, or the probate judge in vacation time, or the clerk of the
probate court in vacation time.
In one respect the court overruled certain implications in a previous
Missouri case, 22 to the effect that the confirmation or rejection of orders made
in vacation time must take place at the next succeeding term of the probate
court. Contestants had argued from the earlier case that the confirmation
order was void because not made at the next succeeding term of the probate
court. The position of the court to the effect that the confirmation orders
need not be made at the -next succeeding term of the court appears to be
sound, in that it gives the probate judge some reasonable leeway in running his court. Actually, considerable confusion might result if this discretion were not given to the probate court (e.g., suppose there has been an
unavoidable delay due to the sickness of the judge). Time is not so much
of the essence in cases like these to warrant placing over-technical burdens
upon the probate court.
,Contestants remaining point was a contention, urged rather mildly,
that the confirmation order by the probate court, without notice to anyone,
operated as a deprivation of property without due process and was therefore
void. The court answered this by noting that a proceeding to probate
a will is one in rem, and that in Missouri such a proceeding may be instituted and litigated without notice to anyone.23 There is no doubt as to
the validity of the court's position where no contest proceedings of any
kind have been started. But once contest proceedings, even though premature and defective, have been started, is it sufficient to say that the pro21. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 532, cited supra note 8.
22. Creasy v. Alverson, 43 Mo. 13, 19 (1868).
23. Citing Benoist v. Murrin, 48 Mo. 48 (1871), and Hughes v. Burriss, 85
Mo. 660 (1885). On the general problem of notice in regard to probate of wills,
and controversies centering around probate, see excellent summary by Atkinson, Old
Priwiples and New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure (1939) 23 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc.

137, 138.
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bate proceeding is an action in rem where no notice to anyone is necessary?
It will be remembered that the procedure centering around probate grew up
in the days when society was much less complicated than today. Possibilities
of actual notice to persons interested in the estate were much greater then
than now, due to the fact that such interested persons ordinarily lived
in tle immediate neighborhood, which was usually sparsely settled, and
where almost everyone knew everyone else. In view of the tremendous
change in circumstances, calling for a greater need of some sort of additional
notice, over and above neighborhood gossip, it is doubtful if the idea that
notice is not necessary should be applied to a case where a contest, although
defective and premature, has actually been instituted, and where contestants
have good reason to believe that the status quo will be preserved until the
contest is disposed of, one way or the other. After all, the question of necessity of notice reduces itself to a question of what is fair to the adverse party.
The ruling of the court that notice of the confirmation order was not necessary is open to question. Further extension of such a concept should be made
with caution. But even assuming notice should have been given, it of course
does not -necessarily follow that a lack of such notice should be considered
an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process. It would
be perfectly possible for the supreme court to hold that an order without
notice is reversible error but not violative of due process.
In the case of State ex rel. Smitk v. Hdl,24 the court reiterated a previously announced rule in Missouri that an intestates's child has no power
to mandamus a probate court to have the court appoint him administrator
de bonis non after first removing other administrators de bonis non. The
statuteO25 allows the probate court discretion in such cases, which discretion
bars the nandamus action.
The court in ManufacturersBank & Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Rossen
Furniture Co.,26 held that if a creditor sues a non-resident debtor and gets
the latter before the court personally, and if the debtor then dies, the proper
remedy of the creditor is not in equity but rather in the probate court for
the appointment of an administrator to represent the decedent in the
pending action, thus reviving it.
24. 348 Mo. 48, 152 S. W. (2d) 106 (1941).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7.
26. 348 Mo. 1177, 159 S. W. (2d) 276 (1941).
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III. CoNrsTs

Two cases decided in 1941 deal with the question of whether the will
was executed in accordance with proper formalities.27 It is believed that
discussion of them on these points is not necessary, inasmuch as no new
28
principles were enunciated therein.

Five cases disposed of in 1941 dealt with the problems of undue influence, or fraud, or capacity, or a mixture of these factors.29 It is not
believed that extended discussion of them would be of value, but the moral
to be derived from them is clear. Trying to upset wills on any of these
grounds is a risky business.30 It may be that to defeat a motion for a
directed verdict for proponents the courts require a little more evidence to
be introduced than is normally required in other civil cases. If this be true,
we may ask whether such a position may be justified. The answer would
seem to be in the affirmative, for two reasons-one, that right the jury
trial is not a constitutional right in cases involving contests of wills, 31 and
its confiscation will therefore not cause so much concern; two, that the
evidence in most cases of this character is so likely to lead to wrong inferences, and is so apt to be tainted with fraud or bad faith, that strict
handling of it becomes mandatory, in order to protect proponents as well
as contestants.

2

In Palm v. Maguire,83 the court pointed out what has been enunciated
before in previous Missouri cases, 34 that sufficient interest in a contestant as
27. Palm v. Maguire, 347 Mo. 189, 146 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941); Deckers

Estate, 348 Mo. 32, 152 S. W. (2d) 104 (1941).

28. Palm v. Maguire, supra, is discussed briefly near the end of the subject

matter of the present division (Contests).
29. Hennings v. Hallar, 347 Mo. 827, 149 S. W. (2d) 338 (1941); Walter v.
Alt, 348 Mo. 53, 152 S. W. (2d) 135 (1941); Hahn v. Brueseke, 348 Mo. 708, 155
S. W. (2d) 98 (1941); Kadderley v. Vossbrink, 149 S. W. (2d) 869 (Mo. 1941),
discussed in (1942) 7 Mo. L. Ruv. 188; Odom v. Langston, 347 Mo. 1201, 152
S. W. (2d) 124 (1941).
30. Of the five cases decided by the supreme court in 1941, involving questions of capacity, undue influence and fraud, only two were allowed to go to the
jury. In one of the latter, the jury sustained the will. In the courts of appeal, three

cases involving the same types of problems were decided during 1941, and only
two were allowed to go to the jury. In one of the latter, the jury sustained the will.
31. ATYINSON, WILLS (1937), p. 479.
32. The author knows of no case in which the court specifically argued along
these lines, but that is not unusual in view of the controversy which would arise
as to the validity of such an argument, if made, and also in view of the fact that
the great majority of wills cases have not been read by the author.
33. 347 Mo. 189, 146 S. W. (2d) 636 (1941).
34. Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S. W. (2d)
935, 129 A. L. R. 316 (1940); Jensen v. Hinderks, 338 Mo. 459, 92 S. W. (2d)

108 (1936).
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to the testator's estate is a jurisdictional requirement. Proponent is not precluded by failing to demur from raising a question as to whether contestant
has sufficient interest upon which to base a contest. The court did not elaborate upon this important procedural problem, since it found that contestant
had alleged and proved an interest in himself sufficient to support his contest,
IV. CONSTRUCTION

Three cases in 1941 involved problems of construction." The only
one of the three meriting discussion is the case of Kingston v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co.,88 where the court allowed a suit for a declaratory judgment of
proper construction of a will. The court said that the rights of the parties
could be adjudicated and if plaintiffs were found to have none, the suit
should not be dismissed, as in the case of the orthodox equity bill to construe a will, but rather, the court decree should recite the rights or lack
thereof. Practically, the distinction meant that the plaintiff was entitled to
have the estate bear reasonable expenses for legal services, in spite of an
adjudication that he had no rights. The court does not say whether all
types of plaintiffs, including non bona fida, would be treated in the same way.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JOHN S. MARSALEK*

Not many cases involving the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act
are now coming before the supreme court. There were sixteen such cases
in 1939, eight in 19401 and four in 1941. The grounds upon which such
cases can reach the-supreme court are somewhat limited. The validity of the
act in most of its aspects, as against objections based upon the constitution,
has already been determined, 2 thus closing one avenue by which compensa35. Price v. Gordon, 347 Mo. 354, 147 S. W. (2d) 609 (1941); Legg v.
Wagner, 155 S. W. (2d) 146 (Mo. 1941); Kingston v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
348 Mo. 448, 154 S. W. (2d) 39 (1941).
36. Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S. W. (2d)
935, 129 A. L. R. 316 (1940); Jensen v. Hinderks, 338 Mo. 459, 92 S. W. (d
108 (1936).
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B. Washington University, 1910.
1. Mo. L. REv., Vol. 6, No. 4, Nov. 1941; Potter, Work of the Missouri

Supreme Court for the Year 1940 (Workme's Compensation) (1941) 6 Mo. L.
REv. 507.
2.

DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S. W. (2d) 640 (1931);

Oren v. Swift & Co., 330 Mo. 869, 51 S. W. (2d) 59 (1932).
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tion cases could reach the court.' The court's jurisdiction over appeals, on
the ground that the amount involved exceeds $7500, does not extend to
cases of accidental injury resulting in awards of a specified sum per week
during the continuance of disability, even though the award states the
maximum period during which compensation is payable and the total, if
paid, would exceed $7500. In such cases the continuance of the weekly payments depends upon contingencies, whereas to confer jurisdiction upon the
court the requisite jurisdictional sum must be involved in any event.4
Where the injury results in death, however, the compensation to which the
dependents are entitled, although payable in weekly installments, is "a
single total death benefit," and the supreme court has jurisdiction over the
appeal if the total awarded exceeds $7500.r
Occasional cases come before the court on petitions for certiorarito the
courts of appeal, based upon allegations that the opinion of the court of
appeals conflicts with a controlling opinion of the supreme court.6 Compensation questions also come before the court for decision in common law
suits for damages, where the amount involved meets the jurisdictional requirement, and the defendant pleads the compensation act in bar. 7 It can
be readily seen, however, from the foregoing outline, that the routine
handling of appeals in compensation cases falls to the courts of appeal,
and that the great majority of compensation cases terminate there.
Fisk v. Welsville Fire Brick Co.8 was the only opinion rendered in 1941

dealing with a question within the compensation field not previously considered by the court. The defendant, a firebrick manufacturer located in
Missouri, sold to an Illinois concern an order of firebrick to be used in constructing core ovens. As an incident of the sale defendant agreed to construct the ovens and sent its foreman to Quincy, Illinois, for this purpose.
The foreman, pursuant to defendant's authority, employed laborers, among
them the plaintiff, Fisk, to do the work. Fisk sustained an accidental injury
in the course of the work and to recover therefor filed a claim against defendant before the Illinois Industrial Commission.
3. Dickey v. Holmes, 208 Mo. 664, 106 S. W. 511 (1907); State v. Swift &
Co., 270 Mo. 694, 195 S. W. 996 (1917).
4. Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 340 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. (2d) 592 (1937);
Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., 334 Mo. 508, 66 S. W. (2d) 147 (1933).
5. Shroyer v. Missouri Livestock Commission Co., 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S. W.
(2d) 713 (1933).
6. State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 349 Mo. 319, 153 S. W.
(2d) 40 (1941).
7. Tindall v. Marshall's U. S. Auto Supply Co., 348 Mo. 1189, 159 S. W.
(2d) 302 (1941).
8. 348 Mo. 73, 152 S. W. (2d) 113 (1941).
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Defendant was not licensed to do business in Illinois and had named no
agent in that state upon whom process against it could be served. To obtain
service upon defendant, plaintiff proceeded under a section of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act which required every party taking any
proceedings under the Act to file with the industrial commission his address, or the name or address of a service agent, and permitting service upon
the party either personally or by registered mail address to him or the
agent: provided that in the event such party had not so filed his name or the
name and address of an agent, service of any notice could be had by filing
the notice with the industrial commission. Defendant had not filed its
address or nominated a service agent under this section. Fisk attempted to
obtain service upon the defendant by filing notices with the industrial commission. All such notices were forwarded by the commission, by registered
mail, to defendant at its plant in Missouri and received by it. The defendant at no time entered its appearance in the Illinois proceedings. Fisk obtained an award of compensation against defendant, filed the award in the
Circuit Court of Adams County, Illinois, and there obtained judgment
against defendant thereon. He recovered judgment against defendant, on
the Illinois judgment, in Missouri. Upon appeal by the defendant to the
Supreme Court of Missouri, the judgment was reversed, on the ground that
the attempted service upon defendant in the proceedings in Illinois was
invalid. The court pointed out that the section of the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act upon which plaintiff relied does not require that a nonresident who becomes an employer under the act thereby make the commission his service agent, and that in addition to this omission, the section
does not require the claimant or the commission, when service is made
upon the commission, to take such steps as would make it reasonably probable that notice of the service would be communicated to the nonresident
employer. The opinion includes a valuable review of the applicable federal
and state authorities.
The opinion serves to call attention to the fact that the Missouri
Workmen's Compensation Act includes no valid provision for service upon
nonresidents having no service agents in the state.9
A provision requiring any nonresident having employees working in
this state to file with the commission the name and address of a resident
service agent, and upon failure to do so appointing the Secretary of State
9. Mo. Ruv.

STAT.

(1939) § § 3735, 3761.
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as service agent for such nonresident, with proper provisions insuring the
forwarding of notices by the Secretary of State would be a desirable addition to the act.
Tindall v. Marshall's U. S. Auto Supply Co.1° was an appeal by the
defendant from a judgment in a damage suit. Plaintiff alleged that he contracted an occupational disease while in defendant's employ. The defense
was a general denial and a plea that the defendant was operating under
the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, and if plaintiff was injured as
alleged, his claim was governed by the act and the circuit court was withoutjurisdiction. The defendant had not elected to accept the section of the act
relating to occupational diseases, but did accept its other provisions. From
sometime in July to the latter part of December, plaintiff was employed
in defendant's department where automobile accessories were installed and
serviced. Due to the operation of motors, carbon monoxide gas was generally present. On occasions the gas affected the employee temporarily, but
he recovered when he got out into the open air. On a very cold day in
December, when the doors and ventilators of the room where he worked
were kept closed, the plaintiff suffered a severe poisoning and collapsed as a
result of inhaling the fumes. The evidence established that noxious gases
are common in such establishments, but not that they are commonly present
in such harmful quantity as to cause disease or injury; that when the latter
condition exists it is caused by shutting off the flow of air from the outside.
The court held that such an occurrence comes within the definition of the
word "accident," within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that the plaintiff could not recover damages at common law for
his alleged injury. The court distinguished the case from one involving an
occupational disease, which is a natural incident or result of a particular
employment and is peculiar to it, developing gradually from long continued
work at the employment, and held that in the instant case there was no
substantial proof of gradual or cumulative poisoning, but that on the contrary the injury was due to the closing of the doors of the establishment on
a very cold day. The court also distinguished the ruling from Joyce v. LuseStevenson Co.," in which the court held that pneumonia contracted from
working in a damp subbasement did not constitute an accident within the
compensation act, because it resulted from exposure in the ordinary course
10. 348 Mo. 1189, 159 S. W. (2d) 302 (1941).

11. 346 Mo. 58, 139 S. W. (2d) 918 (1940).
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of the employment, and not from an abnormal or unforeseen condition
arising more or less suddenly.
In comparing the Joyce and Tindall cases, it should be noted that in
neither case did the evidence present the distinguishing features of an occupational disease. In the Tindall case, the elements of "accident" were present
and plaintiff's right of recovery was consequently governed by the compensation act. In the Joyce case no element of accident was involved, and
consequently an award of death benefits under the compensation act was
reversed.
The opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Jukl v. HussmanLigonier Co. 2 was quashed by the supreme court on certiorari,in State ex
rel..Hssman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes.s Juhl, the claimant, while in the
employ of relator, and while carrying a bucket weighing about forty-five
pounds, felt a sharp pain in his chest. He had often lifted and carried the
same weight without any ill effect. The pain became more intense and he
was taken to his home. From that time until his death many months later,
he was ill, unable to work or take much exercise and was frequently under
medical care. He was about sixty-seven years of age and had done heavy
manual work during much of his life. He filed' a claim for compensation
alleging that his illness was due to an accident. The testimony showed that
his trouble had been diagnosed as a coronary occlusion, and that he had
suffered from this condition on a previous occasion. The condition was
described as a closure of one of the arteries which supply the heart muscle
with blood, usually by a blood clot. The physician who testified stated that
in his opinion the strain of lifting the bucket loosened the blood clot and
accounted for the occlusion. The commission, denying compensation, ruled
that the evidence failed to show an accident; that the employee was not
subjected to any unusual strain or exertion but was doing the usual and
ordinary work incidental to his employment, and that the disability of which
he complained was the result of natural causes.
The award was affirmed by the circuit court. The St. Louis Court of
Appeals reversed the circuit court on the theory that the injury itself supplied the elements of an accident. The supreme court, holding that the
opinion of the court of appeals conflicted with its rulings in DeLille v.
12.
13.

146 S. W. (2d) 106 (Mo. 1940).
348 Mo. 319, 153 S. W. (2d) 40 (1941).
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Holton-Seelye
Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson
said that the injury
itself does not constitute an "event" or "accident," as defined in the act,
and that to so hold would make the act provide for insurance against disease
and injury rather than against accident.
In Weaver v. Norwich, PharinacalCo.,3' the court reaffirmed and applied its previous ruling that where an employee abandons or steps aside
from his employment and engages in work or pleasure purely his own and
while so engaged receives accidental injury, the accident does not arise out
of and in the course of the employment and is not compensable.
CRIMINAL LAW
LAURENCE HOLMAN*

The Missouri Supreme Court, during the year 1941, decided forty-five
criminal appeals; thirty-one of these cases were affirmed, eight reversed and
remanded for a new trial, five reversed outright and one misdemeanor which
had been appealed to the supreme court on account of an alleged constitutional question was ordered transferred to the court of appeals. The writer
was surprised to learn that only an average of about fifty criminal cases
a year are appealed to the supreme court. This is less than one case for
every two counties in the state. We can well be proud of this showing as
it is an indication first, that there is no large number of serious crimes
committed in the state and second, that our criminal statutes and principles
have been so well defined and settled and are so skillfully and fairly applied
in the trial courts that most defendants are not required to request our
highest court to correct errors committed in circuit court trials.
Most of the cases decided during 1941 were disposed of by the application of established rules and principles to the facts and situations in the
particular cases. This review will not be burdened by a reference to these
cases unless they happen to involve some particularly interesting or novel
situation. The decisions as a whole are entirely satisfactory and indicate
trends that are proper and praiseworthy. In reading the cases the writer
was able to perceive a definite tendency on the part of the court to "min14. 334 Mo. 464, 66 S. W. (2d) 834 (1933).
15. 346 Mo. 58, 139 S. W. (2d) 918 (1940).
16. 347 Mo. 995, 149 S. W. (2d) 846 (1941).
*Prosecuting Attorney, Randolph County. LL.B., University of Missouri,
1929.
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imize the importance of form and to relax the great strictness and technical
accuracy required of criminal charges at common law which considered
form so essential that it could not be distinguished from substance."
In State v. Nienaber,' the information was attacked because it did not
allege that the acts were committed with "felonious" intent. The court
held the information sufficient, stating that generally speaking the word
felonious had been considered essential, but where the information otherwise charges a felony, this particular word was not necessary in order to
inform the accused of the nature and form of the crime alleged to have been
committed. In the case of State v. Held,2 it was decided that an information
which insufficiently charged a prior conviction under the so-called habitual
criminal law, would not call for a reversal where it was evident that the
jury disregarded the prior conviction and failed to convict under said law.
In State v. Biven, the court was most liberal in upholding an information
charging first degree robbery which described the money and property
stolen in the following language: "... . about ................
dollars, good and lawful money of the United States of the value of ................
dollars and check
for the payment of money in the amount and value of about $200.00, same
being the money, goods. . . ." It was held that while the information was
be model it was sufficient after verdict, there having been no previous attack upon it, because it appeared from the information that some money
was taken and no particular amount is required to constitute robbery. In
another case' the information was signed by a special prosecutor and complaint was made of the failure of the record to show an order appointing him.
The court properly held this was not reversible error as correct action on
the part of the trial court is presumed and the fact that the court permitted
him to act should be considered tantamount to appointment. The court conceded that there were certain errors of a purely technical nature committed in the trial of State v. Brickeyr but refused to reverse the case where
it appeared in a general way that the defendant obtained a fair trial and
his constitutional rights were substantially protected. In the case of State
v. Myers,' the appellant contended that the state failed to make a case
for the jury because the information alleged that the chickens stolen
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

347 Mo. 615, 148 S. W. (2d) 1024 (1941).
347 Mo. 508, 148 S. W. (2d) 508 (1941).
151 S. W. (2d) 1114, 1116 (Mo. 1941).
State v. Bockman, 348 Mo. 656, 154 S. W. (2d) 781 (1941).
348 Mo. 248, 152 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1941).
147 S. W. (2d) 444 (Mo. 1941).
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belonged to J. E. Morrison, when the undisputed testimony disclosed that
they belonged to Morrison and his wife. The court overruled the contention,
holding that the information supported the proof and evidently considered
that the variance between the charge and proof was not material.
While the above decisions disclose a tendency on the part of the court
to disregard matters of form, there were two opinions involving questions of
first impression in this state, which illustrate that the court continues jealously to protect and uphold the fundamental constitutional righs of persons
charged wih crimes in this state. In State v. Conway,7 complaint was made
of the action of the trial court in permitting the prosecuting attorney to
show, upon cross-examination of the defendant, that she did not testify at the
preliminary hearing, and to argue this point to the jury. There is no
question but that it is error to allude either directly or indirectly to the
defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf, but in some jurisdictions
the courts have followed the rule that if a defendant does not testify at his
preliminary but does testify at the trial, he thereby waives the privilege
against self-incrimination," for the reason that while his failure to testify at
the preliminary does not necessarily tend to prove his guilt or innocence, it
does bear on his credibility as a witness. Our court, however, in the Conway
case adopted the view that the privilege applies to preliminary trials and
is not waived by the defendant subsequently testifying in his own behalf,
for -the very cogent and convincing reasons set out in detail in the opinion.9
7. -348 Mo. 580, 154 S. W. (2d) 128 (1941).
8.. Commonwealih v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 40 N. E. 189 (1895); People
v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 189 N. W. 92 (1922); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 34
S. W. 227, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1214 (1896).
9. 348 Mo. 580, 588, 154 S. W. (2d) 128, 134 (1941). "In the first place,
the privilege against self-incrimination is a part of the Bill of Rights, a personal
privilege, guaranteed by the Constitution in unambiguous language; and the statutory protection against comment, by court or counsel, is a plain legislative
mandate, the underlying policy of which is and was for the draftsmen of the acts
and not the courts. Secondly, since it is a right and privilege granted the citizen,
he should be permitted to exercise it with complete freedom and not at the peril
of being impeached by it in the event that he should ever attempt to assert his
innocence. No suspicion or incrimination should follow the assertion of a constitutionally given right. Thirdly, it is just as logical to assert that a qualification
of the privilege would and does operate to bring pressure on an accused to testify
in the first instance for fear of the consequences of his silence in the event of a
trial as it is to say that it does not so operate. Or, to say that he might remain
silent throughout lest his first silence be used against him. Fourth, the policy
of the two provisions is that 'no person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal case' and if he does not testify it shall not be commented
on or used against him. And fifth, as Judge Valliant said in Masterson v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 204 Mo. 507, loc. cit. 526, 103 S. W. 48, loc. cit. 54: 'We must not
interpret this provision of our Constitution as if it was designed to protect the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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State v. Dowling,'0 was a case in which it appeared that the defendant was
not arrested until more than a year after the crime was committed. At the
trial, a police officer was permitted to testify that after the defendant was
arrested he was questioned by him and stated that he wasn't going to say
anything until he had seen an attorney and when questioned further concerning his whereabouts since the alleged offense, refused to tell where
he had been. When the case was first submitted to the court, an opinion
was written affirming the defendant's conviction on the theory that while
the above statements ought not to have been proved, they were not incriminating and were therefore, not reversible error. However, a motion
for rehearing was granted and the present opinion was adopted, holding that
the admission of such testimony was reversible error. The constitutional
provision that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself was
indirectly violated by the admission of such testimony, showing that the
defendant, after arrest and while in custody, had theretofore been subject
to interrogation and stood on his constitutional rights. It was pointed out
that under our law when a defendant makes a damaging admission while
under arrest, it is admissible if voluntary. Proof of a defendant's refusal to
make such admission does not show voluntary action and yet may of itself
be very damaging in the minds of the jury.
It seems to the writer that both of the last mentioned cases were very
properly decided because the privileges granted for the protection of the
rights of defendants, whether of a constitutional or statutory nature, are
definitely not worth anything if they can be violated in the indirect manner attempted.
There was another question of first impression decided in this state
during the year. It will probably not arise often but should be of interest
to the bar. The defendant, in State v. Jacobson," was convicted of forgery
and appealed. Pending his appeal, the governor, upon recommendation of
the Board of Probation and Parole, granted him an unconditional pardon,
reciting in the certificate that he was convinced of the defendant's innocence.
The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that by accepting
guilty, nor should we presume that one who avails himself of it is hiding his guilt.
The object of the law is to protect the innocent, and the law still covers the man
with the presumption of innocence, even when he refuses to give testimony that
might be turned against himself.'"
10. 348 Mo. 589, 154-S. W. (2d) 749 (1941).
11. 348 Mo. 258, 152 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1941).
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the pardon the defendant waived his right to appeal. This motion was
opposed by the defendant who sought to have his case decided on the merits.
The court held that the ordinary rule that a pardon implies guilt, certainly
did not apply in this case because it appeared that the defendant had convinced the governor that he was innocent. It was further decided that the
questions involved were not rendered moot by reason of the pardon, because
the defendant is entitled to an opportunity to remove the stigma of conviction and to obliterate the record, as it could later be used against him in
a prosecution under our habitual criminal statute. The court, therefore,
considered the case on its merits and finding no reversible error, affirmed the
conviction. It may be noted that the defendant filed with the clerk of the
supreme court, the large number of documents, affidavits, etc., which he
had presented to the parole board and sought to have same considered as
newly discovered evidence. The court very properly refused such, observing
that the defendant was really seeking a trial de novo in the supreme court.
It was also suggested that as the case had been considered on the merits
the defendant might have waived the advantage of his pardon but because
such a ruling would utterly defeat the privileges granted the defendant in
the opinion he was very properly ordered discharged notwithstanding the
affirmance of the conviction.
A very close case of conviction upon circumstantial evidence is illustrated by the much publicised case of State v. LaMance. 2 The case was
reversed and remanded because of errors and the court did not pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence, but the difficulties that sometimes confront
our judges is well illustrated by the following statement in the opinion:
"Reading the evidence and the briefs has left our minds, at least the writer's
mind, in a state of confusion and with a desire to reach beyond the grave
and inquire of Mrs. LaMance what really occurred." One of the errors
upon which the case was reversed seemed particularly interesting. The court
refused to admit the testimony of a witness to the effect that the deceased,
a few days prior to the alleged murder, complained of her head hurting, stating that she had struck it against a car that afternoon. The offer of proof
was rejected because of hearsay. The supreme court was of the opinion that
the evidence should have been admitted because this injury in the opinion of
one of the expert witnesses might have contributed to her death. It was
stated by the court to be the rule in such cases that conversations had be12. 348 Mo. 484, 154 S. W. (2d) 110 (1941).
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tween the person whose health is in question and the witness are admissible,
even though made to a person other than a medical attendant. No reason
is given for this exception to the hearsay rule other than the observation
that such evidence would be of vital importance to the defense and the citation of a previous decision'3 wherein it is stated that such evidence might
have a material bearing in determining the bodily condition of the deceased
on the night of her death and while it is questionable how much weight
should be given the testimony, the defendant had the right to have it go to
the jury for what it was worth.
In State v. Richman," the defendant was convicted of obtaining
property under false pretenses' 5 when he gave a check for $700.00 for live
stock purchased at an auction, the payment of said check being refused by
the bank because of insufficient funds. The defendant contended that if
guilty at all, his offense was a misdemeanor under the statute relating to
giving checks with intent to defraud, etc.:1 The court upheld the defendant's contention on the theory that the two statutes were inconsistent and
-that the false pretense statute is of a general nature, whereas the check statute deals in a minute and particular way with the common subject and
therefore should prevail under the well established rule to that effect in
this state.
It might be of interest to mention briefly some of the other decisions
of the court even though they do not involve any new question of law. In
one case 7 the defendant was charged with burglary and larceny, the value
of the goods being alleged to be $4.00. His conviction of grand larceny
without a conviction of burglary was reversed because under those circumstances a value of $30.00 or more would have been required. The common law rule that a defendant is entitled to be brought into court free from
all shackles was reiterated in State v. Rice,'8 where the case was reversed
and remanded because the defendants were handcuffed together in open
court. In another case' 9 the cause was reversed and remanded because the
record was in a state of disorder and confusion and particularly because the
verdict did not appear in the record proper. Where an active conspiracy
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 14 S. W. (2d) 969 (1890).
347 Mo. 595, 148 S. W. (2d) 796 (1941).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4487.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4695.State v. Barbour, 347 Mo. 1033, 151 S. W. (2d) 1105 (1941).
347 Mo. 812, 149 S. W. (2d) 347 (1941).
State v. Gronholt, 147 S.W. (2d) 440 (Mo. 1941).
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was shown, a wife was held to be subject to conviction for a crime committed in the presence of her husband. 20 In State v. Price,1 a conviction
was reversed and remanded because the instructions did not correctly define
the offense of grand larceny and did not require the jury to find that the
taking was done feloniously, either by using "feloniously" or synonymous
words in the instructions. A wife was held to be a competent witness against
22
her husband where he was charged with an offense against her.

20. State v. Patton, 347 Mo. 303, 147 S. W. (2d) 467 (1941).
21. 348 Mo. 361, 153 S. W. (2d) 353 (1941).
22. State v. Koelzer, 348 Mo. 468, 154 S. W. (2d) 84 (1941).
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